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Continental Drift in the Legal Profession: 
The struggle for collective bargaining by Nova Scotia's Crown prosecutors. 
By Shelagh Mary Reva Campbell 
Abstract 
This dissertation explores the apparent contradiction between the independence 
and autonomy of an elite profession and the pursuit of collective bargaining. Crown 
prosecutors employed in the Canadian public service bureaucracy are full members of the 
legal profession and also form a clearly recognized group of subordinated employees. 
Their need for prosecutorial independence clashes with management control in the 
context of dependent employment. This study examines the implications of a changing 
workplace and a changing profession for professional workers' choices of collective 
action. A case study of the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association experience and its 
members' struggle for collective bargaining rights forms the basis of this research. The 
study probes the question of how prosecutors move between two distinct strategies of 
labour process control and examines the implications of collective bargaining for 
professionalization. The research findings identify the existence of an occupational 
community within the broader legal profession. The occupational community reflects the 
marginalization of Crown prosecutors within their profession. Using narrative analysis of 
prosecutors' own stories of their career and labour struggles, the research reveals how 
this occupational community reflects the specialization and fragmentation of the 
profession and supports a unique work ethic and sense of professionalism among Crown 
prosecutors. Mobilization of prosecutors to demand bargaining rights, otherwise 
forbidden by law, is achieved with the use of specific language around fairness. This 
language has meaning and power in both a professional context as well as in the world of 
dependent employment, organization policy, and management decision making. An 
ethos of fairness enables Crown prosecutors to reconcile two competing logics of 
collective action, and to reclaim the benefits of professionalization eroded through 
dependent employment. 
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Chapter 1 The Story of Nova Scotia Crown Prosecutors 
"No man is an island entire of itself, 
every man is a piece of the continent"1 
The Hollywood version of the prosecutor as a solitary crusader for justice does 
not mesh well with the realities of Canadian public service bureaucracy. Independence 
and autonomy clash with management control in situations of dependent employment. 
Prosecutors are not islands of criminal justice, but form a clearly recognized group of 
subordinated employees. The group is connected to the larger profession, which itself is 
shifting over time. This dissertation examines the implications of a changing workplace 
and a changing profession for professional workers' choices of collective action. 
The work of prosecuting alleged criminals on behalf of the people - public 
prosecution - has evolved over time in the province of Nova Scotia. In the early days of 
the province's justice system there were no public employees who made a career of this 
work (Stager & Arthurs, 1990). Rather, lawyers in private practice would take on 
prosecution cases at the request of the Attorney General, who was an elected member of 
the legislature. The engagement of private lawyers on a per diem basis (hire for the day) 
still exists in Nova Scotia today as a reminder of how far the employment relationship 
has changed. As the population of the province grew, and with it the volume of crime 
and increasing complexity of the criminal code, the Attorney General appointed lawyers 
John Donne 1624, MEDITATION XVII Devotions upon Emergent 
Occasions 
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to full time prosecutor positions in the Department of Justice (Archibald, 1989). These 
appointments were through an Order in Council and were political patronage 
appointments, not the result of an open job competition. Employees thus appointed 
served "at pleasure", which means they could be dismissed when one government fell 
and another Attorney General was elected. Over time and with increasing public scrutiny 
and sophistication in the public service, more and more prosecutors came to positions 
through a competition and following the proclamation of the Public Prosecution Act of 
1990 all remaining Attorney General appointees were converted to civil service status. 
All new hires from that point forward have been civil service appointments through 
competitive job posting. Crown prosecutors are thus relatively recent civil servants and 
have enjoyed a regular, permanent employment relationship with their employer as a 
cohesive group for less than two decades. 
The legal profession, as one of the elite professions, is renowned for the extent to 
which it values autonomy (Rosenberg, 2009); autonomy which has been closely tied to a 
traditional private legal practice and self employment. As a result, lawyers have been 
very reluctant to embrace any form of collectivism in the workplace. The legal 
profession's governing body expresses the profession's values in the form of codes of 
ethics and a duty to the public interest. These values are nurtured in students from the 
earliest days of law school training. Socialization of new lawyers to a common 
worldview perpetuates the professional norms and upholds individual discretion in 
decision-making and independence as the profession's highest ideals. Other occupations, 
such as teachers and nurses, also exist in structured permanent employment relationships 
2 
with a public sector employer. These other professions have developed collective 
bargaining over terms and conditions of employment and recently have become full 
members of the trade union movement. Practicing lawyers, however, have been excluded 
from bargaining by statute. Both the Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, which governs 
private sector employment and the Public Service Collective Bargaining Act have 
specific provisions preventing lawyers from engaging in collective bargaining with their 
employers . Some authors' analysis of unionization among professionals suggests the 
model of industrial trade unionism that has traditionally been geared to blue collar 
workers and large workplaces is not appropriate to the needs and concerns of professional 
employees and may in fact be of questionable value (Black & Silver, 2006; Hurd, 2000, 
2005). They suggest the growth of the union movement lies in traditional appeals to class 
ideology and that a different model of collective action is needed for professionals. 
Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors, however, broke away from professional tradition 
to form the very union-like Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association (NSCAA). The 
NSCAA attempted to engage the employer in collective bargaining, and took the extreme 
step of an illegal strike in June 1998, shutting down the courts for two days. This attempt 
to pressure the employer into meeting demands for an independent salary setting 
mechanism was successful, and talks eventually lead to a form of "voluntary recognition" 
of the NSCAA as the bargaining agent for public prosecutors. The employer voluntary 
2 The BC Health Services decision of the Supreme Court of Canada ("Health Services and Support 
- Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia" 2007) may have the effect of removing this 
limitation on collective bargaining; to date the threat alone of invoking this decision has been sufficient to 
advance the bargaining agenda of the Crown prosecutors in Nova Scotia. 
3 
recognized the NSCAA for the purposes of bargaining over working conditions although 
by statue they were not required to do so. Half of the provincial jurisdictions in Canada 
currently have collective bargaining for Crown prosecutors and the rest are moving 
towards this status with the support of a strong national association. The story of how the 
Nova Scotia prosecutors achieved collective bargaining reveals unique characteristics of 
the working conditions of the employed professional. The reasons why Crown 
prosecutors in Nova Scotia sought collective bargaining and the effect this struggle for 
bargaining had on them and their place in the legal profession is the subject of my 
research. An analysis of the way that prosecutors framed their concerns and how they 
describe their professional and employment roles will help us to understand the structural 
aspects of a profession and the nature of the relationships between professionals and their 
employers. 
When a group protects itself and its activities through rules and restrictions on 
access it practices closure. A profession that restricts the entry of members to a select 
few (Weber, 1947) practices exclusionary closure (Parkin, 1979). A trade union that 
challenges the power structure of an employer and strives to reclaim some control over 
the rules and conditions of work, practices usurpationary closure (Parkin, 1979). Some 
groups both restrict entry and challenge the restrictions of others. The Nova Scotia 
Crown prosecutors participate in both practices, called dual closure. As members of the 
Nova Scotia Barrister's Society they participate in control over who can enter the 
profession. Prosecutors also challenge the limits and rules of the employer through 
collective bargaining. Parkin (1979), however, questions the compatibility of professions 
4 
and the labour movement. He says the two groups do not share views sufficient to build 
solidarity that can overcome class boundaries. Traditional class theories highlight a 
distinction between the owners of the means of production and those they exploit. 
Nevertheless, many professionals are found in dependent employment and thus in 
positions of subordination to an employer. Employer control may be formal, through 
rules and procedure manuals, or real through intense atomization of the labour process. 
This apparent contradiction between control over knowledge as a means of production 
and dependence on an employer for the context and tools of production presents a 
theoretical challenge. Rather than limit the utility of closure theory, this dual 
development opens up a new perspective on professionalization. A closer examination of 
this case reveals occasions where the tools of multiple forms of closure are applied to 
further a group's professional aims. The Nova Scotia prosecutors form a case where 
reality has surpassed the literature. 
The Research Proposal 
The literature on professionalization describes the formation and coalescence of 
occupational groups into social structures whose aim is to establish and protect as close a 
monopoly as possible on their service. In return for this effort, professionals reap 
financial and status rewards and often enjoy privileged relationships with state regulators. 
Hinings (2001) traces an evolution of the study of professions in which he notes different 
stages of research; stages that focus in turn on definition, structure, monopoly, closure, 
labour process and politicization of professions. Current research on professional service 
firms examines the response of the professions to dramatic fluctuations in economic 
5 
stability and emphasis on profitability and economic survival (Hinings, 2005; Muzio, 
Ackroyd, & Chalat, 2008; Muzio & Hodgson, 2008). The case of Nova Scotia Crown 
prosecutors is an opportunity to revisit some of the core elements of the literature on 
professions and examine how the two strategies of professionalization and collective 
bargaining relate to existing bodies of theory. 
There is a growing body of research into the employed professionals in private 
sector firms, specifically the experience of lawyers in private practice (Muzio et al., 2008; 
Muzio & Hodgson, 2008). Despite the growth of collective bargaining among 
professionals (Hurd, 2005; White, 1993) there is little that links collective bargaining 
with professions, and some research indicates professionalization generates hostility 
towards bargaining (Stern & Murphy, 1980). This doctoral research project examines 
professionalization in the context of labour relations. The project draws upon the 
literature of professionalization and examines the labour relations experiences of 
members of an elite profession, lawyers, when they engage in collective bargaining. Two 
formerly opposing approaches to social closure and protection are combined in the 
Crown prosecutors' experience when they bargain with their employer over terms and 
conditions of employment and remain members of the legal profession. A number of 
contrasts confront Crown prosecutors in their work relationships with legal colleagues. 
Prosecutors work side by side with peer members of the Barristers' Society to whom they 
are subordinate in a management hierarchy; they work in collaboration with the defence 
bar who are lawyers either in private practice or in non-unionized jobs with Nova Scotia 
Legal Aid. On the surface members of the same profession fill all of these different roles, 
6 
yet they are subtly different in the way their work is organized and controlled. 
Prosecution is essential work in our society and yet fundamental characteristics of this 
work have not been explored in either the labour relations literature or the sociology of 
the professions literature. 
This study examines public prosecution as a subset of the legal profession. The 
analysis described in the chapters that follow takes into consideration the history of Nova 
Scotia's prosecution service in particular, in order to explore the issues and the forces 
behind the struggle for collective bargaining in this subset of the profession of law. 
Benefits that the profession in a broad sense guarantees its members, such as economic 
power, are eroded when professionals become dependent employees for a single 
employer. In dependent employment, no matter how collegial, professionals give up 
some measure of control over their own work. One aspect of the closure strategy of 
collective bargaining is a desire to regain control over workers' labour process. The 
labour process refers to the specification of work practices and the application of 
expertise to solve work problems. A mechanic might describe her labour process in 
terms of the tools she uses, the steps in disassembling a machine, the diagnosis of trouble 
that she sees, and the nature of the repairs she makes as well as the way in which she 
makes those repairs. Her apprenticeship has laid down much of the knowledge and skill 
required to execute these processes, and her employer controls many terms and 
conditions of the work. The lawyer's work also involves the application of knowledge 
and skill developed through training and a form of apprenticeship. However, the process 
of the lawyer's work is somewhat invisible, particularly the application of discretion and 
7 
judgment. Decision making in prosecution involves complex application of legal 
principles and case law as well as the fundamental decisions of whether or not to proceed 
with a prosecution. This decision best reflects the concept of public interest in a 
profession; a professional acts not only in the pursuit of her own living, but in the public 
interest as holder of a public trust. Some of the autonomy that derives from an 
unfettered, self-regulated labour process is limited by organizational constraints in 
dependent employment. Constraints can take the form of rules and procedures such as a 
policy manual. The Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors chose collective bargaining to 
influence terms of employment to protect and reclaim some of their professional power, 
autonomy, and benefits such as the income that they sacrificed when they choose to 
practice law as employed public servants. 
If a lack of control flows from dependent employment, where workers are 
contracted "in service" rather than entering a "contract for service" and collective 
bargaining helps to restore this control, what other dimensions of professional work also 
change? Does the move to dependent employment in the public service somehow affect 
the professionalism of lawyers? Does the legal profession as practiced by public 
prosecutors revert to an occupation where members are subject to an employer's code of 
practice and mechanics of prosecution? In an occupation governed by codes of practice 
there are correct and less correct methods of practice which are monitored by non-
professionals (Braverman, 1998). In the case of public prosecutions, these modes of 
practice are also publicly monitored and critiqued in the media. The exercise of 
professional discretion may also be jeopardized in dependent employment. The 
8 
application of specialized knowledge may be coded into operations manuals and usurped 
by management in the performance appraisal process and through the accountability 
framework of government departments. As a result, the autonomy of the profession may 
be diminished in reality as well as in structure. Once a professional becomes employed, 
does she cease to be a professional, whether through deprofessionalization (Rothman, 
1984) or proletarianization (Johnson, 1972; Rosen, 1999)? An employed professional 
may also feel a shifting loyalty away from the profession and toward the employing 
organization. Crown prosecutors appear to be subject to the same limits on their labour 
process as other employed workers. If prosecutors' struggle for collective bargaining is 
an attempt to control their labour process and to redirect the financial and tenure security 
from the workplace into their non-work lives (Murphy, 1984), one might conclude that 
the membership in a profession has somehow failed to live up to its promise. 
The results of this research will show that collective bargaining reflects another 
dimension of the legal profession as practiced by Crown prosecutors. Collective 
bargaining is a way to establish and maintain status and power of a sub-segment of the 
profession we know as criminal prosecution. While collective bargaining is a strategy 
associated with subordinate employees who strive to reclaim power from an employer, 
bargaining also serves to enhance the public status, rewards, and solidarity of the 
profession. In effect, collective bargaining helps the sub-segment of the profession to 
achieve social closure for Crown prosecutors and the attendant benefits when the 
traditional means of restricting entry and establishing a market monopoly for a service 
have failed. 
9 
Collective bargaining was not achieved solely because Crown prosecutors moved 
from self-employment to dependent employment. This change did focus attention on 
their diminished power to control their labour process, however the status of permanent 
employee also lead to a stronger sense of occupational community among prosecutors. 
An occupational community emerges among workers when they share an occupation or a 
workplace. Such a community is drawn together through a number of distinct elements, 
including intensity of involvement in work, extended relationships with coworkers that 
bridge home and work life, and socialization to a work identity (Salaman, 1971a). 
Preliminary research in to the legal profession in Nova Scotia indicates that intensity of 
involvement and socialization to a work identity are very strong elements of the 
profession in general. In many cases, extended relationships also develop within the 
profession. Salaman's work on architects reveals how professionals will form an 
occupational community beyond their own workplaces, which is often true of lawyers in 
private practice. However, marginalization also plays a role in nurturing occupational 
communities. Members of marginalized groups, such as midwives , share a common 
view of the role and importance of their profession and will be drawn together in an 
attempt to highlight the value of their occupation (Larkin, 1983). I hypothesize that the 
existence of an occupational community among Crown prosecutors is an aspect of their 
employment experience that supported their struggle for collective bargaining. The 
existence of a strong occupational community permits prosecutors to embrace both the 
exclusionary closure of their profession and the usurpationary closure of collective 
bargaining without losing any sense of professionalism. The particular employment 
experiences of the Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors also play a role in this struggle. 
10 
The object of this research is to understand the factors that contributed to the 
Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors' struggle and ultimately their success in achieving 
collective bargaining. This study addresses numerous dimensions of the prosecutors' 
story. Chief among these dimensions is the impact of employment status on control of 
the labour process. This is followed by examining segmentation within the legal 
profession and exploring the existence, evolution, and dimensions of an occupational 
community among prosecutors. Finally, the study deals with the process by which 
professionals achieve interest representation, and the relationship between collective 
bargaining and other strategies of social closure for professionals who are dependent 
employees and whose managers are also their professional peers. Through a discussion 
of whether closure theory and the distinction between its different forms are still valid, I 
hope to contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon of professionals who bargain 
over their terms and conditions of employment. 
Research Site 
Nova Scotia is a particularly appropriate site for this study because the Nova 
Scotia Public Prosecution Service (PPS) has a unique relationship to the Government. 
Due to its history, the PPS is independent of the Department of Justice and under arms-
length superintendence only of the Minister of Justice. The Director of Public 
Prosecutions reports directly to the legislature and any direction or policy communication 
from the Minister of Justice must be made public, and published in the Royal Gazette. 
This structure was implemented in 1990 as a result of the report of the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution (Nova Scotia 1989), and 
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is intended to eliminate political interference in public prosecutions. The issue of 
independence in prosecutorial decision-making is particularly sensitive in Nova Scotia, 
and notions of autonomy and subordination are especially acute. Because of the 
considerable public scrutiny surrounding the Marshall Inquiry and the new organization 
structure, a distinct culture of independence has grown up around the PPS. Nova Scotia 
is not unique in its experience of public scrutiny and wrongful convictions like the 
Marshall case, however it is the first instance of an independent prosecution service in 
Canada, and thus an important opportunity to study the effect such a structure may have 
on the legal profession and employee representation in collective bargaining. A case 
study approach is well suited to examining the Nova Scotia experience as other studies of 
the process of labour mobilization and the institutionalization of collective power have 
shown (Haiven et al 2005). 
The research design included some archival research, focus groups and semi-
structured interviews. Participants included former and current Crown prosecutors, 
members of the executive of the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association and other 
key informants in the legal profession. The interviews generated narratives of key events 
in individual careers and in the struggle for collective bargaining. This data permits an 
analysis of the form and characteristics of collective action and the circumstances and 
context of job action incidents. Narratives also provide insight into the role and influence 
of power that is based in the profession, the employer, the civil service, and the criminal 
bar. The analysis of Crown prosecutors' stories enables exploration of the construct 
"professional" and how it is redefined by pursuing collective bargaining. The research 
12 
results show that conditions necessary to mobilize professionals to collective action 
include specialization in the profession, which in this case leads to dependent 
employment. In the workplace, professionals are positioned against each other in worker 
versus manager roles and finally, an occupational community emerges to unite 
marginalized professionals. 
Why This Research? 
There is little consideration of processes by which professionals define and 
achieve collective representation. Often they embrace the framework of industrial trade 
unions (i.e. nurses, teachers), a model which is becoming less and less relevant in 
emerging forms of work organization. Bargaining among professionals contains a dual 
problem, because the professional project is also less and less relevant for the forms of 
work that professionals find themselves in, namely dependent employment and 
unaffiliated networks. 
There is a general consensus that the contemporary workplace is fundamentally 
changing, in large part due to the forces of globalization. Much of the debate and 
research has examined the private sector, and the impact that changing work structures 
and relationships have on rates of unionization (Schnabel and Wagner 2005; Bentham 
2002; Verma, Kochan and Wood 2002). Significant questions have arisen regarding the 
impact these changes will have on the labour movement in the longer term, and how the 
movement will define its role in the new world of work. 
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There has also been an examination in recent years of the underlying tenets of 
professionalism and credentialization in the workforce (Haiven 1999; Cranford et al, 
2005) as these features become more common among Canadian workers. In addition, 
researchers have examined the public sector for career development and work-life quality 
issues from the perspective of "employer of choice" (Duxbury, et al 1999) in an effort to 
understand the dynamics of that workplace, and to influence public policy on employee 
retention. Professionalization and the public sector have never been combined to 
examine the process by which professionals, some of whom have been restricted in their 
legislative right to bargain collectively, come to achieve voluntary recognition and 
collective bargaining in the public sector. 
There is a growing body of literature in organization studies related to the nature 
of professional service firms (Muzio et al., 2008) and notably the legal profession. Little 
doubt remains that the tremendous changes to the world of work have touched the 
professions as well (Chreim, Williams, & Hinings., 2007; Powell, Brock, & Hinings, 
1999). However, many lawyers do not work as self-employed practitioners or in law 
partnerships. They work as employees of large public sector organizations, and have for 
some time. However, the employed prosecutor has not been studied in any detail 
(Gomme & Hall, 1995). The legal oeuvre has considered the duties and conflicts 
surrounding prosecutors and prosecution as MacNair (2002) notes, but the employment 
aspect of the Crown prosecutor's role is mentioned only in passing, where it surfaces at 
all. While there have been studies of occupations in traditional employment that are 
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professionalizing (Muzio & Hodgson, 2008) there are fewer opportunities to study cases 
of professions seeking collective representation in the workplace. 
The case of Nova Scotia prosecutors provides a valuable insight into the 
subordination of professional workers and the resulting struggle for collective bargaining 
over terms and conditions of employment. The advent of permanent employment and a 
formal structure to the labour process of prosecution is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
The public employer has sought formal control over the prosecution labour process by 
gathering prosecutors in one organization and controlling the resources necessary for 
their work. Real subordination has been more difficult to achieve, though the use of 
extensive policy manuals3 and to some extent, the socialization of the legal profession 
itself, combine to control the labour process of prosecutors. The prosecutors' struggle for 
collective bargaining is more recent still. The public sector is also a growing sector of 
employment in the service economy (Kumar & Schenk, 2006) and a source of important 
employment for professionals. More and more professionals are finding work in 
employment situations (White, 1993) in the public sector. This research is relevant as 
employers still seek to restrict representation and limit bargaining unit gains - see for 
example the 2008 attempt by the Ontario Public Service to fold Amapceo into OPSEU 
and the waves of "new public management". 
3 The table of contents from the Crown Attorney Manual for Nova Scotia prosecutors is included as 
Appendix D 
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Finally, prosecutors have a significant social impact; "the discretionary power 
exercised by the prosecuting attorney in initiation, accusation, and discontinuing 
prosecution, gives him more control over an individual's liberty and reputation than any 
other public official" (Grosman, 1970, p. 499). The volume of research into the function 
and legal aspects of substantive and procedural justice (MacNair, 2002) stands in contrast 
to the dearth of literature on the experience and issues of professional workers. Little has 
been written about the collective voice of these individuals as an actor in the labour 
process. Understanding the management of professionals in this regard is important to 
the broader study of contemporary organizations. 
This dissertation aims to challenge the idea of monolithic professions and 
professional work. Through an examination of a case where an elite profession 
successfully attains collective bargaining rights and maintains their role and membership 
in the profession I will demonstrate the institution of the legal profession is rapidly 
evolving. The work conditions facing lawyers have an impact upon their sense of 
professionalism as well as their understanding of labour rights and labour issues. By 
developing an occupational community, prosecutors create an ideology that binds them to 
the community and that gives them language that helps them to adopt bargaining as a 
new form of closure. Bargaining helps them to achieve their professional aims as well 
meeting their immediate workplace concerns. The two strategies, bargaining and 
professionalization, work together to reinforce the prosecutors' sense of identity in the 
workplace, in the criminal justice system, and in the broader profession. 
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The legal profession and prosecutors are important exemplars of the foregoing 
phenomenon. The legal profession is a dominant force in crafting and interpreting the 
framework of rules that governs society. Prosecutors are an arm of the state apparatus 
that enforces those rules. Every decision a prosecutor makes has the potential to impact 
legal precedent and all cases that follow. There are also individual and social 
implications of decisions whether to prosecute any given alleged offence. These 
implications extend to the lives of those directly affected, mental and financial wellbeing 
of the victims, alleged offenders and those who depend on them. The safety of as-yet 
unaffected members of society may also be implicated in such decisions. Prosecutors are 
also a vehicle for public policy on matters of criminal justice. In Nova Scotia, the Crown 
prosecutors bear the legacy of a criminal justice system in disarray. They became the 
bearers of a revised version of justice, and of public policy to remake public confidence 
in the justice system. 
Dissertation Outline 
The dissertation begins with a discussion of the theoretical framework in which 
professions and collective bargaining are situated in Chapter 2, Creating a Unified 
Theoretical Framework: Professionalization, Collective Action, and Occupational 
Community. The chapter describes a clash between the social importance of lawyers and 
prosecutors' legal diminishment within the profession and within the civil service. The 
discussion addresses closure theory and presents a closure continuum as an analytical 
tool. Occupational community is proposed as a framework to reconcile the different 
forms of closure used by Crown prosecutors. Chapter 2 concludes that legal 
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professionals, and Crown prosecutors in particular, are an under-studied subject, and the 
context of their work is of social and theoretical importance. The research problem of the 
study is posed as "How is it possible for professionals to move back and forth from 
usurpationary to exclusionary strategies of closure, using both versions of the collective 
action continuum, and still maintain full membership and support for both forms of 
collective to which they belong: the profession and the collective bargaining unit?" 
Chapter 3, Methodology: Collected Voices, describes the research design and the 
choice of case study. Much of the literature on the classical industrial relations problems 
of why people join collectives for bargaining purposes has been reduced to survey 
methodology based on industrial unionism. In order to overcome this limitation, the 
study uses narrative analysis of long interviews to uncover themes and critical incidents 
in the careers and bargaining struggles of Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors. Chapter 4, 
The Evolving Legal Profession: Specialization and Subordination of Nova Scotia Crown 
Prosecutors, describes the evolution of the legal profession in Canada. This chapter 
presents the stories of a wide range of lawyers and traces the specialization of prosecution 
as a sub-segment of the legal profession. The chapter provides a history of the Nova 
Scotia Public Prosecution Service and the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association 
and describes the circumstances leading to the demand for collective bargaining rights. 
The chapter concludes that an occupational community is possible as a subset of a 
profession. 
Chapter 5, Trials and Files: The Role of Occupational Community and Ideology, 
demonstrates the existence of an occupational community among Crown prosecutors and 
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includes a discussion of the narrative analysis of the research subjects' descriptions of 
their struggle for collective bargaining. The discussion in this chapter situates the 
struggle for collective bargaining within the professional strategies of closure that define 
and uphold the prosecutors' control over their labour process. The analysis in Chapters 4 
and 5 incorporates archival information from the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' 
Association and the Public Prosecution Service. Chapter 6, Conclusions and 
Recommendations, summarizes the research findings and addresses the limitations of the 
study and the implications for further research. 
I was drawn to this study through my own workplace experiences, first as a 
credentialed Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations professional and 
then as management's chief negotiator in bargaining between the Government of Nova 
Scotia and the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association. My understanding of the 
issues facing Crown prosecutors and their rationale for seeking bargaining was at odds 
with the spirit of the direction I received as a senior public servant in the execution of my 
duties. When my time in public service ended, I turned to this research in order to 
understand more fully the experience and motivations of Crown prosecutors from their 
side of the bargaining table. The study has not been without its dramatic moments, as 
labour struggles often are. It has helped me to formulate some clearer questions and 
some potential answers for other professional workers, wherever they find their chairs at 
the negotiation table. 
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Chapter 2 Creating a Unified Theoretical Framework: Professionalization, 
Collective Action and Occupational Community 
The goal of this chapter is to place the research problem in theoretical context. I will 
discuss three principle theoretical themes: professionalization, collective action, and 
occupational community. These themes are all arenas of worker control. I will talk 
about each theme in turn and then I will draw them together to show how these themes 
provide a way to understand my research problem. I will highlight workplace control as I 
review each theme and I will discuss the relevant theorists. I will situate my review of 
the literature in the context of contemporary employment conditions for public 
prosecutors, preparing the reader for the case study which follows. The theoretical 
discussion leads into the research problem for this study and the chapter concludes with a 
proposed framework which I will use to analyse my findings in subsequent chapters. I 
develop my discussion of the Crown prosecutors' case with a balance between the role of 
structure and the impact of individual and collective action. To accomplish this broader 
analysis I draw on theorists that may appear to offer contradictory arguments and I 
present a framework that unites these differing points of view. My description of the 
case of prosecutors who bargain collectively will then examine how these contradictions 
are reconciled in practice. 
Three Theoretical Themes 
The themes upon which the dissertation is based each address ways in which 
people organize their work: work spaces, work processes, the rules that govern workers, 
access to work, and the broader social relations of work. Each theme, 
professionalization, collective action and occupational community, is distinct because 
each takes a specific perspective on these various aspects of work. These perspectives 
are outlined in the following sections of this chapter. These themes are not arbitrarily 
chosen. Each theme explores a different forum of worker control. The manner in which 
the themes reinforce each other is the major contribution of this research. The 
combination of professionalization and collective bargaining is made possible through the 
presence of an occupational community. Leveraging this community enables prosecutors 
to achieve greater workplace control. 
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The work setting and work experiences of Crown prosecutors reflect each of the 
three theoretical themes. Through my analysis of the data I collected from lawyers across 
the country, I have developed a framework to help to understand the organization 
experiences of lawyers who practice criminal law and prosecutors in particular. Two of 
the classic bodies of theory on work and workers (sociology of the professions and labour 
process theory) on their own were not adequate to explain how prosecutors embrace very 
different strategies of workplace control. The legal profession professes a culture of 
individualism, while collective bargaining has its roots in the common good of its 
members. I have found that the literature on occupational community offers insights 
relevant to this particular case and provides what Astley and Van de Ven call "a more 
comprehensive understanding of organizational life, since only one school of thought 
invariably offers only a partial account of reality." (1983, p. 245) Crown prosecutors in 
Nova Scotia exhibit characteristics of an occupational community within their profession. 
Drawing occupational community into the analysis of prosecutors' struggle for collective 
bargaining provides insight into how prosecutors reconcile two apparently opposing 
approaches to workplace control. 
The first theme I will address is professionalization. By professionalization, I 
mean the strategies workers use to create and control their occupation. These strategies 
define the scope of work, who can perform this work, and how access to the occupation is 
regulated. An important goal of limiting access to an occupation is to protect or increase 
its market value (Parkin, 1998). The body of literature that addresses these strategies is 
professionalization. This literature describes the ways in which professions organize 
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themselves, their work processes, and their social relations. I will pay particular attention 
to the mechanisms professionals use to distinguish themselves as unique and the tension I 
note between individual autonomy and group membership. Within this theme there are 
several different approaches and key theorists whose work builds in a progression, which 
I will discuss later in this chapter. The professions in Canada have been studied from 
organizational and institutional perspectives, drawing on both the sociology of 
professions and the sociology of organizations (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; 
Hinings, 2005). These traditions emphasize structure and organizational forms over 
agency and capacity to act (Ackroyd, 1996; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003). An emphasis 
on structure is common in the literature on professionalization and collective action; 
however, I will balance this emphasis with a focus on the agency of individuals within 
their institutions. Incorporating occupational community into my analysis brings a 
balance to the structure/agency tension in the literature. 
A second important theoretical theme addresses collective action, and specifically 
collective bargaining. The literature in this theme comes from a variety of perspectives: 
political economy, sociology, and economics. Collective bargaining in North America 
has its roots primarily in the industrial economy, with economic gains as one of its 
principal aims. The rapid post-WWII economic expansion coincided with significant 
growth for the North American labour movement (Kumar & Schenk, 2006). Not 
coincidentally, bureaucratic forms expanded at the same time (Genoe-McLaren & Mills, 
2007) . Professions also rode the wave of business expansion in the post war period, 
including the burgeoning of the public sector where many professionals are employed 
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(Godard, 2005; Stager & Arthurs, 1990). Since the 1970s the decline in the industrial 
base in North America has lead the labour movement to focus predominantly on the 
service and public sectors (Kumar & Schenk, 2006). Union density, the proportion of 
workers eligible for union representation who are covered by a collective agreement4 has 
grown for professionals in the period between 1997 and 2003; health care professionals 
in particular grew from 39.9% to 42% and nurses from 78.1 to 81% density (Kumar & 
Schenk, 2006, p. 72). It is thus not surprising to see two formerly divergent strategies of 
work control, professionalization and collective bargaining brought into closer dialogue 
because of the shift in organizing activity to professional and service sectors of the 
economy. 
The literature based on the first two themes is criticized for an emphasis on forms 
and structure as determinants of social phenomena (Edwards, 2006; Kaufman, B. E., 
2008; Martin, 1999). An overemphasis on structure does not consider that organizational 
forms do not act on their own; individuals act within those structures. In order to fully 
understand the collective bargaining of professionals it is essential to examine the effect 
that structure may have on agency - the capacity for action and the choices of actors in 
the work setting. However, neither structure nor agency alone can satisfactorily explain 
what has occurred in the prosecutor's struggle for bargaining rights (Giddens, 1979). 
Giddens suggests we examine the interaction of structure and action to gain greater 
4 Labour legislation in Canada excludes some types of workers, including lawyers, from union 
representation. The exclusions have been challenged under the BC Health Services decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
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insights into organization life. Writing specifically about guilds, the forerunner of 
modern professions, Krause (1996) provides a framework that illustrates how we can 
include structure and agency in discussion and analysis of labour action. I return to 
Krause's model in greater detail at the end of the first theme on professions. 
The third theoretical theme explores occupational community as a collective that 
is distinct from the formal structures of the professions and collective bargaining. 
Occupational community operates in slightly different ways from the first two themes 
and the literature examines different dimensions of work to describe and explain this 
collective. Authors have challenged the compatibility of professionalization and 
collective bargaining as mechanisms of workplace control (Isler, 2007; Rabban, 1991). 
Some call for workers to "choose between conflicting identities" (Isler, 2007, p. 443) 
before they can successfully pursue strategies of workplace control. I examine the 
concept of an occupational community (OC) (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984) as a device 
that enables professionals to retain full professional status while engaging in collective 
bargaining. OC explains why and how members of a profession are simultaneously 
successful in their participation in the profession and in collective bargaining when the 
two strategies have such different roots and philosophies. The situation of professionals 
in dependent employment differentiates them from their self-employed peers. The 
dependent employment setting creates a unique environment for the development of 
occupational community. The following sections of this chapter explore each of these 
themes in detail and create a framework for examining the experiences of Crown 
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prosecutors. In later chapters we see how prosecutors have achieved greater workplace 
control through a combination of these three themes. 
Theme 1: Professionalization 
Whether one takes a theoretical definition or looks to common usage, there is no 
question that law is a profession. It is not the goal of this study to examine the 
characteristics of professions in order to measure law against them and to decide law's 
status. However, it is helpful at this point to outline the characteristics of professions in 
order to move on in later chapters to explore how they operate in the case of Nova Scotia 
Crown prosecutors. What follows is an overview of the literature on professions with a 
particular emphasis on mechanisms of workplace control. 
A profession is a collective that tries to establish and maintain exclusive control 
over an occupation and as a result gain or maintain a position of special status in society 
(Abbott, 1988; Larson, 1977). These controls address access to membership, define 
standards of practice, and establish market monopolies. Members of a profession strive 
for the exclusive right to practice and to maintain their practice through rules and 
conventions that govern practice standards (Weber, 1947). A monopoly is sought 
through regulatory relationships with the state. State regulation can limit the delivery of 
professional services by requiring people who practice the profession to be accredited and 
recognized by the professional body. Regulation is purported to ensure protection of the 
public interest, ensuring delivery of quality services. The profession-state relationship 
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can move to a point where the state delegates regulation to the profession: "self 
regulation". 
Self-regulation permits the profession to independently set admission standards 
either explicitly or tacitly. Admission standards include apprenticeships, university 
degree and training course requirements, and examinations. These dominate the liberal 
professions of medicine, law, and academia. Self-regulation also facilitates control over 
the creation and dissemination of knowledge which in turn helps to maintain the 
mystique of professions by removing the body of knowledge from the public domain 
(Freidson, 1986). Self-regulation includes the ability to discipline members of the 
profession who breach the professional standards. These standards are often expressed in 
codes of conduct. Finally, professionals are often self employed, although a continuum 
of employment arrangement exists (Campbell & Haiven, 2008). The guild model 
originally held several workers in a common work setting, where the conditions of work 
were maintained by the master craftsperson (Krause, 1996). In contemporary times, 
control over the workplace is sought through self-employment, contractual partnerships 
in professional service firms, or through negotiation with an employer in cases of large-
scale professional employment. The mechanisms of control together effectively close off 
professionals from the open labour and economic goods markets resulting in occupational 




Weber (1947) contributes two foundational ideas to a discussion of contemporary 
professions: social closure and bureaucracy. Occupational closure is the name he gives to 
protection of an occupation from free entry by anyone who so chooses. The liberal 
professions achieve closure, or closing off from outsiders, when the governing body of 
the profession is able to prescribe the rules of practice, the forms of preparation and 
access, the licensing and the evaluation of its members independent of external influence. 
Weber focuses on social structures and facts in his writing. His discussion of rational 
control in organizations stresses the structure and subdivision of tasks and responsibility 
and the rules that govern behaviour. The extension of this rational control is bureaucracy, 
which results when the rules are embedded in "files" that are controlled by carefully 
specified jobs. His work on bureaucracy provides a point of departure for analysis of the 
public service employment of Crown prosecutors. 
In Weber's discussion of the division of labour under capitalism, he sees the 
professions as social class-bound and status-bound. The role of the professions in the 
economic system is to codify the division of specialized labour and protect it from market 
forces. Professionals are characterized as elites and closure is both an instrument and a 
product of preserving social class distinctions. Weber's view of the subdivision of labour 
in capitalism places structures before social interactions and the professions' structure 
becomes a form of control; the institutional form of professional bodies controls the 
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members in addition to the instruments mentioned above. The internal mechanisms of 
the professional body and its formal relationship to the social and regulatory world 
correspond to the rigid structure Weber ascribes to other organizational forms. 
This structuralist approach downplays any agency on the part of professionals; it 
largely ignores the members' capacity to act. Weber views social structures as stable and 
rigid and thus portrays professionals with little ability to change the institution of the 
profession. This is problematic, as it does not overtly address how a profession is built in 
the first place. Weber attributes professions' achievement of closure to social status of its 
members and the power inherent in ownership of property and capital. Weber alludes to 
active capacity of professionals when he describes how a profession is maintained. A 
profession self-perpetuates its position of privilege when members recruit and admit 
those of similar background and social position. In this way, Weber lays the foundation 
for later theorists who elaborate on the condition of the fully realized profession and work 
to address the gaps in his work regarding agency, power, and incomplete control. Other 
theorists also grapple with changing notions of class and social elites. 
Professionals employed in the public service find themselves at the intersection of 
two powerful institutional forms: bureaucracy and the profession, each of which seeks to 
determine behaviour and professional practice norms. It might appear on the surface that 
the goals of public prosecution and those of good government are complementary. The 
first seeks to protect the public interest by prosecuting crime and upholding justice in 
civil society. Government creates those rules we call laws that govern civil society. 
However, when government acts as employer of prosecutors it extends its control over 
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the administration of justice. The legal profession maintains its role as a guardian of 
public interest even when its members are employed. However, the experience of Crown 
prosecutors indicates nothing so simple. The goals of the profession are much broader 
than protection of a public good. The profession and its members have significant social 
status and economic goals, goals that are beyond those of government as an organization 
and as an employer. The economic and social goals of the employer and the profession 
are often in opposition, in fact. I shall return to this issue that reappears in the tension 
between individual autonomy and group goals alluded to in the introduction to this 
chapter. 
Exclusionary and Usurpationary Closure: Separating Out and Claiming Back 
Parkin (1979, p. 45) labels Weber's social closure as practiced by professions 
"exclusionary closure". One of the key goals of professions is to exclude non-members 
from the practice of certain types of work. The medical profession is a good example of 
this (Larkin, 1983). One tactic of exclusionary closure by physicians is limiting access to 
resources, such as education, and thus opportunities to practice medicine with its 
attendant rewards. Social class plays a role in perpetuating exclusionary closure; 
physicians control access to the credentialing process and admit those they know and 
those in their social class. In the early twenty-first century Canada, social class perhaps 
does not limit opportunity for advancement as powerfully as it has in the past. However, 
access to opportunities for education, and thus access to professions, is still a very real 
problem for people who do not come from a professional milieu. 
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In contrast to exclusionary closure, which he claims is the dominant form of 
closure, Parkin posits another form: "usurpationary closure" (1979, p. 74) where 
members of one group mobilize to oppose and take power from a dominant group that 
practices exclusionary closure. The usurpers may be seeking membership in the elite 
group. Likewise, they may try to force their way into formerly restricted domains of 
practice. They may, as in the case of trade unions, be seeking a larger share of the 
economic pie. Usurpation usually challenges the status quo of social relations (Parkin, 
1979). This form of closure is best illustrated in the trade union. The negotiation of 
terms and conditions of work and the creation of a collective agreement is a means to 
reclaim some measure of control of the workplace conditions from the employer. Parkin 
also uses trade unions to explain the existence of both forms of closure at once. 
Admission to an occupation can be limited in this scenario when terms of the collective 
agreement limit membership (common in craft unions and closed or union shops). The 
structure of the usurpationary form of closure has embedded within it the means of 
exclusionary control through limits on membership. The simultaneous existence of 
usurpationary and exclusionary closure in a workplace is what Parkin calls "dual closure" 
(1979, p. 91). 
Parkin hints at the idea that usurpationary closure can be a means to shore up 
professional privilege. He claims there is a difference in motivation between professional 
and union strike action. The former is instrumental, taking advantage of a proven 
mechanism to further enhance their protected social position, while the latter use 
usurpationary tactics as an expression of class struggle (Parkin, 1979). In this way, 
Parkin qualifies dual closure as a strategy for the marginalized or oppressed, and not truly 
available to professions. He does move the theoretical discussion further by recognizing 
collective action of groups. To some extent, his discussion touches on the action of 
individuals. However, the class distinctions that underlie Weber and Parkin's work are a 
limitation of their work. Class boundaries are not as meaningful in contemporary times 
as professions implement targeted recruitment of disenfranchised social groups. Any 
discussion of struggles over control in the workplace that has been based on theories of 
property ownership across broad social classes needs updating in light of several 
developments: the concentration of resources in the hands of fewer and fewer interest 
groups, increasing credentialism in greater numbers of occupations, and the increasing 
power of credentials themselves (Murphy, 1984). 
Usurpationary closure is expanded in Murphy's critique of closure (Murphy, 
1984). He states there are two forms of this closure: inclusionary usurpation, which trade 
unions use in their bargaining for higher wages, and revolutionary usurpation which 
"makes direct attempts to change the structure of positions in society and in some cases... 
the structure of nation states" (Murphy, 1984 p.560). His notion of two forms of closure 
ties well to organizational issues facing employed professionals. Professionals who 
bargain are trying to obtain a share of the benefits controlled by their employer and to be 
included in a broader movement of redistribution of this wealth. They are also 
effectively changing the structure of relations between the profession and other social 
institutions, such as employers and legislators. 
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Murphy seeks a theory of the deeper structure of closure and global social 
structures. His discussion of fragmentation of subordinate classes/groups (he uses the 
terms interchangeably) provides a valuable insight. Fragmentation illustrates how 
different factions of a profession can hold opposing views and strategies based on their 
relative position within the profession. Fragmentation within a profession results in 
subgroups and nested forms of closure. Subspecialties within a profession may engage 
with the main body of the group as though they were outsiders. Crown prosecutors form 
a speciality niche in the legal profession. Murphy's ideas of closure may suggest how 
Crown prosecutors may be located in a subordinate position within their profession. 
Thus situated, prosecutors adopt a strategy of usurpationary closure and remain members 
of an elite profession that also practices exclusionary closure. I discuss the fragmentation 
of the legal profession in more detail in Chapter 4. 
Murphy's differentiation of forms of closure divides property from credential. 
Professionals thus oppose domination without making the struggle a question of property. 
This aspect of his theorizing is perhaps most helpful in explaining the collective 
bargaining of the semi-professions such as nursing, whose members do not typically own 
their means of production. Lawyers in private practice often do own their firms but the 
employed public prosecutor does not have any claim of "ownership" in a capitalist sense. 
Murphy opens up a discussion of "power and control relations" (1984, p. 564) that is 
relevant to organizations and employees. By taking a step away from the institutional 
powers of profession and class theory, his development of inclusionary usurpation sheds 
some light on the experiences of employed professionals. In Chapter 5 I explore how 
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Crown prosecutors use usurpationary closure to claim a greater share of privilege and 
benefits from the employer and a better social status relative to their professional peers. 
They simultaneously practice exclusionary closure to redefine their place in their 
professions. 
Market Control and Closure 
The next two theorists, Larson and Witz, bring the discussion of power and social 
dominance into the literature on professions. They also introduce additional forms of 
closure to aid in refining analysis of professional projects. Larson's (1977) contribution 
elaborates on closure theory, drawing in the concepts of market control. Her work 
addresses control over both labour markets and markets for goods and services. 
Professions, as outgrowths of medieval guilds, achieve market control by drawing on 
power resources. The professional project (Larson, 1977) is the web of structures, rules 
and behaviours which define , isolate, protect, and perpetuate a group's claim to exercise 
a particular expertise in the production of a good or service. The goal of the professional 
project is market closure and professionals collectively mobilize to achieve this goal. She 
describes how fully realized professional projects such as medicine are able to create the 
market for their service by controlling the knowledge utilized in professional work, and 
also controlling the creation of that knowledge, through the university-based education 
system. The extent to which a profession is able to create and sustain a monopoly in the 
marketplace for its services is also a key determinant of the success of that professional 
project. In establishing such a monopoly, the profession is somewhat dependent on the 
state to recognize and sanction licensing for the service, then to delegate control over 
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licensing to the profession itself. Finally the state's support of "monopolistic education 
systems" (Larson, 1977, p. 17) is also essential for a profession to establish control over 
production and reproduction of its specialized knowledge. This total control over 
cognitive and market conditions enables the profession to defend the need for its services, 
define what those services should be, and to develop additional scope of practice for new 
services. Because outsiders are excluded from each aspect of participation in the 
profession, the mystique associated with membership in the profession can be 
maintained. Larson's discussion emphasizes the self-serving aspects of 
professionalization, undermining arguments that support protection of the public interest. 
Larson claims that a preferential social structure is necessary for the emergence of 
a professional project and that enhanced social power will follow successful 
professionalization. The practice of closure reinforces and enhances a group's social 
status. However, the social power of professional projects can in turn be weakened by 
changes in the social structure, particularly the democratization of knowledge creation we 
have experienced in the recent past. Globalization and the emergence of a knowledge 
economy whose transactions are widely accessible to non-professional workers (Evetts, 
2003; Freeman, R. B., Hersch, & Mishel, 2005) undermine professionals' monopoly on 
specialized knowledge. This co-dependent relationship between the structure of an 
institution and the action of its membership hints at a notion I will explore in my 
discussion of labour process theory later in this chapter. 
Labour process theory (Braverman, 1998) addresses formal and real subordination 
of labour and the ways in which rules and structures limit workers' power in the 
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workplace. Formal subordination succeeds when an owner of the means of production 
gathers workers together under a single roof. Workers no longer work for themselves, 
and do not own the output of their labour. However, skilled workers in such settings 
control the actual labour process and exercise autonomy over specific tasks. Real control 
of the labour process is still in the workers' hands. The pressures of competition induce 
owners to exert more direct control over the labour process in an effort to improve 
efficiency and profits. Machine discipline and Taylorism are ways that owners achieve 
real subordination of labour. 
Larson highlights the difference between self employed, entrepreneurial 
professions and salaried professionals in her discussion of doctors versus engineers. She 
makes the distinction based on the latter's lack of power over the market; capitalists and 
industrialists determine the scope and nature of the engineering work to be done. In 
addition, the engineer's work is public, its success or failure is evident to the untrained 
eye, and thus the work does not embody the mystique attributed to medicine. Larson 
quite specifically addresses the circumstances of professionals in dependent employment, 
a concept that reaches back to Weber. She notes that little is left of the independent 
entrepreneurial dream, and that state regulators hold most power. Participants in my 
study echo this comment when they describe the current state of the legal profession in 
Nova Scotia. However, to discuss the success of various professional projects Larson 
draws her comparators from different professions. She does not examine the possibility 
that some members of a single profession may find themselves in varying forms of 
employment facing varying forms of labour subordination. Crown prosecutors, like in-
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house legal counsel in a private firm, may have more in common with the engineers of 
Larson's description than they do with their peers in private practice. 
Demarcationary Closure: Drawing the Lines Between Professions 
Witz (1992) contributes an excellent review of the literature that highlights the 
evolution from trait (and functionalist) theories of professions, through processual 
theories to "institutionalized means of controlling occupational activities" (Witz, 1992, p. 
41). This review emphasizes the primacy of closure as an explanatory device and the 
foundation of professional projects. Witz's discussion develops a hierarchy of closure, 
tied to social positions of dominance and subordination. She elaborates on closure theory 
by specifying what she calls "demarcationary closure" as a strategy used by dominant 
occupations that mobilize power sources to define and limit the practice areas of other 
occupational groups. These occupations exert their dominance both through limited 
access as noted above and by attempting to define the practice boundaries of other 
groups. Witz's discussion of medicine and midwifery illustrates the point succinctly. 
The distinction between the two forms of domination is one of perspective. Exclusionary 
closure's focus is inter-occupational control and demarcationary closure seeks inter-
occupational control over "related or adjacent occupations" (Witz, 1992, p. 44). She 
categorizes two forms of closure as subordinate forms: inclusionary closure and dual 
closure. Inclusionary closure is evident when members seek to join the dominant group. 
For example, licensed practical nurses organize into a regulated subset of the nursing 
profession. In dual closure, members resist the dominant group and try to usurp power 
while at the same time practicing exclusionary closure to define their subordinate 
domain, as in the case of skilled trades in the construction industry. Sometimes these 
skilled workers trade heavily on the public protection argument as well, as electricians 
do. 
Together these two theorists, Larson and Witz, bring the discussion of 
power and social dominance into the literature on professions. They also introduce 
additional forms of closure to aid in refining analysis of professional projects. The 
contributions of Larson and Witz develop the structure/action dichotomy and give a more 
balanced view of the relationship between the institutions that perpetuate professions and 
the actions of individuals and groups within the confines of those institutions and their 
norms. However, the discussion to date has addressed distinctions between different 
professional projects and occupational groups. The contributions that follow further 
specify dimensions of professions that are most relevant to my discussion of prosecution 
as a subset of a large dominant profession. 
Specialization Within Professions 
Specialization within professions has been discussed as an evolution of the 
closure and monopoly features of professions by several authors (Abbott, 1988; Abel, 
2004; Freidson, 1986; Gawande, 2007b). Specialized knowledge and the division of 
labour and professional power can be considered a response to structural, social, and 
institutional changes. Specialization in professions can be considered partly a reaction to 
the explosion in complexity and the knowledge economy (Freidson, 1986) and partly a 
response to increasing market scope through globalization which has put pressure on 
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professional projects to differentiate themselves and to stake claims to emerging markets. 
The result is a reduction in span of professional control over a narrower range of work, 
using increasingly sophisticated tools and methods, and command of a narrow but very 
deep and complex body of knowledge (Abel, 2004). This further excludes outsiders who 
do not possess this knowledge. In some instances, access to the knowledge may be 
limited by access to the employment and training circumstances where the knowledge is 
located. In addition, the licensing of professionals further limits those who can exercise 
the knowledge and develop the skills related to its application. Control over knowledge 
and its use in practice is countered by increasing access to information through the 
internet, increased participation rates in higher education, varieties of semi-professional 
training, para-professionals, and the automation of some discretion based work 
(Susskind, 2008). Professions are thus in a state of flux and transition, where market and 
social forces are changing around them, causing the institutional form and the social 
relations within professions to respond. 
The specialization of professional work and the employment of professionals in 
heterogeneous organizations have lead to two streams of thought. Johnson (1972) 
discusses the proletarianization of professions that results under these conditions. He 
explains that professionals are alienated from their work and deskilled through 
managerial strategies and as a result of administrative controls imposed by management. 
Haug ( 1975) and others describe a de-professionalization where the power and 
characteristics of the profession are diminished to a point where they no longer effect 
control in any meaningful way. For example, Susskind (2008) examines lawyers in 
particular as knowledge workers who face pressures of commoditization of their work in 
an increasingly complex, fast paced economy. Recent authors have successfully 
demonstrated that professions do persist in the face of changing employment forms 
(Rabban, 1991; Susskind, 2008; Wallace & Kay, 2008). Nelson and Trubeck (1992) 
make a compelling case that proletarianization of legal professions is not inevitable in a 
world where more and more lawyers are also employees. They argue that the capital 
versus labour dichotomy in professional service firms is a blurred line, with partners 
doing work and workers aspiring to partnership. The proletarianization thesis's three 
sources of loss of control: deskilling through task division, administrative control over 
tasks, and loss of control over the ends of production (Nelson & Trubeck, 1992, p. 203) 
are less salient for public prosecutors than other occupations such as nursing. The state 
employs prosecutors, their managers do not prosecute for the most part, and yet most 
individual prosecutors are responsible for the result of their work. Administrative control 
fetters individual professional discretion, however, and has encouraged a response and 
resistance from prosecutors, as we shall see more explicitly when prosecutors tell their 
stories of resistance in Chapter 5. 
Institution Theory 
To more fully understand how professions react to contemporary pressures it is 
helpful to briefly consider institution theory (Greenwood et al., 2002; Hinings, 2001). 
Professions are powerful institutions. Khurana (2007) summarizes the four elements of 
institution theory, namely institutional actors, institutional fields (the domain in which the 
institution operates, including various stakeholders), institutional logics (belief systems 
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that shape the behaviour of actors in the institutional field), and legitimacy. He describes 
how each of these elements contributes to creating and maintaining powerful social 
structures and activities that help regulate social action and give it meaning (Khurana, 
2007). The legal profession embodies each of these elements and each in turn helps to 
mobilize resources to secure and perpetuate exclusionary closure. Greenwood et al. 
(2002) describe the organizational field as an intermediary structure between organization 
and broader society. 
The profession, as represented by a professional body, forms an intermediary 
between an individual's professional practice or employing organization and the broader 
public interest served by the regulation of professional services. The professional body 
can act much like an institutional field, setting the policy priorities for the profession and 
monitoring change, publicizing and promulgating best practices. Lawyers are able to 
take action in their practice as well as to support the practice of other lawyers, 
particularly through the articling and mentoring processes. They also work in roles on 
the regulatory bodies and boards to further the aims of the profession. The interaction of 
lawyers with their clients, educational institutions, other associations, the public, and the 
state legislators forms the field in which the institutional practice of law takes place. 
Institution theory's focus on structure (Hinings, 2005) does not leave much room 
for discussion and analysis of individual agency (DiMaggio, 1988). The portrayal of the 
profession as a singular force perhaps is not an accurate representation of the multiple 
interests involved in public prosecutions. Institution theory can be helpful in 
understanding the expectations a profession encourages among its members, and the way 
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the profession shapes to some extent public expectations of criminal prosecution, for 
example. Greenwood et al. (2002) use institutional theory to describe the changes to 
professionals in professional service organizations. This point is taken up by Muzio and 
Ackroyd (2005) who state that institution theory does not adequately apply to the case of 
lawyers and the legal profession. They examine Britain in particular, and though the 
profession has been subject to much rapid and jarring structural change through a series 
of political moves and legislative changes (Abel, 2004), Muzio and Ackroyd claim the 
theory fails to consider the agency of groups. The authors present a quantitative analysis 
of the structure of the legal professional service firms. They focus on this agency of 
groups, and the power dynamic that exists between the ownership/partner ranks and the 
salaried associates in law firms. While all commentators agree that the legal profession is 
changing, a more complex picture emerges when institutional actions and pressures are 
complemented by an examination of the strategies of groups within institutions and the 
organizations that comprise an institutional field. 
The logic of the profession is embedded in its norms and values. These values are 
inculcated in lawyers from their early days of law school, and though not immutable, are 
slow to change. Institution theory draws us toward an examination of broader social 
shifts that help redefine the position of the profession relative to other social structures. 
While bearing in mind the power of these social structures, the speed of change requires 
us to look at ways that institutions are changing quickly. The debate over whether the 
professions are being proletarianized (Derber, 1982b; Johnson, T., 1972) or 
deprofessionalized (Haug, 1975) through social forces that undermine their market and 
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knowledge control continues to draw attention (Powell et al.5 1999). However, the 
discussion is focussed mainly on organizational structures and where the relationships 
between individuals is considered, it is in terms of groups and archetypes (Flood, 1999; 
Kitchener, 1999). I note that little has been written on the power of individuals to effect 
change in an institutional context. My study addresses this gap. Wallace and Kay's 
(2008) study of professionalism among individual lawyers argues against the 
proletarianization thesis with the finding that professionalism is not dictated by 
employment setting (a social structure), but is influenced by the nature of the work 
undertaken by individuals. 
Theme 2: Collective Bargaining 
While Canadian and UK literature on professions exhibits a recent focus on 
professional service organizations (Ackroyd, 1996; Ackroyd & Muzio, 2007), my study 
examines the profession in the employment context of a large heterogeneous organization 
where the types of strain and workplace conflict arise from different roots. In such an 
organizational setting, the professionals are just one subset of dependent employees 
among many different types of workers, some of whom are also professionals but many 
of whom are not. Although shared working conditions may provide sufficient impetus to 
begin to mobilize workers (Kelly, 1998), successful collective action will need to 
overcome or otherwise assimilate the profession's norms and closure strategies as well. 
The goal of professional projects of closure is to exclude other types of workers, as we 
have seen above, and not to unite with them. In fact, lawyers compete with each other at 
every stage of their career. Law students compete for the best articling jobs, juniors 
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compete for partnerships, and the solo practitioner competes with other lawyers for work. 
Lawyers are not encouraged to work together; they are adversaries in legal battles. 
Furthermore, in a heterogeneous organization there is a good chance that 
management and policy makers are not members of the same profession as the individual 
worker. The differences in values and perspective that may arise from differences in 
group membership can lead to workplace conflict (Braverman, 1998). The following 
section will address the theme of collective action in an organization where the above-
mentioned conditions exist. There are certainly repercussions for the ongoing 
development and maintenance of workplace control in a heterogeneous setting and little 
literature that deals specifically with professionals in such a workplace setting. 
The Collective Bargaining Project 
"Modes of closure can be thought of as different means of mobilizing power for 
the purposes of engaging in distributive struggle" (Parkin, 1998, p. 144) Collective 
bargaining is also a means of mobilizing collective power. Kelly (1998) outlines how 
this is accomplished in his discussion of mobilization theory. Kelly discusses the 
translation of individual concerns into collective concerns, and he then describes how 
action escalates through a series of stages. Workers must recognize an injustice, feel it is 
possible and reasonable to have it addressed, and develop a shared interest in the 
problem's solution. In many respects, the mobilization process is similar to the 
professionalization process, and professionals have already achieved collective 
representation to assert control over their work process. When professionals find 
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themselves in dependent employment, however, the employer and the diversity of 
workers in the workplace have the potential to limit professionals' otherwise autonomous 
control of their work. The following discussion of the union model reflects the Wagner-
Act based approach in North America. 
In contrast to the professional project, which defines itself in relation to social 
structures and the other groups of competing workers, the collective bargaining project 
defines itself in one of two ways: by craft or industrial focus. The setting of a single 
workplace defines the industrial union and the craft or occupation defines the craft union 
across a number of workplaces and employers. The craft union is analogous to the guild 
of the middle ages, and the industrial union arose in response to the changes brought by 
the industrialization and mass production in contemporary times. The craft union also 
has parallels with the professional project, where the focus of collective action is to 
protect the dimensions of the work itself, and admission to the practice of an occupation. 
However, in contrast to the social closure described by Weber, the industrial union 
project gathers members together to represent their interests in a subordinated role. The 
project is fully realized when the union is given sole and exclusive bargaining rights of 
state "certification", is a member of the broader labour movement, and is actively 
organizing workplaces and workers. Towards the other end of the collective bargaining 
spectrum are workers who gather informally, perhaps in an association without formal 
status under any labour legislation, to express their concerns and suggestions collectively 
to the employer. The employer may or may not recognize such an association for 
bargaining purposes and in the unorganized extreme may only discuss on a casual, 
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informational basis with no direct participation by workers in decision-making or policy 
development. There is thus a range from less to greater organization and engagement of 
members in developing worker-organization policy and negotiation priorities, dues 
collection and formal membership rituals. Recognition also follows a range from 
voluntary, informal without certification to full unionization under applicable legislation 
and formal, ongoing bargaining. 
Collective bargaining, like professionalization, is also a strategy of control over 
dimensions of work. In Canada collective bargaining most often, but not always, takes 
place through representation of workers in a trade union. There are two important 
differences between collective bargaining and professionalization strategies, however. 
Traditionally workers gathering together under a single employer were not owners of the 
means of production (Braverman, 1998). Workers are called forth when an employer has 
an investment in capital resources and requires labour to realize the value in that 
investment. Workers contribute their labour but do not own the means of production 
itself. This is in contrast with the professional setting, where the means of production are 
tied to mental effort and knowledge with minimal physical tools required to do the work 
and ownership of the business is in the hands of the professional herself. The goal of 
collective bargaining is to wrest from the employer some power over management's 
control of the design of the labour process; the rules and structures around how work is 
completed. Bargaining also looks for a redistribution of the surplus from production. 
Some professions, such as nursing and medicine, have successfully combined 
exclusionary closure as a profession and collective bargaining where members are 
gathered together by single, large employers. The health care setting, with its huge 
investments of capital and employer control over tools of "production" is an example of 
the pressure rapid change in the workplace brings to professions. 
The second difference between the two projects is one of timing. Industrial forms 
of collective bargaining occur after the fact of employment. Workers organize in the 
employment setting that gathers them together. This is true of industrial unions; 
industrial unions organize workplaces irrespective of individual trades and work 
assignments and members are all located at one workplace/employer. Craft unions 
generally organize workers based on their work content, where members practice the 
same trade or craft and they are dispersed across different employers. Craft union 
members often must learn their trade before they become members of their union and 
find work. The professions are similar to craft unions in the way they organize members 
into the profession as a precursor to employment. 
Both professionalization and collective bargaining strategies seek control over the 
conditions under which members execute their work. However, the professions are 
collectivist in the sense of needing a critical mass of members to assert claims for 
autonomy and self-regulation but they have much less of a collective focus than unions. 
The efforts of the professional project are aimed at carving out a market in which 
individuals can practice with autonomy. The collective bargaining project finds its 
strength in the commonality of work conditions that are imposed by the employer, and is 
galvanized as Kelly (1998) indicates, by a sense of injustice. Membership in a collective 
bargaining project is predicated on conflict with the employer (Sykes, 1967) while 
professionalization is based in a drive for market control. Thus, the two strategies of 
workplace control have a basis in quite different logics. I will return to the notion of 
injustice in Chapter 5 as it plays a critical role in the Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors' 
struggle for collective bargaining rights. 
Professionals in Organizations 
Employed professional workers have traditionally been different from other 
workers beyond education and training requirements; they enjoy greater latitude for 
independent decision making than many non-professional workers and the quality of their 
work is subject to peer control (White 1993). These differences might indicate on the 
surface that the traditional model of industrial unionism is not viable for professional 
workers; however, unionism is no longer the preserve of blue-collar workers in industrial 
settings. The most significant growth in union membership in Canada since the 1960s 
has been among white-collar workers in the public sector (White 1993). Professional 
workers are increasingly subject to managerial control in public bureaucracies, a situation 
that has not been extensively studied. There are implications for the Canadian labour 
movement with the inclusion of unions and associations of professionals drawn from 
outside the economy's industrial base. These workers bring not only their numbers, 
voice and economic contribution to the movement, but philosophies developed through 
diverse experiences and processes of collective action and they represent an important 
group for further research. 
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Freidson (1986) addresses the status of professionals as employees. He highlights 
their role as supervisors or managers. His discussion also hinges to great extent on the 
relations between the profession and other, excluded, groups. For example, because the 
label supervisor or manager is drawn from the industrial model, its value in describing 
professional work is only useful when professionals are directing the work of non-
professionals. Professional work itself is self-directed and peer-controlled. The notion of 
separating control from execution falters in the complex relations with the profession 
itself. On the one hand there is the autonomous decision making that is critical to the 
exercise of professional activities and on the other a collaboration and elaboration of 
roles and tasks is necessary to accomplish the professional work. The manager, Freidson 
claims, is ultimately a controller of resources and not of work in the industrial sense. 
Management exercises control over work done by professionals by controlling resources 
that enable or inhibit the application of professional autonomy rather than any overt 
control over the work processes themselves. This type of manager is not fulfilling their 
role in the capacity of a professional. Managers who are actually members of the 
profession they supervise may exercise a formal subordination over their peers. To the 
extent that policy can influence the actions of individual professionals, they may also 
achieve real subordination of professionals under their control. This real subordination is 
based on the manager's specialized, expert knowledge. 
Freidson (1986) also discusses the similarities between employed professionals 
and managers and policy makers and how independence from supervision is itself a form 
of supervision. The community of interest based in this independence should enable 
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professional workers to organize under labour legislation (Freidson based his comments 
on the US). The managerial overtone of professional privilege and the confidential 
nature of much professional work meant that groups of professionals in Canada were 
excluded from larger collective bargaining units until quite recently. For the employed 
prosecutor this meant they were placed in management pay plans and covered by 
management policies for lack of any other suitable category. However, the prosecutors' 
occupational community drew a distinct divide between the regular work of the Crown 
prosecutor and the management cadre of the Public Prosecution Service, further 
highlighting very practical contradictions in the way the management designation was 
applied to all lawyers. 
Other theorists challenge the notion of a managerial labour process (Armstrong, 
1984; Willmott, 1997) in response to Braverman's (1998) claim that management is just 
another work process to be codified and controlled. The distinction between control over 
the work process for its own sake compared to control exercised for other, broader 
organizational goals is clear in the prosecutors' stories collected during my research. In 
provinces beyond Nova Scotia, prosecutors also chafe at the idea of being "lumped" into 
a pay scheme and job classification system designed for work so wholly unconnected to 
theirs. 
Control of the Labour Process 
Freidson calls professionalism the "occupational control of work" (Freidson, 
2001, p. 2) and collective bargaining represents an attempt, successful to varying degrees, 
at worker control of work. Though the members of the profession themselves govern and 
regulate their work in theory, the reality, well discussed in the literature, is that an ideal 
type of profession is subsumed in a bureaucratic form of professional body, with 
complicated ties to State regulators, the public interest, and prevailing ideologies that 
influence market activities. It is easy to distinguish collective bargaining strategies from 
professionalization where there is a distinction between dependent employment and self-
employment. The distinction is less clear when professionals are employed. 
Professionalization has been successful in achieving high status and market closure for 
professional services, as in the case of lawyers. I propose that the case of the Crown 
prosecutors illustrates competing logics of collective action seeking control over work. 
This dissertation explores how each closure strategy informs the other, and how together 
they help Crown prosecutors to wrest control of their labour process from management 
and the employer. The struggle for collective bargaining of prosecutors is nurtured in an 
occupational community. This community enables the otherwise individualistic nature of 
the legal profession to identify collective goals and mobilize for collective ends. This 
case study examines Nova Scotia the occupational community found among staff 
prosecutors of the Public Prosecution Service (PPS), as we shall see unfold in Chapters 4 
and 5. Yet the OC draws support and from the broad community of all prosecutors 
across Canada. 
Why is the structure of the profession, even when it is replicated completely 
within an organization like the PPS, insufficient to guarantee control of the labour 
process to the employed professional? Some tools of the profession do not "work" for 
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professionals in dependent employment. Alternatively, the organization structure is too 
powerful when its rules are used to define and control the workplace. However, in the 
case of law, the work content cannot be (or is not) specifically defined - that comes from 
the profession, so the administrative rules come to dominate in the bureaucracy of the 
civil service. This causes us to question what role management plays in this setting and 
in the control of professional work, especially management from within the ranks of the 
profession. 
The employer exerts control over the design and execution of work in various 
ways. Some of those tactics are formal and impose structures and rules in an overt 
attempt to direct the workers' efforts. Braverman (1998) discusses the notion of formal 
versus real control of the labour process using the factory assembly line as the full 
expression of real control. On an assembly line the knowedlge of skilled workers is 
appropriated, codified in work procedures, and handed back to the workers as small 
sequential steps, requiring no specialized knowledge. Real control is the effective control 
on the shop floor, which comes not only (or perhaps not at all) from formal structures. 
Other theorists have noted that workers do not "go quiet into that dark night" of formal 
subordination but resist and impose in their turn behavioural limits on themselves and 
their peers in the workplace (Burawoy, 1979; Willmott, 1997) to effect real control over 
the labour process. Professionals are subject to the real control of their professional 
norms. The profession inculcates values and standard work practices so that each 
professional perpetuates a real control over the labour process independent of formal 
restrictions. 
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One form of formal control is the salary system that assigns value to the labour of 
Crown prosecutors. The salary mechanism for management employees in government, 
which covered Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors until the advent of collective bargaining, 
was removed from the direct contract of employment and set by Cabinet fiat in the form 
of an Order in Council. Prosecutors interviewed for this study describe how the 
inconsistencies and favouritism rendered the assignment of value in exchange for their 
labour power meaningless. The salary system was a major issue of contention and was 
the first item negotiated in a collective agreement between the Nova Scotia Crown 
Attorneys Association and their employer. 
Larson (1977) indicates command over scarce resources is necessary to establish 
and maintain professional power. However, it was due to low wages and perceived high 
workload that people were disinclined to participate in the labour pool for Crown 
prosecutor. The imposition of a salary system as noted above highlights a tension 
between professional control and employer control over working conditions. 
Faulconbridge and Muzio (2008) argue that organizational and managerial control of 
professionals are possible only when the objectives of such control align with those of 
professionalism. Other writers (Ackroyd, 1996; Hinings, 2005) have examined 
professionalism and organization structure for the intersection of organization 
configuration and professional values. A labour process perspective provides a lens 




Professionals give up some measure of control over their own work in situations 
of dependent employment. One aspect of the closure strategy of collective bargaining is 
an attempt to regain some control over workers' labour process appropriated for 
organizational goals. The labour process refers to the specification of work practices and 
the application of expertise to solve work problems (Braverman, 1998). Like a mechanic 
or millwright, the lawyer's work also involves the application of knowledge and skill 
developed through training and a form of apprenticeship. However, the process of the 
lawyer's work is somewhat invisible, particularly the application of discretion and 
judgment. Decision-making in prosecution involves complex application of legal 
principles and case law as well as the decision whether or not to proceed with a 
prosecution. This decision best reflects the concept of public interest in a profession; a 
professional acts not only in the pursuit of a living, but also acts in the public interest as 
holder of a public trust. Some of the autonomy that derives from an unfettered, self-
regulated labour process is limited by organizational constraints in dependent 
employment. Constraints can take the form of rules and procedures, such as a policy 
manual. Public prosecutors chose collective bargaining over terms of employment to 
protect and reclaim some of their professional power, autonomy, and benefits such as 
income, which they sacrificed when they choose to practice law as employed public 
servants. 
The literature presents contradictions when we consider the employment of 
professionals, particularly in the public sector. Many public sector professional workers 
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are unionized yet the literature on professionalism and unionization generally juxtaposes 
the two concepts as competing options for occupational power (Crouch, 1982; Freidson, 
1973; Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980; Parkin, 1979) whether the discussion is based on the 
traits of the profession, social class and material power, or logics of action. Isler (2007) 
describes the dilemma for professionals as a choice workers must make between 
constructing an identity as a professional or as an "organizable worker" (p. 443) Much 
theorizing about professions and professionals encompasses the self employed ideal type 
of autonomous professional as well as the professional service firm. Muzio and Ackroyd 
(2005) have recently explored closure theory in the context of professional service firms, 
demonstrating that mechanisms of social exclusionary closure continue to prevail, but 
have moved inside the firm rather than being located externally in the marketplace. 
Although aspects of employment and the labour process of professionals are changing in 
professional service firms, much of the context of the work and the relationship with 
clients remains the same. There is an external, paying client and the complexity of the 
work is measured in time and effort that is billed to the client. The movement in North 
America away from the billable hour towards a fee for service model has not yet altered 
this fundamental relationship to any great extent yet (Furlong, 2010). 
A gap exists in the area of the employed professional whose conditions of 
employment do not involve an external client. Despite the preponderance of literature 
contrasting the two strategies of professionalism and unionization (Isler, 2007; Rabban, 
1991), some professionals have acquiesced to positions as employees under "flat fee" 
situations, and bargain collectively. Nurses and allied health professions (Haiven 1999), 
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teachers, doctors, and now lawyers do so. In-house counsel who provide legal advice to 
employers are salaries employees, though they do not engage in collective bargaining. 
The employment of professionals is not a recent phenomenon (White, 1993), and offers a 
rich field for further study. Derber (1982) discusses employment of professionals and 
control by non-professionals as de-professionalization and deskilling of their work. 
However, now prosecutors are no longer in the Department of Justice; they are managed 
and directed exclusively by other lawyers who are also prosecutors. The "other" is 
government and its ministers and not a manager drawn from outside the profession's 
ranks. 
Class theory 
It is important to take this opportunity to address class theory, if only briefly. The 
literature discussing class and white collar workers addresses a trend of bureaucratization 
and formal control of the labour process. The gathering of prosecutors into dependent 
employment places them in a position where comparisons with other white collar workers 
is inevitable. I do not propose to categorize prosecutors as members of the working class. 
They hold positions of significant social power that preclude any meaningful discussion 
of that status. However, prosecutors have sought an additional closure mechanism: 
collective bargaining. Some authors on class theory make salient points that are relevant 
for problematizing the Crown prosecutors' struggle. This section touches on some of 
those ideas. 
Parkin (1979) suggests that the enthusiasm with which professions join the labour 
movement and find solidarity in views and values based on class is limited. Traditional 
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class theories highlight a distinction between the owners of the means of production and 
those they exploit. But many professionals are in what Wright (1978) calls a 
"contradictory class location." They own their intellectual capital and yet may still work 
in conditions of dependency and subordination. The ownership of intellectual capital 
contributes to the strong professional identity, yet the position of dependency through 
employment contributes to an urge to unite against the power of the employer. Nurses 
are one example of this phenomenon. 
There is a broad literature on white collar workers, white collar unionism and the 
"new working class" (Hyman & Price, 1983). One of the most significant points made in 
reviewing this literature is that a singular definition of worker category or class is not 
possible. There is such considerable variation within the white collar and professional 
ranks that all ideological and political perspectives can be represented (Giddens, 1973). 
The concept of productive and unproductive labour itself is contested (Crompton & 
Gubbay, 1977; Giddens, 1973; Poulantzas, 1975). The decline in property relations as a 
basis for group division (Murphy, 1984) further clouds the debate. The final straw is the 
problem of the public service. Poulantzas (1975), for example, says that social relations 
rather than the work itself is the basis for understanding class position. Public servants 
are excluded from the working class because they are actively involved in reproducing 
capitalist social relations; however, they too are exploited. Public servants are employees 
and capital has "seized hold of their activities" (Poulantzas, 1975 cited in Hyman and 
Price at p. 111). 
56 
In their discussion of management and of Wright's work, Crompton and Gubbay 
(1977) highlight an important point. The worker who carries out only part of a capitalist 
function is no less an agent of capital because the duty is attenuated or divided. 
Management's dissatisfaction with bureaucratic limits to their authority does not make 
management part of the worker collective (Crompton & Gubbay, 1977). What is 
important to the situation of Crown prosecutors is the role hierarchy plays in structuring 
social relations at work. The hierarchy of the broader civil service and that of the newly 
formed Public Prosecution Service both obscure the prosecutors' class position. On the 
one hand prosecutors are more independent and express greater control over their labour 
process, and on the other hand they are confined in a more extensive hierarchy. Although 
the application of mental effort is not curtailed or exploited by technology in the same 
way as physical effort, management still tries to control prosecutorial discretion. 
Management in the PPS are full status members of the legal profession and may also take 
on some level of courtroom work. Staff prosecutors are peers in the profession, but 
subordinated to management and to the employer's economic aims. A focus on 
production of surplus value and lack of ownership of the means of production as defining 
measures of working class status is clearly out of date. 
Collective Action 
Why people join unions has been the subject of several different streams of 
research, as Riley (1997) summarizes and explores in her comprehensive review. 
Professionals are not usually examined in this research for the simple reason that the 
study of professionalization has focused upon private practice and the professional 
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services firm, and industrial relations theory building has been based on large industrial 
unions. The two seldom coincide. Some social identity research has examined the legal 
and medical professions, and particularly the development of the medical doctor's 
identity through internship (Harrison, 1994). There has been little examination of the 
professional's labour process in these studies, and little research into employed 
professionals, with some UK exceptions (Evetts, 2003, 2004; Muzio & Ackroyd, 2005; 
Muzio & Hodgson, 2008). Research is warranted that draws on both streams of theory, 
collective bargaining and professionalization, to explain the reality that professionals do 
unionize, and very elite professions at that. 
Unions use usurpationary closure while professionals who bargain collectively 
use both usurpation and exclusionary closure (Parkin, 1979). Parkin questions the extent 
to which professions take the further step to join the labour movement, engage in 
collective action, and find solidarity in labour's views and values. He takes a class 
perspective on labour struggles, which would deny the elite professions any meaningful 
participation in labour action. However, a subordination/subjugation perspective draws 
different conclusions. Considering the broader realm of professions in various forms of 
employment (Haiven, 1999) it is increasingly common to find fewer traditional industrial 
unionists in the broader labour movement and more and more independent contractors, 
artists and fee for service employees, some of whom are employers in turn. These 
individuals and groups are seeking collective representation over compensation and other 
terms and conditions of the sale of their labour and labour value. 
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Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) describe the several ways in which collectives of 
labour differ from collectives of capital, highlighting how these collectives are 
constituted and the basis of interest representation. The basis for effectiveness of the two 
logics of collective action is particularly important here. The union's is based on 
willingness to act, whereas the capitalists' is based on willingness to pay. The union's 
logic is a momentum in favour of action. Without action, nothing is gained. However, 
the capitalist need not take action in a collective as he is master of his enterprise and 
retains significant control if he remains independent. If the capitalist wishes to relinquish 
some of that control in favour of some form of association of capital, usually at a cost, the 
incentive for such an action needs to be significant. A comparison can be drawn between 
the capitalist forms of collective and the professional association; sort of an "action if 
necessary but not necessarily action" approach to issues. 
Lawyers are members of an elite profession that enjoys a position of social power. 
They exercise a monopoly over legal services. Their form of association exists to protect 
this monopoly and to define and control the realm of the practice of their specific skills 
and tasks, and to exert control over the expertise required to maintain autonomy and 
individual practitioners. In many ways, the professional association can be compared to 
the capitalist industry association. Although membership is compulsory for the lawyer, 
she subscribes to the principles of the Bar Society. The Society in turn acts on behalf of 
its members without continuous confirmation of its mandate and without requiring 
individual action. Members comply with external directives, such as the changes to Civil 
Procedure Rules. Lawyers are represented by the Society in consultations but collective 
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action is not necessary in every matter. The analogy can be continued even to the point 
where the individual practitioner does not fully realize the earnings promise of the 
monopoly until she hires others. A union or union-like collective is essentially the 
antithesis of this form of power, and represents a broad range of what Offe and 
Wiesenthal call life-based interest. The wage, continued employment, and working 
conditions of their members (redefined as they are through continued membership in the 
collective) are broader reaching dimensions of life than the manipulation and 
administration of capital (dead or liquid labour) for business goals. 
Offe and Wiesenthal (1980, p. 78) discuss the power of individual interest in 
preserving autonomy of business organizations, and by extension this can apply to the 
professional under governance by the professional society. The Bar Society represents 
the interests all lawyers share in common for the integrity of the profession and their 
individual reputations. The Bar Society achieves these aims through certification and 
licensing in the profession. Interests regarding the practice of law and the freedom to 
conduct their practices unfettered are often reflected in the efforts of other forms of 
collective, such as the Canadian Bar Association. These collectives lobby government 
and the Bar Society alike, as well as promote public debate on topics and points of view 
of importance to the collective. Issues and concerns specific to a particular subset of the 
profession are represented by specialized associations; there is a Criminal Lawyers' 
association, for example, whose mandate is largely one of professional development for 
its members. Crown prosecutors across the country have formed associations expressly 
to represent their interests as employees of provincial prosecution services and to take on 
the mandate of collective bargaining over employment conditions. This last form of 
collective is a response to prosecutors' feelings of powerlessness within their 
organization structures. In Chapter 5 we will see how the Nova Scotia prosecutors 
position their collective bargaining body within the realm of these various interest 
frameworks. 
Lawyers do not lose their membership in the Bar Society, nor the benefits of 
membership and malpractice insurance protection when they join an additional 
representational group. In fact, membership in special interest associations is encouraged 
in order to meet individual lawyers' needs for interest representation. The provincial Bar 
Societies specifically deny they represent individual interests in favour of the protection 
of the public interest. In Friedson's (2001) model of the profession the occupation 
controls the division of labour and the market, as well as the training program for 
credentials. It is true even within the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service that the 
professional lawyer executes certain types of tasks and no other employee can do these 
things. Prosecutors describe in Chapter 5 how they find themselves at the intersection of 
incredible autonomy and complete monopoly over their prosecution function, while 
simultaneously chafing at administrative controls imposed by their organization life. 
Their choices are more complex than just forming an interest group, however. We will 
see later how they must work diligently to define and preserve a rationale for a body that 
represents their collective interests. 
What do Crown prosecutors seek in their collective bargaining struggle? Why do 
they seek "unionized" status? The three key interests (Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980) of 
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wages, continued employment and working conditions are relevant in the Crown 
prosecutor case. The application of an arbitrary salary scale that ignored any evaluation 
or assessment of prosecutors' market position significantly affected the actual and 
perceived earning promise of the profession. Salary management was a perceived 
injustice in the workplace which Kelly (1998) says is necessary to mobilize workers. The 
struggle over wages was one of principle not just amount. Barling et al (1992) describe 
motivation to unionize through a model of collective action based on collective interests. 
These issues can encompass protection from arbitrary treatment, voice on the job and a 
say in how the work is done. In the context of professionals, the profession determines 
most of the dimensions of these issues but the employer may command resources in the 
workplace to facilitate the execution of the work. The employer can effectively fetter 
professional discretion through structural control. The power of the profession loses 
force (Raelin, 1989) in a heterogeneous organization - a circumstance that can lead 
professional workers to unionize. Crown prosecutors are situated in an employment 
context with the features just described. Their response to these pressures is to seek 
collective bargaining. This dissertation uses the example of Crown prosecutors to 
illustrate how employment context affects choice and effectiveness of strategies of 
collective action. 
While professions may once have been construed as virtual organizations that 
served members' interests they have been redefined by a professional body, a tangible 
organization that serves the public interest by supervising (the monopoly of) licensing. 
Associations have assumed the role of individual interest representation, but these do not 
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and cannot meet the specific needs of the employed professional. Thus, Crown 
prosecutors have formed a body for purposes of collective bargaining. This is a 
consistent approach when examined from an interest representation perspective. The 
fragmentation of interests that occurred as the profession became more established and 
bureaucratized has led to what seems inevitable. Many of the classic reasons that people 
join unions were features of prosecutors' workplaces. We cannot examine Crown 
prosecutors as one or the other, employee or professional, in pursuit of exclusionary 
closure or usurpationary closure. We must reconcile the distinct theoretical frameworks 
that define their interests as complementary strategies in an effort to control their labour 
process. The sociology of professions can extend its relationship with labour process 
theory to a new point, where strategies of collective action in pursuit of workplace goals 
are complementary to those that meet the goals of the profession. In fact, the profession 
can come to be defined to some extent in terms of the place of employment, and not the 
other way round. 
Why did the Crown prosecutors form a separate collective bargaining association 
and pursue collective bargaining and not leave the organization, using exit as a strategy 
of resistance (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Hirschman, 1970)? Likewise, they could have 
developed alternate forms of organization to control the labour market for prosecution 
services. For example, why is there an association bargaining with the employer rather 
than a force within the profession pushing the "special status" of the Crown prosecutor 
within the criminal bar? Why is exclusionary closure not pushed to its logical 
protectionist extreme? If a Crown can say "I won't work to rule, it's not professional, but 
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I will withdraw my services completely in a strike that is not sanctioned in statute or 
agreement" is he not blending the profession and the union-type collective in a novel 
way? To explore these issues fully it is helpful to examine the impact of dependent 
employment on the professionalization project and particularly on the notion of 
professional discretion. 
Professional Discretion 
A key concept in the quest for professional status is "mystique" (Larson, 1977). 
As well as a commanding a body of knowledge, professions purport to be an unknowable 
"art." To practice their art, professionals seek wide, and preferably unfettered, discretion. 
Professional discretion is manifest in the interpretation of core knowledge (the science) 
and the exercise of tacit knowledge (the art) in the execution of work functions. The 
application of this tacit knowledge and discretion is inherently entwined within the 
process of becoming a professional, and in reproducing one's professional identity over 
time in each work undertaking. Discretion and the ability to exercise it lie at the heart of 
professional control. 
In bureaucratic workplaces work processes become more carefully detailed and 
specified and process steps are committed to written form. This routinization of work, 
often rationalized as a quest for better public accountability and quality control, threatens 
to strip professions of their discretion. Several professions, such as nursing, medicine, 
and engineering have experienced a continual differentiation into specialties as they 
mature and as technological and scientific advances become embodied in professional 
practice (Evetts, 2004; Gawande, 2007b) As a result, employers or engagers have the 
potential to exercise greater control over those documented processes. Thus the 
routinization of much professional work jeopardizes professional identities in the 
contemporary workplace, particularly in the case of publicly employed professionals 
(Dent & Whitehead, 2002; Misztal, 2002). The symbol of prosecution control is the 
policy manual. Although there is an argument that says policy protects the public interest 
by ensuring accountability and consistency (Davis, 1969), prosecutors take issue with this 
position. In Chapter 5 we will see how they frame an opposing argument. 
Professions respond to the incursion into discretionary power by exercising 
greater or different closure strategies. The professions may make efforts to use different 
elements of Krause's model, enlarging their market monopoly, or they may attempt to 
organize more members within and beyond their profession. The goal is to more clearly 
define the boundaries of the profession, and thus exert control over access through that 
boundary. In some cases, these professions have turned to the usurpationary closure 
strategy of collective bargaining. 
Lawyers in private practice interviewed in this study indicate the labour process 
of professional lawyers is comparable across all forms of employment: self-employment, 
large and small private practice in professional service firms. Even civil lawyers (non-
prosecutors) in the public sector find much in common with their private sector peers. 
They decry the long hours spent building a practice and the absence of control over work 
when they take "whatever comes through the door" in order to build their practice. If 
careers of both private and public lawyers are built in much the same way, by taking up 
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challenges as they present themselves, then something must have occurred with Crown 
prosecutors to lead to collective bargaining. Is it the lack of career progression to an 
ownership like role? Do associates in private practice not mobilize because they hope to 
be partners one day? There are promotion opportunities for Crown prosecutors that come 
with increased status and earning power; some opportunities come with management 
responsibilities. On the surface, it might seem more likely that associates in very large 
law firms represent a greater critical mass for collective mobilization than the numbers of 
provincial prosecutors. Prosecutors are a very small group in their place of employment, 
where there are thousands of civil servants. Private law firms are managed 
democratically to some extent; managing partners are elected. Public service 
employment creates supervision that aims to extract effort from subordinates. This 
structure removes one of the key motivators of professional groups - economic gain and 
direct effort-outcome mechanisms. It is not that Crown prosecutors are no longer 
professionals, but they have a different component mix on the closure continuum and 
substitute collective bargaining mechanisms for professional ones when necessary. 
Dependent employment sets up a managerial dichotomy within the profession 
where some are superior to others, and hold disciplinary power over others, outside the 
role of the professional. This hierarchy undermines the profession's exclusive control 
over the application of its expertise, and introduces a managerial role with allegiance to a 
structure and values outside the profession. This managerial class, however, is bound to 
the profession in the same way the Crown prosecutors are bound to it, and defined by it. 
Yet there is no ownership status and less directional control than the managing partner in 
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a private law firm. Therefore, the labour process for Crown prosecutors is markedly 
different from other lawyers. Prosecutors' experience is different from that of other 
members of the civil service who are supervised by professional managers, and not 
individuals with expertise in the field of those they supervise. The profession remains the 
means to deliver prosecution services, but its cachet has been devalued through 
dependent employment. Just as the labour process of the prosecutor becomes 
subordinated in form first, and then in reality through structure, rules, and public 
exposure, so too has the status of prosecutor fallen in form, by being subject to dependent 
employment, and then in reality through structure and as rules eroded power. At present, 
there are no alternatives to prosecution other than by lawyers. In this sense, the 
profession still has monopoly control. However, the career path of prosecutors may 
indicate that specialization in the profession precludes movement between its branches 
after a certain point in time. Specialization of the legal profession is a theme that 
dominates the exploratory research and description of the legal profession in Chapter 4. 
Prosecutors draw strength from their specialization, which helps them to reconcile their 
completing logics of collective action. 
A Continuum of Closure Strategies 
With the forgoing broad discussion of characteristics and theories of a profession 
it is possible to conceive of individual professions along a continuum of forms, using 
different combinations of strategies and achieving different degrees of control at different 
stages. Krause's (1996) model of guild power (precursors of modern professions) 
contributes a dynamic framework through which we can view professions and 
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professionals beyond a static institutional lens. The model's four elements of 
membership, work conditions, market domination, and relations with the state are 
notionally present across all professions. Each instance of exclusionary closure may 
combine the four elements differently, reflecting the specific context of market 
centralization, economic models, and the relative power of pressure groups (Krause, 
1996). A guild-like group may use membership rules and relations with the state in 
differing ways, for example, depending on the economic model and the mobility of 
labour. Krause extends Larson's discussion of power to describe the interplay of these 
four elements. In his model, Krause argues that the traditional sources of professional 
power are eroded by the growth of capitalism and the modern state, which might be 
partially offset by the specialization described earlier. Gains in one or more of the 
elements of the model may be offset by retreats in other areas. For example, gains in the 
status of credentials may occur simultaneously with increased regulation and competition 
from new market entrants. 
Krause and continuum: A New Level of Development 
Campbell and Haiven (2008) elaborate Krause's work as a continuum to give us 
an indication of the multidimensional aspect of professionalism. This encourages us to 
be mindful of the complexity inherent in professions' attempts to sustain the scope of 
their practice and their roles in society and the world of work. In their discussion of 
professional control over work conditions, Campbell and Haiven describe how a 
profession or other guild-like body can be positioned at any point along a progression of 
increasing organization and formalization. The further one moves along the continuum 
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the greater power a professional body has, to the point of a fully realized professional 
project with market monopoly and self determination, which often extends to influencing 
the demand for services as well (Freidson, 1986; Larson, 1977). In this way, the authors 
link the strategies of exclusionary and usurpationary closure in a single model. This 
extends the work of Witz on processes of social power, and makes possible a discussion 
of both forms of closure in a single instance of professionalization. The continuum is 
illustrated below in Figure 1. 
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The idea of a continuum to represent progress towards full professionalization is 
not new. It is also clear that some occupations are further along the path to achieving the 
professional project than others. Greenwood (1957) and Hickson and Thomas (1969) 
have addressed the gradual nature of increasing professionalization and they suggest 
continua. MacDonald (1985) describes such a framework in his discussion of the 
accounting profession and its use of multiple strategies to achieve social closure without 
a full legal monopoly in the marketplace. Campbell and Haiven (2008) propose that a 
more finely graded continuum is warranted, with several additional points to describe 
fully the stages of professional closure. Furthermore, a comparable model can also apply 
to collective bargaining and frames a comparison of these two closure strategies 
(Campbell & Haiven, 2008). Finally, consideration of Krause's dimensions of guild 
power broadens the professional continuum beyond issues of social closure and class to 
explore relationships with state and other parties that are not dependent on capital and 
property. However, a continuum does not explain how a group shifts its thinking from 
one strategy to another. Heavy socialization of professionals is not undone in a moment, 
and cannot be undone and redone without effort. 
Campbell and Haiven show that collective bargaining among professionals is a 
strategy to reclaim professional power from the state. The strategies of collective 
bargaining and professional monopoly are both used to achieve the closure and control 
goals of professions. The Crown prosecutors move back and forth across the continuum 
using strategies from both exclusionary and usurpationary closure. 
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Conflicting Ideologies 
Control over the professional labour process is based on the exercise of 
specialized knowledge in an applied setting; professionals solve problems by 
discretionary application of expertise. Discretion and knowledge are at the heart of labour 
process struggles for all employees, not just professionals (Braverman, 1998). What 
differentiates professionals from the blue-collar worker, the craft union member, or the 
highly skilled technician is their monopoly on the knowledge and its exercise. They are 
typically not subject to any authority higher than their own profession's governing 
council. Thus on its face there is no contradiction between the ideology of profession and 
collective bargaining as both strategies seek control over use of discretion and 
application of specialized knowledge (Illich, 1977). However, collective bargaining 
traditionally raises issues of class power that do not resonate in a discussion of self-
employed professionals. The self-employed may exert real control over their labour 
process by assuming the values of the profession, but they do not "oppress" themselves in 
a class sense. When professionals are employed in bureaucracies collective bargaining 
becomes a relevant choice as a traditional form of association embraced by those with 
less control. There remains, however, a stigma attached to labour and labour issues 
voiced in this way. There is also a tension between subordination and autonomy that 
must be addressed if professionals are to bargain collectively. 
Kay (2004) distinguishes between professionalism, the characteristics of 
individuals and groups exhibited through behaviour, and the structure and traits of 
professions as more immobile entities. Furthermore, professionalism is depicted as an 
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ideology, a striving for some broader higher goals beyond individual and financial 
interests. When we examine the stories told by Crown prosecutors, just such an ideology 
emerges. In Chapter 5 this ideology, expressed as an ethos of fairness, is explored in 
greater depth. The ideology supersedes the pursuit of rewards that usually flow to 
members of the legal profession working in partnership settings and it emerges within a 
subspeciality of the profession. 
Specialization within the practice of law is cited as a further detriment to an 
overarching sense of professionalism (Abel, 2004). Specialization leads to segmentation 
in the profession which detracts from the solidarity of the professional community. This 
erosion of solidarity is problematic because the collective nature in question is attributed 
to an entity that is joined only in ethos, and not in organization. These traces of 
relationships between multiple parties lead to an assessment that the profession of law is 
in serious decline and jeopardy (Abel, 2004). If the nature of the legal profession as a 
monopoly is under attack or in decline alternate forms of collective action might well 
emerge. Institution theory would indicate that the most suitable form of organization will 
survive when an institutional field is faced with sudden shock or gradual change 
(Hinings, 2005). This very clearly echoes Abbott's (1988) conclusions when he states 
that in inter-profession disputes over professional boundaries the most appropriate 
professional body will emerge to represent the work and workers. Crown prosecutors 
developed an alternate form of organization in response to organization change. In 
Chapter 4 we will see how this move led to collective bargaining. In Chapter 5 I will 
discuss the impact of collective bargaining on closure for Crown prosecutors compared 
with the status quo membership in their professional regulatory body and subject matter 
interest groups. 
An Example of Conflicting Ideologies 
The right and role of the employer in disciplining employees is well known and 
documented. It is a fundamental management right in law and explicitly recognized in 
collective agreements with the balancing proviso that employees have the right to grieve 
discipline and discharge. Professions carry a double jeopardy because discipline by the 
employer over professional conduct is usually reported to the governing body of the 
profession. This triggers a second disciplinary process the final step of which is a 
disciplinary hearing. This path to discipline is in contrast to the (possibly) mutual 
problem solving approach in the employment setting. The risk to the practitioner is loss 
of license and thus ability to work in the profession anywhere, not just for the current 
employer (whereas discipline by one employer does not preclude working for another at a 
later date.) My preliminary research into discipline focused on the role of different 
bodies and organizations. Speaking with focus groups of nurses, one study participant 
mentioned that there is a professional obligation upon each individual licensed nurse to 
report suspected lapses in any co-worker's professional conduct or integrity. Lawyers 
have a similar obligation regarding their professional peers. This individualism and 
individual support for the professional ideal is in marked contrast to the individual 
support of the collective through a union. In fact, this participant indicated she has come 
into conflict with her union colleagues on this point. Reporting on a colleague for 
misconduct, particularly to the employer, directly undermines solidarity within the union. 
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The repercussion is that the event may also be reported to the professional body. On the 
other hand, reporting directly to the professional body may also require reporting to the 
employer on an ethical basis in addition to code of conduct requirements set out in 
practice standards (e.g. nursing). There is a tension built into the relationship between 
employer-union-profession. 
The Crown prosecutor represents an interesting paradox - membership in multiple 
forms of collective with differing logics of action and yet these apparently are not just 
compatible but mutually reinforcing. The broad generalizations of professional projects 
as they might apply to all members of a profession are insufficient in explaining the 
developments among criminal prosecutors as a particular speciality. It is not a case of 
splitting an individual's identity among several groups, and weakening each or forcing 
one to dominate in an allocation of finite resources. Crown prosecutors seem to move 
between two strong institutional forms, collective bargaining and professional 
membership, at will and fluidly. How is this development affected by the relationship of 
prosecutors to their broader profession? To their political masters? Their management 
bosses? The existence of an occupational community within prosecution may provide 
insight into these questions. 
Theme 3: Occupational Communities 
Occupational communities are groups of people who affiliate on the basis of their 
occupation, and develop relationships that extend beyond the content of daily tasks. 
These relationships touch members' personal lives and the multifaceted reinforcement of 
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the occupation across different life interactions in turn helps to forge an identity uniquely 
based in the occupational community (Salaman, 1971a; Van Maanen & Barley, 1984). 
Although members in occupations will draw on their interaction with others informing 
their identity and their occupational community (Sandiford & Seymour, 2007), at the 
same time the community is "to some extent separate from society" (p. 211). 
Occupational communities link members together through a number of distinct 
elements: the intensity of involvement in the work, extended relationships with 
coworkers that bridge home and work life, identification and socialization to the work 
identity (Salaman, 1971a). Marginalization, a diminished sense of status, plays a part in 
forming occupational communities as well; members of marginalized groups share a 
common view of the importance of their profession and tend to highlight the occupation's 
worthiness (Salaman, 1971a). Salaman also says that occupational communities arise out 
of loneliness, particularly the loneliness that derives from working asocial hours. Finally, 
members of an occupational community share values and norms (Van Maanen & Barley, 
1984) and tend to be satisfied with their work (Elliott & Scacchi, 2008; Salaman, 1971a). 
Occupational communities have certain characteristics: 
• The job is pervasive and sets norms for activities outside the workplace 
• The tasks set limits over non-work activities influencing friendship patters, non-
work norms and values 
• The organization controls activities outside work directly like sleeping, eating and 
recreation 
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• Jobs tend to be of short duration which may cause cultural norms and values 
constructed outside the workplace to be "imported" 
• Essential to maintain the "mystery" of certain jobs by unclear communication of 
knowledge descriptions and "know how". The community thereby retains 
ultimate control of knowledge and work. Once tasks are understood and codified, 
self-control of the group is reduced. 
• All friends, interests, and hobbies are work-based. (Lee-Ross, 2008, p. 470) 
Research on occupational communities may deal with just one or two of these 
characteristics (Lee-Ross, 2008) or may entail an investigation of a range of these 
characteristics within an occupation (Marschall, 2002; Sandiford & Seymour, 2007), 
often in a quest to determine whether a group of workers form an occupational 
community. Research in occupational communities has often dealt with leisure activities 
(Gerstl, 1961b; Salaman, 1971a). This is partly because hours of work have such a 
significant impact on available leisure hours. Salaman noted the particular power of 
irregular working hours and extended hours of work beyond the social norm to foster 
occupational community among railway workers; their colleagues were home at the same 
times they were and had available the same types of activities during those hours 
(Salaman, 1971a). The leisure activities were outside of work hours and often beyond the 
scope of the occupational content of work. However, underpinning the leisure activities 
is what Gerstl (1961a) describes as the "convergence of informal friendship patterns and 
colleague relationships" (p.3 8). If we focus on the colleague relationships then the nature 
of the activities is perhaps of lesser importance than the bonds that form and the 
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mobilization that is enabled by strong occupational community, which Gerstl attempts to 
measure. The key indicators of occupational community are reflected in the relationship 
measures such as the number of colleagues among a worker's ten best friends (Gerstl, 
1961a). In Cannon's (1967) study of compositors he notes that a characteristic of 
occupational community is also task-based and that OC is stronger among those workers 
who frequently seek the help of others in the execution of their daily tasks. This aspect of 
work is especially true for Nova Scotia prosecutors who work largely independently in 
the court room, but rely to a great extent on advice and input from their colleagues before 
and during pauses in court proceedings. 
Some occupational communities reflect Lee-Ross's list of characteristics to a 
greater extent than others, depending on circumstances. A number of studies cited here 
address the occupational community within established professions, such as dentistry and 
medicine (Salaman, 1971a). Much of the mystique and normative aspects of OC are 
addressed in the professional project. The use of specialized language is another example 
of a characteristic of OC (Cannon, 1967) that is an acknowledged aspect of the legal 
profession. This leads to the question are professions any different from occupational 
communities? Although the two concepts have much in common and seek similar goals, 
professions and occupational communities are manifest in different ways. The emphasis 
in the professional project is on the power of a collective to establish a market and a 
mental space for individuals to perform their work. A body of members exists, but does 
not operate in a collective sense in the daily execution of workers' tasks. A professional 
project relies on the elements of institutionalism for success. An occupational 
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community is beyond the scope of the profession, particularly when it exhibits Cannon's 
dependence on others for assistance and the social/leisure overlap with workmates. Yet 
OC contributes to the professional identity of its members as Van Maanen and Barley 
have discussed. There are aspects of professional workers' lives that contribute to their 
work practices and work identities that are only adequately explained by occupational 
community. Furthermore, the marginalization of an occupation contributes to 
development of a strong occupational community, and the division of a profession into 
subspecialties can lead to differential status and marginalization across the ranks of its 
members. 
The literature on occupational communities describes two ways they can form: on 
the basis of a workplace or an occupation. The latter spans a broader geographic area, 
and in fact its members seldom work closely together, but form their relationships outside 
of the workplace. Research on occupational communities is divided among employees of 
a specific organization and those in various organizations who are members of the same 
occupation. Van Maanen and Barley (1984) state that occupational communities 
"transcend organizational settings" yet they are also "bounded work cultures" (p. 314). 
The development of a work culture occurs first through the work itself (Lawrence, 1998) 
and this connection to the occupation can be enhanced when the occupation is 
marginalized (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984). Salaman (1971b) compares two forms of 
OC when he contrasts railway workers with architects; the former employed by a single 
organization and the latter in multiple organizations but united through their professional 
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training and practice. There is a trend in research on occupational communities to favour 
a structural approach (Salaman, 1974). 
Occupational communities are often precursors to professionalization. The OC 
helps to forge commitment and identity within an occupation, and the strength of 
relationships and norms within the community (Lee-Ross, 2008; Van Maanen & Barley, 
1984) can enable its members to mobilize for lobby, accreditation, education and other 
elements of professional projects. Success in establishing some level of control over 
these elements of the occupation in turn reinforces the occupational community. 
However, it may also be possible that the characteristics and operation of an occupational 
community may exist in any work setting, in any organization, and among any group of 
employees. Marschall (2002), for example, addresses the existence of subcultures within 
an occupation that develop in a specific employment site. Elliott and Scacchi (2008) 
describe subcultures within an occupational community that spans an industry. The 
potential for distinct occupational communities to exist within a single employer or as a 
sub culture of an existing profession is of particular interest in the case of lawyers. The 
profession of lawyer is heavily structured through training and apprenticeships, social 
norming, control of knowledge, and self governance. At the same time, there is a trend 
toward employment of large numbers of lawyers in single firms (Susskind, 2008) while 
the profession is subdividing into specialities across a variety of employment settings. 
The possibility thus exists that occupational communities may form within the profession 
based on some aspects of its evolving nature. In particular an occupational community 
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may exist within a subspecialty of the profession, within a specific employing 
organization, or both. 
Prosecutors seem to be second class lawyers, in the sense they have held few 
posts in the lawyers' professional society, earn less money on average than their private 
sector peers, and suffer increases to workloads without recourse. Prosecutors share these 
characteristics with Legal Aid lawyers and criminal defence lawyers to some extent. In 
Chapter 4 I relate my finding of how members of the legal profession describe 
themselves and their work. They do not express a hierarchy explicitly as this would 
undermine the solidarity of the profession. It is difficult to find explicit 
acknowledgement of this isolation among lawyers generally. The stories of prosecutors 
in Chapter 5 are much more forthright in this regard. Prosecutors also seem to be second-
class civil servants, especially when compared to other lawyers in government. Some 
aspect of this may be attributed to the conditions in which they work. Much has been 
written about the marginalizing effects of "dirty work" and its power to unite an 
occupation (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Bolton, 2005). Prosecutors certainly deal with 
unsavoury individuals and circumstances in the regular performance of their work. They 
meet individuals in police stations and jails; they are dealing with hurtful, often violent 
actions that emerge from the baser aspects of humanity. This bonds the prosecutors' 
occupational community closely together but also isolates it. Evidence of this isolation 
exists in the code of ethics of the Barristers' Society. Prosecutors have special rules 
which apply to them, and which exempt them from the application of certain portions of 
the code due to their unique circumstance of practice. Prosecutors are also isolated by the 
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requirement for confidentiality and the fact that they often cannot share the details of 
their work as it progresses. 
Prosecutors represent a third variation on OC. Prosecutors are members of a 
profession in which the workers are usually independent practitioners whether in solo or 
group practice. Prosecutors, however, are grouped together in a single employing 
organization. They are members of the broad occupation of lawyer and the specific 
subset of those who practice criminal law. The criminal speciality is subdivided further 
into those who prosecute and those who defend. Virtually all prosecutors are found in 
one of two single organizations, the provincial prosecution service / branch of the 
provincial Department of Justice or its federal counterpart. In the Crown prosecutor we 
see united the power of occupational community based on location and profession. Adler 
and Kwon (2008) explore community among professionals and they address medicine 
and law as characteristic autonomous professions that are moving to community-like 
structures and practices. However, the notion of occupational community in fully 
realized professional projects within a single dependent employment setting is largely 
unexplored in the literature, particularly in the case of the legal profession. 
This study creates an opportunity to examine whether and how the characteristics 
of an occupational community are present among professionals in dependent 
employment. Furthermore, we can examine how the conditions of dependent 
employment may undermine some aspects of professional control, and lead workers to 
search for additional control strategies that are supported by the occupational community. 
The case of Crown prosecutors is more than just an instance of independent practitioners 
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becoming dependent employees; it is a question of the governance of the profession, and 
how the governed exert control over their labour process and the exercise of discretion so 
essential to the professional project. 
Olson's (1977) work on the logic of collective action indicates that small groups 
will be more successful, and more motivated by greater returns, in achieving collective 
action than larger groups. This explains to some extent why the Crown prosecutors, a 
very small group in terms of a profession, have been successful in mobilizing. They have 
achieved bargaining and a mechanism that results in an arbitrated salary settlement, 
though they have never reached agreement by bargaining alone and have had to proceed 
to interest arbitration in each round of contract talks. 
Olson describes the provision of public goods, and the failure of a pure 
instrumental market logic to do so. Those with ample resources bear a greater burden in 
providing the good and others in the market become free riders. Under this model, the 
provision of prosecution as a public good would fall to lawyers with greater resources. 
This model may have applied in times when all prosecution was contracted out (Arthurs, 
Weisman, & Zemans, 1986; Stager & Arthurs, 1990). However, it may also be that those 
with many resources declined to provide this lower paying service, those with few 
resources could not afford to take the work, and so a captive section of the professional 
labour market was devised as dependent employees to provide the service at all times. 
This is one explanation for the public employment of prosecutors, and the small size of 
this legal specialty. 
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Not all of the characteristics of occupational communities are relevant to the legal 
profession and the Crown prosecutor. However, there are aspects of each characteristic 
noted above that do resonate with the members of this occupation, to an extent that it is 
worthwhile inquiring further into the existence of an occupation community as a 
subgroup of the profession. There are elements of marginalization, intense working 
conditions, irregular hours, and common values systems, to name a few, that tend to unite 
prosecutors, and that are not as powerful across the Bar in general. In addition, some of 
these characteristics emerge through the nature of professional work and some through 
the nature of dependent employment. The presence of an occupational community 
among prosecutors is a valuable heuristic that bridges the profession and the employing 
organization. 
Theorizing Collective Action Among Professionals: The Research Questions 
Edwards and Wajcman (2005) state that one needs to be able to explain why 
forces in society contain contradictions and what their effects are on the politics of 
working life. This rationale prompts my exploration of a paradox. On the one hand 
prosecutors struggle for collective bargaining, a usurpationary strategy that stems from a 
position of subordination. On the other hand they occupy positions in a elite profession, 
protected in Nova Scotia by special regulation of their governing body that secures their 
social closure. Professions and unions have a similar struggle over the control of 
discretion, and research has shown that both move along a continuum of strategies as 
they seek greater control over their labour process, markets, and social relationships. 
83 
The research question for this study asks: how is it possible for professionals to 
move back and forth from usurpationary to exclusionary strategies of closure, using both 
versions of the collective action continuum, and still maintain full membership and 
support for both forms of collective to which they belong: the profession and the 
collective bargaining unit? 
Hypotheses 
Occupational Community Among Prosecutors 
An important function of the professional project is to control the labour 
process and labour market for professional services (Larson, 1977). The focus of the 
study is to understand the role of closure in achieving goals of professionals - examining 
closure theory and how it operates in situations where professionals are employed 
permanently in heterogeneous organizations. Collective bargaining can achieve some 
measure of similar control and Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors selected bargaining as a 
supplementary strategy when their professional project faltered. The answer to why the 
professional project failed to achieve the goals of prosecutors and how collective 
bargaining came to resolve those issues lies in the development of a distinct occupational 
community within the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service and among other 
prosecutors across Canada. Some say the prospects of professions are diminished 
(Dussault, 1985; Susskind, 2008) but the presence and strength of occupational 
community suggests otherwise. 
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The characteristics of an occupational community emerge or are highlighted when 
a profession is segmented into a speciality. In this case criminal prosecution is a 
speciality within the legal profession. The profession is further segmented when 
individual practitioners are grouped according to their employment relations, in this case 
as employed public servants. I thus hypothesize that: 
An occupational community exists among Crown prosecutors in Nova 
Scotia. The characteristics of occupational community are uniquely available to 
lawyers in dependent employment with the Public Prosecution Service. 
An occupational community enables prosecutors to move between 
strategies of usurpationary closure and exclusionary closure to maintain their 
professional identity and vigorously pursue bargaining rights. 
Muzio and Ackroyd (2005) limit their discussion to occupational closure, and 
illustrate how closure moves from the broader societal forum to an internal form of 
protectionist exclusion. Through this transition they conclude that the legal profession is 
not in permanent decline, but is taking on a new form. Greenwood et al (2002) come to 
similar conclusions, though through institutional change. Through a discussion of the 
legal labour process, Muzio and Ackroyd challenge the deprofessionalization and 
managerialization thesis by revealing the adaptation of exclusionary closure to the 
internal workings of the professional services firm. This dissertation moves the 
discussion forward and examines both exclusionary and usurpationary forms of closure in 
the legal profession. Through a detailed case study, I explore the role of both forms of 
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closure in a prosecution service comprised of lawyer prosecutors and lawyer managers. I 
will demonstrate how relations between these two groups over control of the labour 
process affect the professional project of lawyer and prosecutor. The study will highlight 
how occupational community plays an important role when professionals seek collective 
bargaining over terms and conditions of employment. 
On the issue of occupational community, specific questions this study will address 
include: 
Which elements of occupational community are important to professionals? 
How are these different elements manifest in the case of Crown Attorneys? 
How does the prosecutors' occupational community form? 
How does the existence of a strong occupational community impact the 
struggle for collective bargaining? 
Ideological Conflict Among Closure Strategies 
The study explores how Crown prosecutors reconcile the exclusionary 
closure strategies of the elite profession of law with usurpationary closure strategy of 
collective bargaining. In pursuit of this I asked: 
What use do prosecutors make of the progressive strategies from the closure 
continuum? 
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How do prosecutors talk about unions and collective bargaining relative to 
professional associations? 
How do prosecutors move back and forth between exclusionary and 
usurpationary strategies; professional forms of representation and collective 
bargaining? 
Nature of the Work and the Labour Process 
The Crown prosecutors' struggle over collective bargaining reflects a deeper 
struggle between management seeking administrative control, the public demand for 
transparency, the broader legal profession protecting its domain and workers themselves 
in an occupational community as they vie for control of the labour process. Prosecutors 
strive to be connected in relationship to each group, and still control their own economic 
gains and prestige as members of their profession. The independence and discretionary 
powers recognized and upheld by the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, and which derive 
from the authority of the Attorney General, are constrained by the employment 
relationship and are a source of frustration for Crown prosecutors when they compare 
their situation with that of other lawyers. Resistance in the form of collective bargaining 
and collective action in new forms outside the Barristers' Society and Criminal Lawyers' 
Association is necessary for lawyers to meet professional goals and needs. Prosecutors' 
degree of discretion and autonomy at work is improved through collective bargaining. 
I hypothesize that the tightening controls of bureaucratic and direct personal 
resistance (Hodson, 1995) lead to worker isolation from the profession and means a new 
Association is the most effective vehicle to achieve their goals. The power inherent in 
the professional project is diminished when lawyers are employed in a dependent 
employment relationship. They describe their profession in terms of segmentation and 
division of interests between management and rank and file prosecutors. The unity of the 
profession thus diminished results in an uneven distribution of status, financial security, 
and security of tenure across the profession. Specific questions in this domain include: 
Did the labour process of Crown prosecutors change as a result of forming a 
new organization - the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service? 
What does collective bargaining achieve for Crown prosecutors? 
Does criminal prosecution rank low in a professional hierarchy and as a 
result is there a proletarianization within the profession, or somehow a 
subordination of the speciality? Does this lower status give rise to a different 
labour process for prosecutors? 
Professional Project of Prosecutors 
I further hypothesize that the practice of prosecution is not "de-professionalized" 
(Haug, 1975) as a result of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining by Crown 
prosecutors strengthens the sub section of the profession dealing with criminal matters by 
defining boundaries, specifying membership and controlling access to representation and 
the benefits of bargaining. The practice of prosecution exhibits characteristics of an 
occupational community (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984) which have been heightened if 
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not created by organization and statutory forces and reinforced by the governance of the 
broader profession. 
How do prosecutors reconcile their collective bargaining project with their 
professional project? 
Once bargaining was achieved, did professionals redefine their professional 
project to accommodate changes in workplace relationships? 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework that guides this research study. The 
next chapter describes the methodology I used to design the study, and to collect and 
analyse data from lawyers across Canada and from Crown prosecutors in Nova Scotia. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology: Collected Voices 
The goal of Chapter 3 is to describe my chosen methodological approach to data 
collection and analysis and to explain why this approach is the best suited to this project. 
I present the case study as my research design and discuss why narrative analysis lends 
itself to this particular research project. The chapter describes the literature on the 
narrative method of data collection and analysis and my chosen approach to this type of 
analysis. I detail the study implementation and conclude with a review of the advantages 
and limitations of narrative analysis in this specific project. The discussion addresses the 
rationale for my methodological approach as a project in organizational studies and the 
unique characteristics of my research topic and study participants. 
A methodology is a combination of theoretical assumptions and data gathering 
techniques framed by analytical approach (Silverman, 2005). This dissertation project is 
based on a single case examining the labour process of professionals in dependent 
employment. My analysis of participants' workplace experiences follows an 
interpretivist approach(Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). I have chosen narrative analysis for its 
iterative nature that lends itself to an examination of the empowerment/constraint aspects 
of labour theory. Narrative analysis allows several different readings of the same 
material within the context of a single analysis, as I will describe below. My discussion 
of the results takes a critical perspective on the organization and workplace relations 
(Willmott, 1997). This is accomplished by using narrative analysis of accounts of the 
Crown prosecutors' struggle for collective bargaining rights. 
Narrative analysis is a rich approach to analysis because room exists for the 
researcher's reading of the stories and this is acknowledged as an inherent component of 
the method. The voice of the storyteller is present, along with voices of the network of 
relations within the labour process. The reader's interpretation and reflexive analysis of 
the narrative, built on a theoretical framework, becomes part of the data as the analysis 
progresses. The researcher's reading becomes integral to the analysis; what she chooses 
to include, to omit, to classify under specific constructs, etc., all becomes part of the 
broader telling of the research story (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, & Zilber, 1998). This 
research project is rooted in my personal experience in the Nova Scotia civil service, 
which I describe in the following section. Narrative analysis solves two issues in this 
dissertation project: the rigor of an established methodology will help to establish my 
credibility as a researcher; and moving from specific experience to broader commentary 
through the analytic process will contribute insights relevant to my academic field. 
Methodological Approach 
The following section develops a methodological framework for examining the 
experiences of professionals who seek collective bargaining. The research is based on a 
case study of public sector professionals in Canada and draws on archival materials, 
focus groups and semi-structured interviews with thirty seven individuals. Sixteen of 
those individuals are or have been Crown prosecutors. I asked focus group participants 
to tell the story of their careers and to reflect on forms of representation in their 
profession. In some focus groups I asked participants to describe the story of collective 
bargaining in their profession. These focus groups were comprised of lawyers, nurses, 
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and librarians. I applied narrative analysis to this preliminary data. This analysis 
generated a framework then used to analyze the experiences of Crown prosecutors. I 
spoke with prosecutors in three provinces, British Columbia, Ontario and Nova Scotia 
and developed a case study of Nova Scotia. 
Many Options 
Quantitative/Qualitative 
I faced many methodological choices when starting this project. The first 
significant choice was between qualitative and quantitative methods. The industrial 
relations literature, like much of business and management research (Johnson, P. & 
Duberley, 2000), is dominated by quantitative studies as any review of major academic 
journals will attest. Studies of the legal profession also draw on quantitative methods 
(Ackroyd & Muzio, 2007; Kay, 2004). The design options for quantitative studies are 
numerous and include surveys, experiments and quasi-experimental design, as well as 
archival research and numerous applications of content analysis, to name only a few. 
Although these approaches generate compelling results, and I am interested in aspects of 
causal relationships between the structure of professions and the behaviour of their 
members, I was drawn to an approach that would uncover meaning within the 
experiences of my study participants. I sought a methodology that would not only test 
theory, but also help to uncover aspects of the theoretical framework that have not yet 
been specified. 
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Qualitative research is more common in the social sciences than the business 
milieu (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Hodson, 2005). Pinnington and Suseno (2008) use 
qualitative methods to explore aspects of change in the legal profession. Qualitative 
research is also notable in studies of the professions as social movements, for example 
(Bucher, 1962). Bucher's qualitative work on professions and segmentation provides 
some important insights for the analysis of the legal profession in Chapter 4. A 
qualitative approach seemed indicated based on my research questions and the early 
investigation I conducted into the legal profession which also uncovered change and 
segmentation. 
My motivation to choose a qualitative approach is firstly academic because it 
answers the demands of my research questions. However, this choice is also partly due 
to my firsthand experience with Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors and their struggle for 
collective bargaining. I worked for a period during the later 1990s and early 2000s with 
the central human resource agency of the Nova Scotia provincial government. In the 
course of my tenure I handled major corporate files that either introduced significant 
change to personnel management practices or posed human resource challenges of 
various sorts to Government. The Public Prosecution Service was one such file, and I 
was directly involved in several stages of consultation and later in negotiations that lead 
to voluntary recognition5 of the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association. I personally 
5 At the time the labour legislation in Nova Scotia prevented lawyers from applying for union 
certification as a first step towards collective bargaining. This restriction can be avoided if the employer 
voluntarily recognizes a group for the purposes of bargaining ("Trade Union Act," 1989). 
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witnessed the events that lead to the negotiation of a salary setting mechanism and I 
know the core facts in the case. During my employment I also had access to individuals 
and information about the working conditions of Crown prosecutors in the Province. As 
a result, an objective type of data gathering that collected facts and events without scope 
for interpretation and elaboration by Crown prosecutors would add little to enhance my 
understanding of the research problems. I needed richer and more detailed data than 
many quantitative methods could provide. From the outset of this project I was very 
familiar with the history and the analysis of the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service 
that had been conducted by several independent parties. What this study demanded was a 
more intimate view of the experiences of the prosecutors themselves; a view that could 
only be obtained by gathering detailed data that allowed the study participants to reflect 
broadly on the events and relationships under examination. 
Case Study 
A case study is a single instance of a phenomenon, examined in detail for insigts 
that it brings to the broader experience of the researcher and the field (Yin, 1981). By 
choosing Nova Scotia as a case study of the Crown prosecutors expereince, I am able to 
explore in depth the context and the detailed expereinces of the individuals who are 
working in their profession while they stuggle for collective bargaining. In a broader 
sense, the occupation of Crown prosecutor is also a case, and I have drawn data from two 
other provinces whose prosecutors also bargain collectively. The complexity of social 
action and the dynamics of concurrent membership in collectives that hold differing 
ideologies and goals demand a robust methodological approach such as case study offers. 
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A single case is not a limit on the ability to transfer and compare findings to another 
context (Chreim et al., 2007), it is a richly detailed exposition of a phenomenon. 
The phenomena of professionalization and collective bargaining could be studied 
in numerous ways. One could examine cross sections of various professions, located at 
different points along the closure continuum, for example. Comparative research across 
different legal jurisdictions is another possible way to study the legal profession. Studies 
of occupational community have taken a comparative approach as well. (Gerstl, 1961a; 
Salaman, 1971b). However, the research design must follow from the research questions 
(Silverman, 2005) and so to understand how a profession endures the move to dependent 
employment and embraces supplementary strategies of closure, a detailed examination of 
one case is appropriate. I have rejected a tiered case study of all provincial jurisdictions 
across Canada for the weakness Abbott (1992) describes in the population/analytic 
approach to cases. He states that they "lose their complexity and narrative order" (p. 83) 
in the quest to reduce all variables and attributes to simplest form and generalize across 
all instances of a phenomenon with core traits. As I rejected the trait theory of 
professions in Chapter 2,1 cannot embrace a research design that would end with a trait-
based result. 
Case studies are built over time through direct observation and experience with 
the research site, personal contact with operations and extended reflection and revision of 
descriptions and interpretations of findings (Stake, 2005). This is the process I followed 
in conducting this study. I had direct experience as an employee of the Nova Scotia 
provincial government, responsible for human resources strategy for non-unionized staff 
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in the mid 1990s until 2003. My role was that of chief negotiator for management in the 
extended discussions that led to collective bargaining for Crown prosecutors in Nova 
Scotia. The story of those negotiations is developed in Chapter 4. My direct experience 
provided me with numerous insights into the context and regulation of employment in the 
civil service and my direct work experience with Crown prosecutors in Nova Scotia gave 
me some insight into their challenges and concerns. However, it was only by extending 
this experience in a structured research project, using in-depth interviews with key 
informants, and collecting comparative data in other priovinces and across other 
professions that I have been able to achieve the level of analysis that has the potential to 
provide insights into the broader experience of professionals who bargain collectively. 
Research Design 
Choice of Case 
While some authors address the legal profession in a very general sense (Bell, 
2009; Kritzer, 1999; Paton, 2008; Pue, 2009), and include educational institutions and the 
courts in their studies, most data and examples are drawn from professional service firms 
(see Chapter 2). This may be due to the fact that most lawyers are employed in this type 
of large firm. The profession is built upon a model of self employment and some studies 
do differentiate respondents on this basis (Kay, 2004) but few studies have examined the 
change in employment relationship over time (Muzio & Ackroyd, 2005). Professionals 
are growing as a proportion of the public service, and the public service accounts for 
much of Canadian union density (Kumar & Schenk, 2006). There is a notable silence in 
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the literature on public sector lawyers, and I could identify no literature on institutional 
theory or the sociology of the profession that includes specific examination of public 
sector lawyers and prosecutors. This is an important gap which this dissertation 
addresses. 
The idea that the profession protects the public interest (Krause, 1996) takes on a 
more powerful meaning when we discuss public prosecution. There is both a sense of 
protection of the public from offenders and a requirement that prosecution duties be 
executed in an excellent, competent manner. This latter requirement demands that justice 
be done, and to be seen to be done, in order to ensure the principles of fairness and 
innocence are safeguarded. This is particularly salient in Nova Scotia with its legacy of 
the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall Jr. and subsequent Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into that conviction which cast shadows of doubt on the actions of political 
figures and prosecutors. 
The public sector is an important site for research into professionals for three 
significant reasons. First, employment in this sector is often regularized around duties 
rather than around clients, as is the case with private sector lawyers. Second, the number 
of professionals as a proportion of the public sector workforce is rising (White, 1993), 
Third, the literature on professions has not dealt with public sector employment in any 
major way. In addition, the public sector has a single payor for most employment: 
government and it is under close fiscal scrutiny. These features combine to place 
significant pressure on professional employees. Their work results are often difficult to 
quantify due to the intangible nature of much of their decision-making and this conflicts 
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with the emphasis on accountability and measurement in current public management. A 
study of the lawyers in a public sector organization is an opportunity to examine the 
impact of changes on the professional labour process and illustrates workers' response to 
these pressures. 
Not only has the legal profession changed in terms of the employment status of 
lawyers, but the nature and organization of prosecution has also changed over time. In 
Chapter 4 I describe the evolution of public prosecution from fee-for-case prosecutor to 
public employees who make a career of this work (Stager & Arthurs, 1990). Unlike the 
private sector lawyers who can build a practice across a variety of work, the public sector 
prosecutor does not "drum up business" but rather waits for it to come through the door. 
All prosecution is now conducted by the state. The delegation of this activity to 
professionals within a dependent employment relationship shifts the control of terms and 
conditions of employment from the purview of the professional to the bureaucracy of the 
civil service. The autonomy to define one's work and apply one's tools (in this case 
specialized knowledge) can potentially be fettered by an employer. Although the lawyer 
in a professional service firm can also be viewed as a dependent employee, the 
employing organization is comprised of professionals, and ownership of the firm rests 
with partners who are themselves members of the profession. This is not the case in a 
heterogeneous organization like the civil service. Therefore, a case study of public 
prosecutors offers a window into a profession that has undergone significant change. The 
organization of work and the relationship of prosecutors to the rest of their profession 
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have been impacted. A detailed study of the way prosecutors adjust to these changes is 
the optimum approach to the research questions posed by this study. 
Interpretive Approach 
Qualitative research allows for the subjective interpretation of events (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005; Silverman, 2005) by participants. My research objective was to link the 
experiences of my research subjects, Crown prosecutors, to the context of their profession 
and their status as dependent employees. This objective suggests an interpretive 
approach (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Prasad, 2005) in order to link the context of work to 
the active agency of workers' lived experience. This approach regards the social context 
of work not as a given structure but rather as an work in progress, constructed by the 
participants (Prasad, 2005). In particular, the way that prosecutors experience their 
profession is not only given to them through the socialization process of law school and 
articles, but is also socially constructed by prosecutors themselves as they live their 
experience. This research project explores not only the material motivations behind 
relations of production, but also the ways that social structures are created and recreated 
by social actors. The stresses and strains of the organization, the Public Prosecution 
Service, are relevant factors to consider in the analysis. This project explores the 
participants' own view of events and uses their interpretations as data. In this approach I 
can explore where latent power lies dormant compared to where it is exercised in the 
organization, and how the actors interpret their situation. 
99 
Collecting narratives, or long stretches of storytelling (Riessman, 1993) to 
accomplish my research goals further supports the interpretive approach; narrative 
creation by the storyteller is an action itself. We can learn much from the content of the 
stories, but also from the way in which the stories are told. Stories are developed and 
recounted in specific ways to meet the needs of not just the researcher, but the study 
participant as well. As Reissman (1993) says, the telling of the stories reflects the teller's 
interpretation in addition to relating events. 
Stories and Narratives 
Individual stories lie within the long narratives. These stories are episodes in a 
longer tale. Pulling stories out of Crown prosecutors' narratives reveals how they 
understand the social relations that define their employment, their labour, and their 
profession at key points in time. Prosecutors' stories can be analyzed to uncover how 
power is latent or manifest in these relations. Stories can reveal the motivations behind 
Crown prosecutors' choice of closure strategy. One of the primary goals of this research 
is to explore how Crown prosecutors reconcile their participation in their profession with 
collective bargaining. The analysis of personal stories is a way to show how these 
professionals reconcile competing logics of collective action. 
Narrative analysis does not presume a fixed social structure at the outset and thus 
fits well with an interpretivist approach to labour theory. For example, the researcher 
assumes some external perhaps non-empirical real construct of power exists, and yet 
allows that this is perceived quite distinctly by different social actors and in different 
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space-time contexts. As a result, the methodological approach of narrative analysis 
permits us to begin with the observed and interpreted actions in order to explore a 
problem and to uncover deeper structures, meanings, or themes in data analysis. We 
begin with professionals, and an established profession. By allowing prosecutors to 
describe their career and their profession in their own terms a distinct picture of social 
relations between prosecutors, their professional peers, and their employer emerges. 
Why Stories? 
Narrative gives us ordered stories of events, experiences and impressions in a 
historical recreation to serve a purpose (Lieblich et al., 1998). I have suggested in the 
opening section of this chapter why such data is particularly useful for addresses the 
problems posed in this research. In addition, prosecutors are storytellers almost by 
definition. They take the facts and evidence of a case and present these in a particular 
way to convey to a judge a compelling picture of events, motivations, and outcomes from 
some past incident. Prosecutors are sifters of data and extractors of critical events. As 
research subjects it follows that an effective way to approach their personal experiences 
is to ask them to tell their own stories and to draw on the richness of their experience in 
as unrestricted a way as possible, while guiding them to address this study's research 
questions. Storytellers present their stories to an audience, and I am aware that the study 
participants craft their stories specifically for me. As I possess my own view of the 
"facts" in this case, the way prosecutors present their stories is a very important part of 
my analysis. Items they emphasize, episodes they downplay or omit all construct a view 
of the struggle for collective bargaining that makes sense for the tellers. This is the goal 
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of my research project - to understand how it is that prosecutors negotiate both sides of 
the closure continuum in a way that is meaningful and consistent for them. Asking for 
narratives provides rich data, with layers of nuance that are not available in a more 
positivistic research approach. 
"For scholars who analyze personal narratives, it is important to recognize that 
stories that people tell about their lives are never simply individual, but are told in 
historically specific times and settings and draw on the rules and models in 
circulation that govern how story elements link together in narrative logics." 
(Maynes, Pierce, & Laslett, 2008, p. 3) 
Because stories are entrenched in the social relationships and structures of the 
storytellers, a careful reading of these stories can provide insight into how the individual 
experience ties to the broader collective and institutional forces (Maynes et al., 2008). 
Stories situate prosecutors within their profession, their workplace, and within the 
struggle for control they experienced. One of the weaknesses of theoretical development 
in industrial relations and the sociology of the professions, noted in Chapter 2, is the 
dominance of structural forms with little regard for individual agency. The capacity for 
action and its effects can be uncovered through individual accounts of ordered life stories. 
These accounts are subjective, reflect the context in which individual action takes place 
and are thus a methodological bridge between the theoretical foundation of this study and 
the seemingly contradictory experience of Crown prosecutors. 
Narrative Analysis 
"Narrative analysis assumes a multitude of theoretical forms, unfolds in a variety of 
specific analytic practices, and is grounded in diverse disciplines. .. .the theoretical 
complexity and methodological diversity in narrative modes of inquiry are its major 
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strengths... particularly useful for addressing the unmet challenge of integrating 
culture, person, and change" (Daiute & Lightfoot, 2004, p. viii) 
Taking a narrative analysis approach to research means not fitting and testing a 
theory to circumstances, but exploring circumstances to allow theory to emerge 
(Freeman, M., 2004). This type of analysis is an iterative process that allows a researcher 
to explore data more deeply by referring back to theory and circumstance repeatedly, and 
exploring different aspects of the same material. Marsden (1999) suggests a similar 
approach in his development of a critical analysis of the labour process. Freeman (2004) 
suggests that narrative is structured, and thus is read backwards from the ending to the 
source in an expository way that is helpful in understanding the latent dimensions of 
social production. In this study I read the results of the preliminary focus groups which 
led to a question framework for subsequent in-depth interviews. My interview questions 
asked for the story of events that have already taken place. I read and reread those 
interviews, allowing the role of occupational community to emerge as an explanation of 
the circumstances prosecutors faced in their professional lives and workplace relations. 
Forms of Narrative 
A story necessarily has a teller and an audience, even if these are the same 
individual, as in autobiographical private storytelling. The analysis brings at a minimum 
the researcher into the story as audience and there may be several audiences for a given 
story. Given this diversity, we find that narratives, their constituent stories, take on 
different forms. These forms include anticipatory, habitual, hypothetical, topic centred, 
and thematic/episodic accounts (Riessman, 1993). These accounts are not all stories in a 
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chronological sense, though they share specific elements. Labov and Waletsky (2003) 
specify the following components of narratives: abstract, orientation, complicating action, 
evaluation, resolution, and coda. There are different forms of stories and they are built in 
a particular way, of specific components. Each story will contain some or all of the 
Labov and Waletsky's 6 elements. A variety of materials in addition to oral stories can 
be treated as narrative, including archival material from organizations and records of 
public events, for example. 
Narratives, though often individual, can also be collective and organizational 
(Czarniawska, 1998). Narratives are a source of information about how individuals and 
organizations construct themselves, particularly for a public audience (Czarniawska, 
1998) and we come to know an organization through these narratives. Organization 
narratives can be found in archival material as well as in the verbal accounts of key 
informants. Organizational narratives are particularly relevant to the proposed 
dissertation research as they are a tangible production of underlying social structures. We 
can understand the notion of worker power in a collective or a profession, through a study 
of organization narratives that come from the collective body or that are in opposition it. 
Gabriel (2004) says that narratives do not sit on top of the organization as an afterthought 
or an additional descriptive device. Instead, narratives are part of the essence of the 
organization and a reader will be able to see in the narrative the teller's way of enacting 
the relationships within the organization itself. In the collective bargaining project, this is 
an ideal tool to explore the nature of the social relations of production and social closure. 
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Narratives are deliberate and conscious rather than merely serendipitous 
descriptive accounts. Every story has a purpose its teller wishes to convey (Riessman, 
1990). Each storyteller makes a series of strategic decisions in constructing and telling a 
story (Riessman, 1993). A story reflects not only the history of an organization in terms 
of experienced events and actors decision, but also the current context, and the values and 
future intended direction of the organization. Tellers will situate themselves and their 
experiences in the context in a unique way. For example, they will reflect how they 
negotiate between material causes of power and other levels of the labour process model. 
As a result, the form cannot be separated from the content of narratives. I sought the 
thematic/episodic form of narrative in my study because it reflects the positioning of the 
teller in relation to their context and experiences. Analysis of narrative moves beyond 
the surface of experiences to a broader commentary (Riessman, 2008). 
Flexibility 
Narrative analysis is incredibly flexible as a methodological approach. It was 
founded in the literary tradition (Onega & Landa, 1996) and lends itself, for example, to 
psychology (Lieblich et al , 1998), positivist research in content analysis (Mir & 
Rahaman, 2006), grounded theory (Beech, 2000), interpretivist rhetoric analysis 
(Feldman et al., 2004), organization studies (Czarniawska, 1998), and labour relations 
(Cullum, 2003). Because there is a variety of narrative form and content, there is little 
limiting the researcher who proceeds without a priori theoretical assumptions and as a 
result, narrative analysis also takes a number of forms. Narratives reveal the "practices 
of power" (Riessman, 1993, p. 5) and "distill political and social relations" (Feldman et 
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al., 2004, p. 3) in story form, which are elements of my research problem. Storied 
accounts can then be analyzed for themes where the emphasis is on the content - what is 
said, what is not said. Structural analysis focuses on how a story is told: its components 
and ordering. To explore how respondents impose order on the flow of their experiences 
(Riessman, 1993) researchers analyze the tellers' stories. A close analysis of stories, 
Riessman argues, reveals how individuals understand their role in the realization of their 
goals. The approach is very well suited to a study of closure strategies which are overt 
attempts to manipulate social relations in pursuit of personal and group goals. 
Boje (1991) distinguishes between narrative and story in terms of time. He 
classifies narratives as tales that are concerned with the past while stories are tales of an 
emerging present. There is a great deal of inconsistency in defining narrative and story in 
organization studies (Hyde, 2008; Rindfleish, Sheridan, & Kjeldal, 2009; Whittle, 
Mueller, & Mangan, 2009), but Boje's point allows this study to embrace both the past 
and emerging work experiences in the form of tales told by participants. This flexibility 
lets me explore events and impressions from the past that are part of an ongoing life and 
organization. Prosecutors have not achieved collective bargaining in its fullest form and 
their struggle continues. Their stories provide insight into their past achievements and 
also their way forward. 
Narrative analysis accomplishes an important function in labour relations 
research; it provides an order of events and a coherence from the storyteller's point of 
view that reflects the way in which the teller positions herself in a socially constructed 
world (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). There is a coherence of structure and text in a 
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narrative that eliminates the need to reconcile these two elements because they are 
presented simultaneously to the researcher. The interplay of form and content in 
narrative analysis (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2004) makes it an appropriate tool to capture 
the action, motivation and deeper social structures that are of interest in light of the 
theoretical framework for this project. By examining the narratives of Crown prosecutors 
I explore the social construction of the professional within the context of dependent 
employment. My approach to this study combines the detailed analysis of individual 
experiences of the participants on the frontier of the struggle with a small archival 
component. The archival research captured an historical aspect of the struggle through 
the institutional and personal narratives of actors otherwise inaccessible to this 
researcher. Archival data also gave a voice to the government employer as a social actor 
in this struggle. 
Narrative Analysis of the Labour Process 
The narrative approach has the potential to capture the tension between 
empowerment (telling one's own story, creating one's own truth) and constraint (by the 
form of storytelling and the relations within the story itself). This mirrors the dialectic of 
empowerment and constraint in the struggle for collective bargaining. The dialectic of 
the labour process that enables and constrains labour emerges in narrative; participants 
describe aspects of this dialectic and also reveal it in the structure and style of the 
narrative itself. In narrative the teller reveals conduct as well as intention, and situates 
the action in a context that reveals the social structures which generate that action 
(Czarniawska, 1998). The context includes the history and organization of relations, and 
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so reflects the underlying relational networks of the labour process of professionals so 
germane to this project. Czarniawska (1998) also states that narrative "renders the 
unexpected intelligible" (p.6) which is of particular relevance in the case of professionals 
who change their closure strategies. 
Poveda (2004) illustrates the value of narrative analysis as a tool for 
understanding closure. In his study of a discussion of a group outing he reveals the 
ability of the tellers to recreate not only the social dimensions of the experience itself but 
also to continually define the relationships within the group through their narratives of 
the outing. The tellers use strategies that are inclusive or exclusive of group members 
who were not present at the outing. They also use affiliative and resistance strategies in 
their storytelling to position themselves within the group after the event, irrespective of 
the institutional norms of the group or the outing (Poveda, 2004). This analytic approach 
has much to offer an exploration of the struggle for Crown prosecutors' bargaining rights. 
When conceived or recounted as an event that took place in the past, the struggle can be 
narrated by those who took active part as well as by those who did not. The relationships 
within the profession and the employee group can be examined through the narrative 
devices and conventions the tellers use. The latent characteristics of relationships can be 
revealed through positioning strategies of storytellers. The presence of an occupational 
community and its characteristics can be explored in this way. There is also no study that 
explores unionization and professionalization from the participants' own perspective. 
Van Maanen and Barley (1984) base their recommendations for empirical data gathering 
on the premise that a community is defined by those within it. Thus, collecting data 
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directly from participants on the nature and scope of the boundaries of their community is 
the most appropriate way to understand the occupational community. 
Silverman (2005) recommends finding a model for one's research method. 
Bertaux & Bertaux-Wiame's (1981) work on artisanal bakeries in France provides such a 
model. These authors conducted a narrative analysis of the labour process of the artisanal 
bakery. Rather than limit their study to a materialist analysis of the relations of capital to 
physical labour, they examine the "psychic structure" (p. 174) of the social relations in 
the immediate production of a bakery and in the network of relations that sustains the 
artisanal movement. Their study is an exploration of how this network sustains and 
reproduces its labour capacity. They begin with a social phenomenon, the continued 
production and consumption of artisanal bread throughout France. Their conclusions are 
the reverse of their original supposition, that idiosyncratic taste drives the production. 
Industrialization of the bread process changed the bread product in many western nations, 
but this is not the case in France. The authors discover that nature of production literally 
and figuratively feeds consumption, which is contrary to a contemporary interpretation of 
consumption in a monopoly capital context. The authors are guided in their study not by 
a strict hypothesis testing and scientific method but by a spirit of exploration as they 
gather narratives from regional artisanal bakers. They do not abandon theory, but use a 
theoretical base as a point of departure as they discover the strength and latent power that 
lies in the social contract of bakers' marriages, apprenticeships, and family ownership. 
They interpret these as the foundation of the relations of production. 
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The phenomenon that catches my attention in this research project is a variation 
of the Bertaux & Bertaux-Wiame study. I pursue how the independent artisanal 
prosecutor, if you will, experiences a change in the relations of production from an 
independent, craft type of work to a dependent employee subject to administrative control 
over his professional discretion. Like the artisanal bakers, the prosecutors could have 
been subsumed in an industrialization equivalent of the bakery model. Prosecutors' work 
could have possibly been de-professionalized to some extent. However, I find that 
prosecutors maintain membership in their profession and develop a specialized niche 
therein. The "psychic structure" of prosecutor's occupational community protects and 
sustains their control over their labour process. The network of social relations in 
prosecution work lies at the heart of the answers to my research questions as it did in 
Bertaux & Bertaux-Wiame's study. Prosecutors did not seek collective bargaining 
simply because they became dependent employees, subject to management control. They 
sought collective bargaining as the full expression of their professional project as 
specialized lawyers, with a unique ideology based in their occupational community. 
Below I will describe the methods used to gather empirical material and the application 
of narrative analysis to this project. The chapter will conclude with a summary of 
possible strengths and weakness of this approach to my dissertation topic. 
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Implementation of the Study 
Data Gathering 
I approached the data for this project using Riessman's (1993) five levels of 
representation in research: attending, telling, transcribing, analysis and reading . In 
attending to the primary experiences of Crown prosecutors, my research was conducted 
in the field to gather as much narrative as possible from the milieu in which it is 
produced. Telling the experience included semi-structured interviews (McCracken, 
1988) at the workplace. Semi-structured interviews with Crown prosecutors, based on 
elaboration of the research question, generated personal narratives for further study. 
Archival research at the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association and in publically 
available media produced additional material that contains narratives of individual 
members, of the association as an organization, and of the employer (Czarniawska, 
1998). 
Reviewing Archival Data 
There is a body of literature that recounts the history of the legal profession in 
Canada. I draw upon this work to position the Crown prosecutors in their profession and 
the prosecutor within the employment context of the civil service. There is additional 
literature that takes an international perspective; Susskind (2008), for example, explores 
the legal profession in the UK and draws conclusions for an international audience. The 
Nova Scotia provincial government publications, such as press releases and web sites, 
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policy manuals, and legislation with its accompanying regulations, as well as contracts 
and settlement awards contributed background for this study. 
As an organization of public sector lawyers that has evolved over time, the Nova 
Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association is a rich source of narratives on collective 
bargaining as well as non-bargaining professional employees. These are located in notes, 
files and briefs prepared by members of the Association. The public record generated 
narratives in the transcripts of public accounts committee meetings and Hansard record of 
provincial legislature debates. Stager & Arthurs' (1990) history of lawyers in Canada is 
another valuable source of archival narrative. Finally, the many public reports that 
recount investigations of various aspects of the Nova Scotia public prosecutions provide 
an external perspective on the historical basis for the Crown prosecutors' struggle. This 
variety of material takes into consideration Riessman's (Riessman, 1993) admonition that 
representations of experience captured in narrative are limited by being selective and thus 
imperfect. The inclusion of archival material also introduces additional voices in an 
attempt to overcome this possible limitation. 
Transcribing Interviews 
Personal narratives were transcribed in a conventional oral-to-text method with 
electronic aids. I transcribed half of the data myself and engaged assistance from two 
professional transcriptionists for the balance of the interviews and focus groups. I 
reviewed each transcript thoroughly for accuracy before analysis began. The archival 
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narratives were reproduced from Web sites and media coverage as well as by reproducing 
electronic documents. Analysis and reading are described below. 
Data Analysis 
An important analytical challenge is to regard each story as a whole for its 
purpose and overarching teller's problem (Riessman, 1990) and to take it apart to reveal 
its components. The components are studied for the way they are organized, linked, and 
structured into a coherent ensemble, including those elements that are absent or differ 
from one teller to another. To accomplish this analysis thematic and structural analysis 
of the personal narratives was necessary. The archival material was analyzed primarily 
using a thematic approach. 
Lieblich et al. (1998) suggest narratives be analyzed using a Cartesian framework 
based on holistic/categorical and content/form dimensions. This framework keeps the 
base social relations in mind while considering the specific experiences at the surface of 
production. I considered this approach, but found structure inflexible for the nature of the 
data provided in the narratives. I did retain the idea of base and superstructure of social 
relations as I read the narratives, however I depended upon Riessman's (2008) approach 
to themes in my analysis. For example, I looked for categories within the content that 
reflected the material, agency, and motivational causes of power. I also compared 
narratives as I read them. Narratives of Crown prosecutors who were present but not 
directly engaged in negotiation were compared with Crown prosecutors who sat at the 
bargaining table or those who have been employed since collective bargaining was 
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established. Differences in tone and themes were noted, and similarities in content were 
also important findings that reflected the presence of an occupational community. I also 
explored the idea of poetic trope (Gabriel, 2004) in a third reading of the narratives. The 
epic story was particularly notable in the stories dealing with collective bargaining. 
Structural analysis can also extend to the examination of rhetorical devices. The use of 
metaphors, labelling others in the story, and the suppression of aspects of experience all 
revealed insights into the research problem. 
In both phases of the study, each interview was analyzed in three distinct waves. 
The first wave reviewed each transcript holistically with the project research questions in 
mind and several themes emerged. The second wave review sought specific stories in 
each transcript that corresponded to the themes from the first wave and reflected critical 
events in the participants' experiences. The third wave of analysis examined the stories 
in more detail, noting tone and perspective, actors and roles, and the use of specific 
language to describe critical events. 
Critical Incidents 
I regrouped the narratives into critical incidents for another level of analysis. 
Critical incidents are key determinants in recall of life experience (Webster & Mertova, 
2007). Memory is a strategy of adaptation and most important occurrences are 
transmitted to the listener. The criticality of events is determined by the teller, as they 
chose what to relay (Webster & Mertova, 2007, p. 83). Critical incidents are also change 
events (Strauss et al., 1973; Webster & Mertova, 2007) which shed some light on the way 
people cope with conflict and the ensuing transitions that may be required. The critical 
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incident approach is popular in industrial psychology, developed in 1954 by J.C. 
Flanagan, (Webster & Mertova, 2007) but it is also an important qualitative analysis tool. 
Webster and Mertova note the importance of situating the events in context but also 
highlight the importance of time lapse in determining criticality. It is necessary for time 
to elapse after an event in order for its importance to be perceived and understood. Thus, 
the historical aspect of this study, talking to people several years after they experienced 
the events that lead to collective bargaining, is necessary in order to uncover important 
aspects of the data. A critical incident approach highlights the stories most important to 
the teller. 
I identified critical incidents by the tone and the language tellers used to introduce 
these particular stories. I also identified them through the thematic analysis that preceded 
this stage. They were not always complete stories, with a full resolution (Labov & 
Waletsky, 2003) but they held significance for the teller and usually given as examples 
introduced by a general comment. Sometimes the critical incidents emerged from the 
teller's natural narrative, and sometimes these were the result of a prompt from the 
interviewer (McCracken, 1988). I grouped together incidents that related to particular 
themes from the earlier stages of analysis and reread these together to explore patterns in 
the data. The critical incidents I identified helped to explain more full the themes in the 
data and the way that themes related to the research question. 
In the critical incidents I examined the circumstances, behaviour and outcomes 
(Catano & Smithers, 2002) experienced by Crown Prosecutors in order to explore how 
they define and redefine their professional and employment roles. A description of 
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circumstances helps to frame the experience, which is important for interpretation of the 
actors' behaviour. The actual behaviour, which I define broadly and can include 
emotional response and idea generation as well as physical action, provides further 
insight. Tellers describe the creation and adaptation of roles and event outcomes. They 
provide a self-assessment of personal effectiveness, power (or powerlessness), and 
position relative to other actors in the organization and the profession. In effect, the 
outcomes of critical events help us to see the changes achieved through the behaviour, 
and also how the changes are perceived. A thematic approach, supported by deeper 
analysis of critical events is in keeping with an interpretive approach to my research 
problem. 
Reading 
Finally, the reading level of Riessman's (1993) model includes the many passes 
taken with the data. The first stage of reading is of the original transcripts and archives, 
to determine a story line. A second stage looked for the tone and role of the storyteller. 
Finally, the critical incident reading took place. I selected specific stories and regrouped 
them by themes. I reread these thematic stories to develop an analysis of collective 
interpretations that were common to prosecutors as a group, and individual reflections not 
shared by others in the study. Reading also took place in the dissertation committee 
structure. My dissertation supervisor read the analysis of the stories in various forms, and 
the whole committee read the material as it developed into its final form. I also shared 
the results in an abbreviated format with members of the prosecution community at their 
semi-annual national conference in Vancouver in 2009 and in Ottawa in the fall of 2010. 
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Preliminary Study 
I conducted a series of focus groups and interviews with lawyers, nurses, and 
librarians to explore some of the key components of sociological theory on professions 
and themes that I identified through my reading: concepts of knowledge and expertise, 
regulation, specialization, and career. These three professions were not only accessible to 
me, but represented different articulations of the professional project and the collective 
bargaining project. The nurses are a long-established occupation that still struggles with 
concerns of legitimacy and control (Haiven & Haiven, 2007a, 2007b). University 
librarians are more recent participants in collective bargaining and to professionalization 
(Carson, 2002). It was important to speak with a variety of lawyers for comparative 
purposes. All three groups are public sector employees, an element of the research 
design noted above. These three professions pursue both professionalization and 
collective bargaining but each is at a different stage on the closure continuum described 
in Chapter 2. Each profession uses different elements of that continuum to achieve their 
workplace and professional goals. 
I wanted to gauge the focus group participants' reaction to several of my research 
questions and I was interested in how they described the current state of their profession. 
I was asked what members thought about the governing body, regulation, their social 
status and working conditions, as well as how closure strategies contributed to their 
personal sense of being professionals. In sessions held with lawyers I aimed to gather 
specific information regarding the legal profession in Nova Scotia, however comparisons 
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were offered about the profession in other provinces as well as the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The list of questions for these focus groups is attached as Appendix B. 
Focus group sessions ranged from one to one and a half hours in length and all 
were recorded and transcribed. I asked participants in these sessions to reflect on the 
statement "(Law, nursing, librarianship) is a profession." As they discussed their 
opinions and insights, I probed with questions about how the profession was changing, 
the relationship among the differing bodies that provide representation to professionals, 
whether this was a regulatory College, a special interest Association, an Employer, or a 
Union. I also inquired into the relationship of the individual professional to these bodies. 
Through this preliminary study, I was able to refine the research questions which guided 
the principal study to focus more specifically on closure and occupational community. I 
returned to this preliminary study data repeatedly through the rest of the project as themes 
emerged or repeated in the principal study. I compared the non-prosecuting lawyers' 
stories to those of Crown prosecutors, the unionized employee to non-unionized stories. 
Participants in the preliminary study focus groups came from the Halifax 
community. I identified these individuals through personal contacts and public 
information on the structure of various professional bodies. I approached the Nova 
Scotia Barristers' Society, the Nova Scotia Nurses' Union, members of the Nova Scotia 
General and Government Employees Union, and the library staff at Saint Mary's 
University as well as numerous contacts in the legal profession, the civil service, and the 
academic community. The preliminary study took place over six months, from January 
2009 to July 2009 and I spoke with 21 individuals (14 women and 7 men) in five focus 
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groups and four individual interviews. The lawyers I interviewed came from large, 
medium, and small private firms with a range of specialties. Participants included federal 
and provincial government employees and members of academia. Seven participants 
held governance positions with their regulatory body. Only two participants of the 
preliminary study had experience with prosecutions, but it was clear from the data 
gathered from all participants that prosecution is a unique specialization in the legal 
profession. The way in which collective bargaining is included in the employment and 
professional experience of prosecutors sets them apart from other professionals and from 
other lawyers whether they were be in private practice, in-house counsel, or non-
prosecution public servants. 
Sample 
For the principal study, I contacted the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys Association 
and requested interviews with members of the executive as well as general members of 
the Association. Some individuals I knew personally from my work in government and 
some I did not know until I contacted them for this study. I was able to contact and 
interview individuals who had been members of the Association during the late 1990s 
and were still employed by the Public Prosecution Service. I interviewed former 
members who have gone on to work in different capacities in the criminal justice system 
and I interviewed current prosecutors who joined the PPS after the onset of collective 
bargaining. Several individuals referred me to additional participants and in all I 
interviewed 11 individuals with experience in the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service 
(either past or present). I interviewed 5 prosecutors from other Canadian provinces 
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(Ontario and British Columbia)6. I also interviewed one member of the private bar in the 
principal study. Five of the participants were women, 12 were men. All participants 
were career lawyers and career prosecutors with the exception of 2: the person in private 
practice and a legal aid lawyer. Although some spent a few years in other aspects of law, 
most prosecutors had spent the bulk of their careers in prosecution. Two individuals had 
prosecution experience with the federal government in addition to the provincial 
government, three participants are now members of the judiciary, and five individuals 
had management experience in prosecutions. Although these ratios were not designed as 
proportional to the population, the snowball approach continued to broaden the reach of 
the study until each aspect of prosecution experience was covered. 
McCracken (1988) recommends eight interviews and Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 
234) suggest a sample of a dozen interviews "will exhaust most available information". I 
contacted participants as they became available to me or as they were recommended by 
existing study participants. I continued until I reached a saturation point, in which the 
stories were consistent and no new themes, concepts, or issues emerged. The eleven 
prosecutors from Nova Scotia therefore form a reasonable sample size for a case study. 
Any additional participants and the volume of data analysis quickly becomes 
unmanageable. A weakness of this approach of course is that additional interviews might 
reveal nuances that have not been exhausted. However, this weakness is mitigated by the 
analysis I conducted on the preliminary study data as well as the ongoing transcription 
6 Appendix E contains a demographic analysis of prosecutor respondents. 
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and review of texts throughout the data collection phase which brought me back to each 
interview repeatedly. 
Reluctant Respondents 
I contacted two individuals I thought would be key informants based on their 
membership in the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys Association and their tenure during the 
struggle for collective bargaining during the late 1990s. However, I was unsuccessful in 
interviewing these individuals. This aspect of the interview process extended beyond 
what Dundon and Ryan (2010) describe in their work with reluctant respondents. I did 
not have a chance to use any of the recommended interview tactics despite the two 
individuals' initial enthusiasm about the project. Both were quite forthcoming initially; 
each expressed interest in the project, spoke with me by telephone or met in person 
informally and indicated they would be able to participate. However, both individuals 
eventually became more and more difficult to contact. One participant requested a 
number of approvals with various levels of his organization, citing these as reasons to 
delay our meeting. I moved on to gather data from more willing participants, allowing 
my contact with these reluctant participants to lapse. Both these participants had moved 
from staff positions in prosecution and prominent roles in the struggle for bargaining 
rights into management roles subsequent to the onset collective bargaining. This aspect 
of their personal experience may have caused them some conflict in terms of 
organizational loyalty and may account for their unwillingness to participate in an 
interview. These were isolated instances of resistance. I did contact a number of other 
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individuals who had similar experience with the NSCAA and who held management 
roles, so there is no significant gap in the study data. 
Conducting Interviews 
I began each interview in the principal study with a brief overview of my research 
project and invited the participants to tell me the story of their career and then to tell me 
the story of the struggle for collective bargaining. I developed a list of detailed probing 
questions (McCracken, 1988), included as Appendix A, to cover the theoretical 
dimensions of my study. These questions were based on my review of the literature. I 
refined the questions during the preliminary study. In most cases, the participants 
covered the areas targeted by the probing questions. However, in a few instances I did 
need to use the questionnaire to gather the desired information and complete the 
interview. For the most part simple nonverbal prompts and the use of "why do you say 
that?" and "can you tell me more about that?" were sufficient to elicit detailed stories 
from participants. 
I met with the executive of the national umbrella body for public service lawyers, 
the Canadian Association of Crown Counsel, in Ocotber of 2009. My aim was to provide 
a summary of the project and preliminary results along with the theroetical framework 
and to solicit feedback from members of the researched community. I asked them about 
the appropriateness of my framework. I was also eager to hear whether my preliminary 
findings resounded with this audience. The meeting was successful in gathering 
feedback, the executive indicated their support, and further study participants were 
122 
referred for in depth interviews as well. I committed to return to the CACC's semi 
annual meeting in October 2010 with my final results. 
Ethical Considerations 
The narratives shared in this study were of a very personal nature. Participants 
were asked for the story of their careers and of a significant struggle in their lives. They 
revealed personal details both directly and obliquely in their stories. Each paricipant was 
provided with the opportunity to review the research goals and to decline participation at 
any time. No participant declined to provide data for the study past this point and no 
participants withdrew after the interview. The interviews were conducted in person or 
else over the telephone following a personal contact. Thus, as researcher I knew each 
participant beyond the context of the study and was able to identify all the data with a 
specific participant. This resulted in a heavy burden on the researcher to preserve the 
anonymity of the study participants. Gender has not been disguised in the study because 
it reveals a division in the profession and work experiences of study participants. 
However, all identifying characteristics in the transcripts have been disguised or omitted 
in order to present the findings in a way that protects the identity of participants. 
Individual quotations are identitied by letter, as in Lawyer A, Lawyer B, etc. The 
administrative records and data from the study are stored on a secure server at Saint 
Mary's University and only the reseracher has access to the data. Printed copies are kept 
locked in an office on the university campus and will be retained in accordance with the 
Tri-council Policy on Ethical Treatment of Human Subjects (Panel on Research Ethics, 
2005) for as long as the research project remains active. 
Reflexivity 
In Chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter I explained my role in the story of the 
Crown prosecutors' struggle for bargaining rights, their strike, and the negotiation of the 
framework agreement. This experience presented both an opportunity and a problem. 
There was a risk to my objectivity in collecting and analyzing data for this study because 
I am very familiar with the events and participants. I also had to manage the tension of 
my own version of events when recording and analyzing the accounts of people who sat 
across from me at the negotiating table or shared experiences with me. My recollection 
of the order and content of events as well as my interpretation of events and social 
dynamics was not always shared by study participants. An interview schedule helped to 
keep my intrusion into the storytelling to a minimum, and prevented me from adding any 
commentary to the data gathering itself. I also separated the history of the Public 
Prosecution Service and the organization events from the career and collective bargaining 
stories, in order to present those as a separate chapter, Chapter 4. This allowed me to 
focus on the Crown prosecutors' stories without any reference to my own interpretation 
of events. Finally, I had two other transcriptionists work with the data to ensure faithful 
records of the interviews. I was able to compare these transcripts with my own, and 
found no significant differences in the conduct and recording of the interviews. 
McCracken (1988) notes that the investigator is an instrument in the research 
process and must draw on the "broad range of his or her own experience... in ways that 
are various and unpredictable" (p. 18). This warning offers some comfort in a case study 
such as the one described here. My personal experiences enabled me to identify key 
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informants and develop relationships. These relationships promoted access to the 
community under study. This opportunity perhaps would not have been available to 
another researcher. I also was able to direct questions and interviews quickly on the 
aspects of the legal profession and the struggle for collective bargaining that were most 
relevant to the research project. When I spoke with people who knew me from my work 
in government, I was able to get straight to the point of the interview without subterfuge. 
I feel this enhanced the quality of the data collected, rather than diminishing it. Finally, 
the fact that I have not been employed by government for over seven years helped to 
allay participants' concerns regarding my objectivity or the confidentiality of the study 
results. The ethics review process further assured participants of confidentiality. 
McCracken (1988) also encourages scholars to "manufacture distance" in order to 
preserve a spirit of critical inquiry. I deliberately chose to explore the Crown prosecutor 
experience from the point of view of the sociology of the professions, which was new 
territory for me. As I am not a member of the legal profession myself, the exploration of 
lawyers' perspectives on their profession enabled me to maintain a distance and 
objectivity in my inquiry. I also took advantage of the control I held in the interview to 
establish a neutral perspective as a student interested in narrative, the profession, and 
collective bargaining. I did not reveal my employment history with the Province nor my 
role in negotiations with the Crown Attorneys' Association to my study participants at 
the outset of each interview. I did reveal my past employment and in some cases, my 
role in bargaining if this appeared to be helpful to elicit the confidence of the interview 
participants. Revealing my past role also saved time and avoided participant's lengthy 
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explanation details not relevant to the study. In one instance revealing my background 
did appear to dampen the enthusiasm of the interview respondent, though I cannot be sure 
if that was due to his sense that I was biased or because his train of thought and 
storytelling was interrupted. 
Strengths and Limitations of the Methodological Approach 
As described above, stories involve both the storyteller and the listener in the 
telling/listening experience. As a listener, the researcher may fill in gaps in a story based 
on her own experience. I addressed this risk in the reflexivity section of this chapter. 
From a methodological viewpoint, the interviewer is liable to transmit subconscious cues 
to the storyteller as well, with prompts, open or closed body language and facial 
expressions (Boje, 1991). The story told may in fact be partly a reaction to the listener 
(Hyde, 2008). Awareness of this risk and comparison of different interviews highlighted 
instances where this may have posed a problem. 
The snowball sampling approach I used also posed a risk that all respondents 
share characteristics and perspectives, skewing the data and under-representing differing 
views. The Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service employs approximately ninety 
lawyers, and during the late 1990s employed approximately 65 full time lawyers. I 
gauged that the likelihood of finding only one viewpoint in a sample representing a ratio 
of one in six members of the target organization was low. Furthermore, when people 
recommended snowball participants, they usually identified clear reasons for their choice 
of referral and outlined the expected contribution to my research. I found that in all 
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cases, those expectations on the part of the referrer were incompatible with the 
perspectives shared by the subsequent participant. Referrals did not result in common 
perspectives. This finding helped to maintain my objectivity as each interview held an 
element of surprise! 
Although narrative analysis provides the potential to probe deeply to uncover a 
great deal of insight into the actions and interpretations of participants, the narratives may 
not produce rich enough material to do so. The skills of the researcher may be 
insufficient to elicit the material in oral form, or to access the textual archives that 
illustrate relevant features of the research site. The counterpoint to this concern lies in 
the holistic, multi-level and multi-voice nature of personal accounts. Narrative 
complexity may make it difficult to identify links among elements of the narratives. This 
complexity may also present a challenge to interpret narrative components relation to a 
theoretical framework. If successful, however, the approach has the potential to bring to 
the surface the complexity of organization meanings constructed by participants (Beech, 
2000). 
One strength of the interview method is its personal contact. It is easier to explain 
the goals of the study, the purpose of individual reflections, and to reassure participants 
of confidentiality in a face-to-face interview. Written accounts lack the spontaneity of an 
interview and reveal, particularly with lawyers, a studied representation of a position on a 
topic, particularly a contested topic. The complex treatment of language which narrative 
analysis entails might be made even more so because lawyers' dialogue is often complex 
in its own right. This aspect of the research subject's professional training makes it 
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necessary to have personal contact with research subjects to gather their stories. 
However, personal sensitivity, emotion, and personal consequences of providing 
narrative may result in material that is out of bounds for the researcher's use. 
A significant strength of narrative analysis lies in the periodicity of stories. 
Probing for additional examples or instances in the interview may enable tellers to tell 
multiple stories and reflect mutable identities through the course of a story. This may 
reveal ways in which professional and collective bargaining closure strategies are 
mobilized and balanced over time. On a very practical level, narrative analysis has the 
advantage of being based on a small number of subjects. This is quite important in a 
project where some key informants have left the region and may not be accessible to the 
researcher. The population is limited to begin with, and some people who appear 
repeatedly in others' narratives may not be in a position to contribute their own particular 
perspectives in personal narrative. 
Validation is one of the limits of narrative that Riessman describes (1993). Tied 
to the notion of validation is trustworthiness and implied comparison: valid as compared 
to what? The benchmarks would appear to be positivist empirical research based on 
statistical methods. A more relevant notion might be 'well done' in the sense that the 
process of collecting and analyzing narratives adheres to a rigor in the field and a 
coherence of analysis that follows the theoretical assumptions of the researcher. 
Riessman further encourages making the method visible in the research report and 
making data available to other readers. This is accomplished by including transcripts 
within the report itself, for example. The statistical notion of validity is challenged in 
qualitative research (Webster & Mertova, 2007) on the basis that statistical study results 
are based on chance: reaching and eliciting responses from individuals on a given day, 
missing others, and using quantity as a substitute for quality. As opposed to taking the 
view that statistical significance indicates what is important, I believe that the choice by 
study participants themselves of the stories that are important to tell reveals what is 
significant. 
One challenge to narrative analysis is determining the scope of the narrative. For 
example, in the case of the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service, the Donald Marshall 
Inquiry report (Nova Scotia, 1989) describe the prosecution of Donald Marshall as well 
as the operation of the prosecution service, the Attorney General's office, the civil service 
and the broader judicial system. A decision was needed regarding how much of this 
material is relevant to identify the narrative of the PPS. Just the fact that an external, 
independent inquiry took place becomes part of the narrative; let alone what the content 
of that document revealed. What of the press releases surrounding the issue of the 
Inquiry final report, the recommendations list, and the resulting legislation to establish an 
independent PPS? Then there is the glancing or direct reference to these contextual and 
organizational events in the individual narratives of the people in and around the 
organization. For this reason, I began with those individual narratives and turned to 
documents afterward, especially as individuals referred to events or other aspects that 
might be reflected in documents or related to documents. I acknowledge that the 
narratives are influenced by the existence of the documents and my reading of documents 
was influenced by the narratives I had collected. However, this approach builds a sense 
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of the organization narrative from the individual narrative in keeping with my goal to 
examine the individual agency in relation to larger social structures. 
Narrative analysis addresses the complexity of the human condition. It is an 
approach well suited to exploring the type of research problem I have identified, where 
two different paradigms or stances are held concurrently in one person or group. Finally, 
narrative analysis is not an approach commonly found in the labour relations field, 
especially in Canada, and may open a broader discussion in the field (Mrozowicki, 
Pulignano, & Hootegem, 2010). 
Conclusion 
The experiences of Crown prosecutors in their struggle for collective bargaining 
rights are reflected in their personal narratives. Analysis of those narratives enables the 
researcher to move beyond the surface descriptive power of the story. Thematic, 
structural, and critical incident analysis help to explore how relations of production are 
bound up in the material sources of power of the profession and labour. Narrative 
analysis is an effective way to study the relationship between professionalization and 
social closure as two forms of collective action because in narratives "people distill and 
reflect a particular understanding of political and social relations" (Feldman et al., 2004, 
p. 148). My aim in this study is use narrative analysis to examine the social relations of 
the profession and employment, and how Crown prosecutors perceive and act upon their 
inherent power. 
This is a story of change within an organization taken from the point of view that 
the people themselves constitute the organization in a real way. Participants' stories are 
an important manifestation of the organization, the actions that create change, and the 
underlying social relations that reproduce the actors and generate their capacity for 
action. The purpose of the study is to generate insights into the relationship between 
professions and collective bargaining in order to inform the theoretical frameworks 
surrounding labour process and social closure. 
Various themes emerged through narrative analysis of the Crown prosecutors' 
stories. There were also structural insights gathered from the way stories are ordered. 
The stories presented histories and events from the past; they reflected choices in specific 
instances and described underlying motivations. Some stories were anticipatory and 
some reflected a strict chronology. All the stories were selective: they are comprised of 
specific actors, situations and outcomes which intentionally place the actors on a certain 
path toward achieving certain goals (Riessman, 1990). Examining the themes and 
structures that emerge in these stories illustrates how Crown prosecutors balance the 
pressure of professionalism with the need to bargain over terms and conditions of 
employment. Chapter 4 sets the background before we turn to the stories themselves in 
Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 The Evolving Legal Profession: Specialization and Subordination of 
Nova Scotia Crown Prosecutors 
The goal of this chapter is to examine the legal profession in Canada and 
prosecution in Nova Scotia in particular, using the analysis of closure introduced in 
Chapter 2. I draw upon the results of my preliminary study with lawyers as well as my 
interviews with prosecutors to illustrate how the profession in Canada is in a period of 
transition that includes increased specialization. I explore the impact of this 
specialization on the way prosecution work is organized. I examine the historical context 
of prosecution in Nova Scotia in order to illustrate the convergence of professionalization 
strategies and collective bargaining in a specific organizational context. This discussion 
leads into an outline of the struggle for collective bargaining in the Nova Scotia Public 
Prosecution Service. The stories of individuals across the profession and those directly 
involved in the struggle highlight aspects of public prosecution that prepare the way for 
the discussion of occupational community in the next chapter. 
The story of Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors demonstrates the way workers use 
usurpationary closure in an attempt to achieve greater control over working conditions. 
Parkin (1979) says that the use of both exclusionary closure and usurpationary closure, 
which he calls dual closure, is incompatible with the elite social position of professions. 
He positions dual closure as a strategy used by marginalized and oppressed groups of 
workers. This view of closure does not take into account the increased specialization of 
professionals and the impact such complexity has on professionalization strategies. It 
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also does not consider the growing number of professionals in dependent employment. 
Professions form smaller and smaller subsets of their profession in an attempt to define 
the boundaries of specialized expert knowledge. These subsets protect specialized 
practice from incursions by the unqualified and can be arranged in a hierarchy, opening 
up the possibility of marginalization for some specialties. Marginalization can lead a 
group of workers to adopt usurpationary strategies, such as collective bargaining. Within 
subsets of a profession lies the potential for an occupational community to develop, a 
community unique to the specialty. When an occupational community is located in a 
formal organization structure like the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service, we find a 
potential explanation for how professionals reconcile what may be considered competing 
logics of action. On the one hand, prosecutors pursue heightened professionalization 
through specialization and on the other hand, they pursue collective bargaining in their 
employment setting. An occupational community is the instrument that enables this 
reconciliation. Chapter 5 pursues a deeper examination of the occupational community 
itself; this chapter sets the stage. 
The Legal Profession 
The evolution of the legal profession along the Krause-inspired (Campbell & 
Haiven, 2008; Krause, 1996) closure continuum is ongoing. In countries modeled on 
British common law, like Canada, the profession has enjoyed independence, self-
governance, and autonomy; it may be tempting to say that exclusionary closure is 
complete. The professional body controls apprenticeship opportunities, requires 
membership in order to be licensed, sets licensing and discipline standards, influences the 
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educational standards of entrants, controls forms of association by requiring membership, 
enjoys state delegation of governance and members enjoy a market monopoly on legal 
services. However, evidence indicates the profession has retreated along the closure 
continuum in recent years. The profession's relationship with the state has shifted with 
greater government intervention (Abel, 2004) in the United Kingdom and Australia. The 
profession has lost control over legal education (Bell, 2009) in Canada, and my 
preliminary study indicates employment of lawyers in the public sector has increased 
with more lawyers than ever practicing outside the self-employment model (Pink, D., 
2009). The growth of large public service firms has also segmented the profession 
(Girard & Haylock, 2009; Heinz et al., 2005). Large firms control certain segments of 
the market, leaving smaller firms and individual practitioners with a limited range, and 
often less lucrative practice opportunities(Heinz et al., 2005). Processes for controlling 
professionalization and the institutional forms that result are changing. Lawyers 
themselves feel this change, as one lawyer notes: 
I think one of the more striking changes in the profile of the profession over 
the past couple of decades is that I think people used to think of the legal profession 
as basically private enterprise; lawyers who ran law offices and those were 
businesses. But we're seeing now a dramatic increase in the numbers of lawyers in 
the public sector. (Lawyer A) 
Canada 's Nascent Legal Profession 
In Canada's days as a British colony, colonial governors licensed lawyers. They 
used a hybrid of French and English legal systems to control litigation and ensure a 
monopoly over legal services. This approach also presumably protected the interests of 
the Crown (Stager & Arthurs, 1990). Law societies gradually took control of the 
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regulation of practitioners and colonial governments enacted various controls over the 
profession; examination of candidates was first done by judges and existing barristers 
(Stager & Arthurs, 1990), in contrast to the university education and bar exam of 
contemporary times. The Nova Scotia population in its early days was too small to 
support a bar modeled on the British, with separate barristers and solicitors and a system 
of Inns of Court where only members were heard by the bench. There were simply too 
few individuals to handle the growing volume of work. Thus, separate roles for advice 
and pleading in court collapsed into a single occupation. Central regulation of the 
profession was established in a Barristers' Society, and gradually the profession emerged 
as we know it today. The pattern varied across Canada in terms of educational 
requirements (Bell, 2009) and discipline in its initial years but became more 
homogeneous over time (Stager & Arthurs, 1990). Issues like specialization and 
advertising have meant there is some differentiation across Canadian provinces, but 
recent mobility agreements counter this in favour of a more national perspective on legal 
practice (Ceballos, 2009b). A lawyer can be licensed in Nova Scotia and practice in 
another jurisdiction for many months without any impact on their license or status (Pink, 
D., 2009). 
The contemporary legal profession in Canada is comprised of three main groups: 
lawyers in private practice, lawyers in public practice and in-house or corporate counsel 
(Pink, D., 2009). Private practitioners are further divided into those who practice 
independently, in the traditional model of self-employment, and those who are either 
partners with an ownership stake or else employees of large professional service firms. 
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As indicated earlier, the number of lawyers in public practice with government agencies 
and departments of government has grown considerably over time. Public lawyers now 
hold governance positions in the regulatory body, the barristers' societies and law 
societies across Canada, as this exchange from a focus group with members of the Nova 
Scotia Barristers' Society governing council indicates: 
25 years ago... I can't remember anyone from any of the public sector 
legal organizations who had a representative on Bar Council. But now if you look 
at the composition of Bar Council, we have a lot a lot of public sector lawyers who 
are involved in governance work. (Lawyer A) 
I never thought of it, when you look around the table... [at Bar Council 
members] (Lawyer B) 
We're [private practice lawyers] the minority. (Lawyer C) 
The organization of work in the legal profession and the division of duties across 
its members has changed with time and circumstance. This profession continues to 
evolve. The next section of this chapter examines the structure of the profession and the 
forms of interest representation. From there I draw upon stories of lawyers themselves to 
explore the relationship of closure to changes in the profession in Canada. A second 
theme that emerges from lawyers' stories involves career choice and specialization in the 
profession. 
Institutional Forms and Ideologies 
The terms 'profession' and 'professionalism' in the literature can be distinguished 
as structure on the one hand and capacity to act on the other (Kay, 2004; Nelson & 
Trubeck, 1992). When we talk about the profession, we refer to the institutional forms 
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and the practices and rules that govern becoming a professional. To a lesser extent, the 
term profession describes the standardized work of those who practice the profession. 
Professionalism is a characteristic of individuals and refers to both outward demeanour 
and internal identity. When a person embraces the ideology of their profession and 
appears to put the public interest before personal interests, when she addresses her tasks 
with care and attention to detail, we often say she has a sense of professionalism. 
Professionalism is a conscious action that can be controlled by the individual as well as 
the institutional forms that surround her (Nelson & Trubeck, 1992). Abel (2004) 
distinguishes between these two concepts when he writes that professionalism in English 
law is in decline but the profession itself may continue. 
Abel (2004) predicts that the legal profession will be reconstituted with new 
ideologies to support the public interest over individual interests of lawyers. For 
example, burgeoning ranks of lawyers and competition for business coupled with 
commoditization of some legal functions has affected law firms' financial security. Non-
lawyers and foreign providers of legal services threaten legal monopolies. These changes 
are in response to the globalization and specialization pressures of the contemporary 
marketplace (Abel, 2004). Government intervention in the governance mechanisms of 
the profession in the UK and has made Canadian lawyers anxious for the future of their 
profession (Ceballos, 2009a). While most writers argue the profession will continue to 
exist, the fee for service model, education requirements, and practice norms will be under 
pressure to change, both in Canada (Leclair, 2009; Moulton, 2009a, 2009b) and beyond 
(Susskind, 2008). How members will define the profession, its relations with consumers 
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of legal services, and the social reproduction of the legal profession during this period of 
change are all uncertain. Exclusionary closure mechanisms of the past may also need to 
change to keep pace. 
This period of transition frames my investigation of the labour process of law that 
I described in Chapter 2. Crown prosecutors are a subset of the legal profession and they 
have redefined labour relations and labour process control to some extent in their struggle 
for collective bargaining. Prosecutors' experience can provide several insights into the 
broader profession. One the one hand there is sense of a continuing profession. 
Prosecution enjoys a protected, enduring role; crime will always be with us and with it 
the need to prosecute on behalf of the public. However, Crown prosecutors' 
professionalism has been challenged broadly and locally, and has been redefined in the 
process of seeking and achieving collective bargaining. 
Interest Representation and Professional Closure 
Professionals' interests are represented by three distinct devices (Haiven 1999): 
public protection, advocacy, and collective bargaining. Three institutional forms exist to 
address these interests: a licensing and disciplinary body, speciality associations, and 
trade unions. There is a correspondence between devices and their institutional form and 
I will address each one in turn. The licensing and disciplinary body of a profession 
purports to protect the public interest. Lawyers belong to a Barristers' Society or a Law 
Society that fulfills this role. These actions are deemed to protect the public by ensuring 
quality service and triggering repercussions for those who fail to comply with 
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professional standards (Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, 2010). The actions of the 
governing body also meet the needs of members. Members effectively secure control 
over access to the profession because they administer the licensing process themselves. I 
have noted in interviews lawyers seldom acknowledge this aspect of the professional 
society's role. In recent times, the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society has also taken on a 
role to educate the members in certain core compliance areas, such as civil procedure. 
Other professions have a similar structure. Colleges of Nursing, for example, license and 
discipline registered nurses. 
A number of interest- or specialty-based associations regroup professionals in 
particular types of practice, such as the association of oncology nurses or the criminal law 
association. The goal of these special interest groups is advocacy on behalf of their 
members. These associations may also support education programs and exchange among 
members with closely similar practices. The associations often provide a forum for 
exchange and advice. Larger national associations exist for most Canadian professions as 
well; for lawyers it is the Canadian Bar Association with corresponding provincial 
chapters. These national professional associations provide similar advocacy and 
education services on behalf of lawyers' interests. In most provinces membership in the 
bar association is voluntary. 
Finally, there are unions, which represent the interests of workers in specific 
bargaining units. Provincial labour boards define bargaining units that are in turn subject 
to provincial labour legislation. Federal labour legislation covers employees of the 
federal government and its agencies, and workers in designated industries. Most 
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provincial labour legislation prohibits lawyers from collective bargaining with their 
employers. Other professionalized occupations, such as teachers and nurses, have existed 
in structured permanent employment relationships with a public sector employer for 
much longer than the public prosecutors. These other professions have developed 
collective bargaining over terms and conditions of employment, but statutory exclusion 
prevented lawyers from unionizing under labour legislation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
BC Health Services had the effect of removing this limitation although provincial statutes 
have not yet been amended to permit unionization among lawyers. There is nothing to 
prevent groups of employees from forming an association and attempting to engage their 
employer in collective bargaining. In half of the jurisdictions in Canada public 
prosecutors have successfully formed bargaining associations, achieved recognition from 
their employers, and engage in collective bargaining. In some instances the civil-side 
public sector lawyers also bargain. In most of these cases, the employer has voluntarily 
recognized the prosecutors' bargaining association, without recourse to legislation. 
However, there is no statutory protection of strike or striking workers, and nothing 
compels the employer to recognize the association or to bargain in good faith. In British 
Columbia, the Crown Counsel Act recognizes the BC Association of Crown Counsel as 
the bargaining agent for Crown prosecutors in that province. Otherwise collective 
bargaining among private sector lawyers is rare (Chaffe, 2009). Haiven (1999) 
represents the relationship between these instruments of closure and institutional forms in 
this way: 
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Figure 2 Interest Representation 
from Haivcn. 1999 
Some professions do not use all three devices of interest representation; they may 
not bargain, for instance. In addition, some professions will attempt to use one 
institutional form for more than one function, such as combining advocacy and 
bargaining, or advocacy and public protection. Some teachers unions combine all three 
devices in one institutional form. Lawyers do not make systematic use of all three forms 
of interest representation. The legal profession, with the exception of university law 
professors, some public prosecutors and public sector civil lawyers, has not embraced 
collective bargaining. Crown prosecutors follow the one to one correspondence of 
representation as I have outlined it. 
It is clear that prosecutors are distinct among lawyers in their choice of collective 
bargaining to represent their interests and that they have overcome significant 




















bargaining is an appealing instrument for Crown prosecutors. For the moment, I will 
demonstrate that lawyers as a professional group have a distant relationship with their 
governing body. Distance in the relationship also distances lawyers from the protection 
of the public interest. Although the Barristers' Society exists to protect the public 
interest, involvement with the Society is driven by individual interest, a finding echoed 
by Nelson and Trubeck (1992). The distinction between individual and public interest 
will become important when we look at why the Crown prosecutors in Nova Scotia were 
able to mobilize for collective action. 
One member of the legal profession, with over twenty years of prosecution 
experience, describes his involvement with the Barristers' Society like this: 
[EJarly in my career I felt that it was important to get involved in the Bar Society 
because I thought that it would be a great opportunity to meet people and broaden 
my perspective of the practice of law and issues. Eventually I ended up becoming 
the elected council member for [my region]. (Lawyer D) 
A former President of the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society offers this comment: 
During the past two years I have had the opportunity to travel the province and 
discuss issues with lawyers whom I met. I am amazed to learn how little our 
members know about our Society. (Pink, J., 2008, p. 5) 
Another lawyer with public, private, and academic sector experience explains the status 
of governance like this: 
I would say that I think the organized legal profession, the body that has that 
responsibility, is just one more institution that is increasingly seen to be of less 
relevance and as having clay feet, just like all other institutions... [TJhere's a core 
of lawyers who... tend disproportionately to be the more successful lawyers and 
maybe the sort of big firm lawyers, pay a lot of attention to the Barristers' Society; 
they get themselves elected and what have you. (Lawyer E) 
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These reflections from members of the profession indicate they feel a distance 
between their own practice and the protection of the public interest. Protection of the 
public interest is a core element of defining a professional project and essential to 
obtaining the freedom to self regulate. However, lawyers in Nova Scotia do not feel a 
strong personal connection to their regulating body. They see participation in formal 
roles in the Barristers' Society as furthering a personal interest; career building perhaps. 
The professional regulatory body does not engender a sense of "professionalism" among 
lawyers. The Barristers' Society safeguards the profession as these comments about 
discipline indicate: "...and you have to maintain this designation and you can lose it if 
they find you're a screw up" (Researcher: who is they?) Oh, that would be us [Barristers' 
Society]! (Lawyer B) 
But by and large, I don't think it [Barristers' Society] impinges very much on what 
many lawyers do as long as you don't get in trouble. And I don't think many 
lawyers feel that they're personally implicated in what the Barristers' Society does 
or does not stand for (Lawyer E) 
The regulatory body maintains discipline in the legal profession through its rules 
of conduct (Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, 2007) and its control over access to practice. 
The barriers to entry and the certification processes are so significant in the legal 
profession that they render the final governing stages, the monitoring of individual 
practice, somewhat ineffectual and unimportant in the eyes of members. Even the peer 
aspect of governance is separate from daily practice as shown by the comment "them" is 
actually "us". In this case, the participant was describing his role as a member of a self-




Although members may be blase towards their Society, the profession is well 
protected, from a closure standpoint, to afford this nonchalance. The strength of the 
profession's norms is significant and inculcated from admission to law school onwards. 
This normative power of the profession influences the behaviour of individuals in their 
practice of the occupation as well as the way they describe themselves as professionals. 
The following exchange came from the focus group with lawyers: 
In my life I think that my wife and kids would say that it's not so much a question 
of what I do for a living, it's what I am. lam a lawyer. (Lawyer B) 
even if you weren't practicing you would be a lawyer (Lawyer C) 
These lawyers illustrate that they fully embrace a sense of professionalism. Their 
professionalism is a product of their individual actions and not overtly linked to the 
institutional forms of the profession. They develop an identity as lawyers that they 
maintain almost independent of the profession's regulatory body. Though the two 
elements, institutional structure and individual action, are necessary to maintain a 
professional project, the distinction lawyers make between the two is important. This 
separation prepares the way for us to consider the profession not as a monolith but as 
comprised of quite distinct elements serving different purposes. There is room in the 
legal professional project for new instruments of closure, which can be used to further 
specific interests of the members. I will show in the sections that follow how the 
profession is also not a singular basket of practices, but is segmented into various 
specialty practices. The creation and maintenance of the profession is heavily dependent 
on the agency of individual members. In Chapter 5 we will see how prosecutors in 
particular formulate an ideology of their profession that enables them to embrace an 
additional form of interest representation, collective bargaining that enhances their 
professionalism. Before we turn to that discussion, the following sections will describe 
how lawyers perceive their changing profession. They speak about the organization of 
their work into a labour process, and the organization of the profession into specialties. 
Based on these two themes the discussion examines in more detail the specialty of 
prosecution. 
The Changing Profession 
Susskind (2008) writes that legal matters are becoming business matters with the 
routinization of legal work. Advances in technology result in a pressure to commoditize 
certain legal transactions. Increased government intervention in lawyers' market 
monopoly for legal services may result in a period of significant structural change where 
the profession's relationship with the state is redefined. These pressures are echoed in 
Canada. There is an ongoing debate in Canadian legal circles over the principal form of 
economic security; the discussion over a move from billable hours to fee for service and 
flat fee structures is gaining momentum (Balbi, 2009). The first university degree 
granted for the study of law, the LLB, (Moulton, 2009c) is under review; several 
Canadian universities will be changing the degree to a doctor of jurisprudence, a JD, to 
indicate a higher status for lawyers who obtained a first degree in another discipline. 
This change is partly motivated by competition with American lawyers who hold the 
more prestigious degree. The legal profession in Nova Scotia is considering changes to 
its governance structure to align with other Canadian jurisdictions(Pink, D., 2009). These 
are examples of how the profession as an institutional field shifts over time. The field is 
subject to contextual pressures and external forces. A model that best advances the 
interests of the institution emerges as the new institutional paradigm in response to these 
pressures (Greenwood et al., 2002). 
The changes mentioned above are shaping the context for the legal profession. 
Participants in this study reflected on how these changes also affect the practice of law 
and their individual choices. In particular they note the way their labour process is 
organized and the social relations of production, whether in a private practice or in the 
broader relationship to the State as regulator. 
There is kind of an economic or ... organizational imperative that's profit driven... 
that affects the life of all lawyers [in private law firms]. ... the more senior you get 
the more you're a partner then you're the person who's sort of managing, making 
sure that team that's working for you is working at that level of efficiency. 
Because you have the relationship with the client and they're not going to want a 
bill for a hundred thousand dollars if it's work worth fifty thousand dollars. 
(Lawyer F ) 
This statement from a lawyer in private practice underscores two themes. The 
first theme echoes the growth of large, professional service firms and the dependent 
employment of associates in those firms. Lawyers need to manage the labour process of 
other lawyers, and sometimes on a long-term basis. Ackroyd and Muzio (2007) 
examined this phenomenon and highlight occupational closure within large legal firms. 
They illustrate the division and protection exercised by partners against associates in the 
same profession. However, there are also differences in how practices are organized in 
the market generally. The billing imperative does not exist for public sector lawyers, for 
example. As the profession bifurcates on public/private lines, the imperative described 
above is only relevant for some lawyers. So what does the profession look like in reality, 
today? 
Well one could take kind of the orthodox definition and say the legal profession is 
composed of all ... lawyers who are eligible to practice. You could even... say it's 
composed of all members of the Barristers Society ... both practicing and non-
practicing members. But that's the orthodox approach and I don't think that's true 
anymore. I think we have probably several professions within the broad legal 
profession. ... two distinct groups within the profession .. .are becoming further 
and further apart: those who practice in the public side and those who practice in 
the private side. And there is emerging a fairly significant third group which are 
those who practice for single employers. [0]ne might call them corporate counsel 
... they are employed by their client, they have often both a corporate and a legal 
role in the client [organization], and I think that that is a real challenge for the 
principles that govern the profession as a whole because of the nature of loyalty to 
the corporation employer. (Lawyer G) 
I think the way to put it that is more inclusive, that is more accurate to the change, 
is the setting of lawyering has become a whole lot more diffuse and diverse, right? 
So like there's lots of organizations now that either historically didn't have lawyers 
or historically didn't exist. (Lawyer E) 
These comments by Nova Scotia lawyers clearly state the changing nature of the 
profession, but also link that change back to the issue of interest representation. As the 
institutional field changes, it draws different interests into the practice of law. The 
example of corporate counsel illustrates this point. Lawyer G speaks of a tension lawyers 
may feel between loyalty to the goals of the profession and loyalty to the goals of the 
employer. Lawyer E highlights the point that even "corporate employer" is not a tidy 
category. There is a proliferation of places and ways to practice law, all with potentially 
conflicting loyalties. In each of these instances there may arise a need for interest 
representation beyond the Barristers' Society. One lawyer draws a comparison with 
another profession with well-established exclusionary closure: medicine. 
What medicine has going for it as an organized institution in Canada is Medicare, 
because there's a collective between the medical profession and the state. And 
therefore that is constantly reinforcing the validity and legitimacy of the medical 
societies, whatever they may get called. Law is a whole lot more diffuse than that 
and so the state would have to intervene in some sort of truly exceptional way 
before you'd get many issues that the Barristers' Society could rally all the troops 
around the way the medical society can. (Lawyer E) 
While some are questioning the value and composition of the legal profession and its 
relationship with the state regulator, legal work itself continues to become more complex. 
The criminal code and Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has made the first 
stages of criminal law cases, for example, more complicated. 
When I first started I remember the knapsack I had. It was the knapsack like you 
take to school and... it fit the files in. And now box loads of files, and disclosure's 
become massive... I mean obviously the Charter was ten, thirteen years in when I 
started, but you know, just really picking up speed. [TJhere's a lot of pre-trial 
applications before you get to 'did they or did they not commit a crime?' You 
know the work load has really increased. [Wjhen I first started you might have had 
between 5 and 10 assigned files. People are working now 25 assigned files. So 
that's 25 sex assaults, attempted murders, manslaughter... The work is getting 
heavier, more complex. (Lawyer H) 
This quote is from a lawyer who deals with special prosecutions. It reflects the 
pressure on workers from the demands of volume and complexity. Coupled with the 
earlier comment about economic imperatives, lawyers are feeling pressured in the same 
way as many workers in today's economy. Prosecutors' work is also divided in a 
different way. The complex serious crime cases arise more frequently. These complex 
cases go to regular prosecutors and are not reserved solely for the special prosecutions 
unit. External social ills put pressure on the labour process though the internal division of 
work. Regular prosecutors also carry a daily courtroom assignment with a full 
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complement of lesser crimes in addition to their complex cases. They must manage 
different bodies of expertise to cope with both loads. 
At the same time, the body of knowledge under control of the profession is 
growing. This growth in special, technical knowledge is offset by the release of other 
knowledge into the public domain. Some technical expertise previously in the domain of 
the profession is also being claimed by other professions (Susskind, 2008). In some 
jurisdictions land specialist firms and not lawyers, for example, do conveyancing. With 
electronic access to historical files, it is easier to trace titles. Paralegal and administrative 
staff are taking over many of the labour intensive tasks of lawyers by using powerful 
databases. Demarcationary closure in the legal profession is being revised to exclude 
some functions and knowledge and embrace others. The profession is in a period of 
adjustment in its relationships with other types of workers. 
The reason that the Canadian legal profession can be a collection of several 
professions and yet still retain a sense of unity, is due in part to the uniform education and 
apprenticeship aspects of lawyer training (Arthurs et al., 1986). The profession presents a 
unified face to the public and to government when lobbying and addressing matters of 
regulation. But in fact the profession is a disparate set of segmented specialists, and is 
becoming increasingly so. This raises the possibility that forms of closure may emerge 
within the profession. The following section looks closely at lawyers' stories of their 
careers and illustrates how individuals experience the profession, and recreate it through 
their actions and choices. 
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Themes from Careers in the Legal Profession 
"Hungry enough " 
Two themes emerged in discussions of career that reveal how lawyers establish 
and maintain a practice. One theme addresses the transfer of knowledge between 
professionals. This transfer is markedly different for Crown prosecutors than it is for 
lawyers in private practice. The other theme is the serendipitous manner in which 
lawyers develop their practice specialties. Once lawyers obtain their undergraduate law 
degree, complete the apprenticeship requirement of articling for a year, and pass the Bar 
exam, they embark on their careers. Many will stay with their articling firms and pursue 
a career in the field(s) of the firm's specialty, but others will seek an opportunity with a 
firm in a specialty that interests them. For many the development of their career is a very 
prosaic affair, as these stories about solo practice indicate: 
If you're one of the article clerks this year and you don't stand a ghost's hope in 
hell of getting a job come June... the only hope is to start a small practice of your 
own and hope to find some files that you don't know anything [about]. There's no 
glamour, there's no honour, dignity or whatever... I've gotta find somebody to get 
some money out of so I can buy some groceries today. (Lawyer B) 
Or it can even be where you end up physically, right? I mean it could be that you 
had every intention to stay in Halifax but maybe one of your parents fell ill and you 
had to move home to deal with them. And you gotta pay the bills so that means 
opening up your own place wherever they are. So if they're in a smaller 
community that means you need to branch out. (Lawyer I) 
The lawyers in these stories carry their education and their sense of 
professionalism into the marketplace, and then build their independent careers according 
to the circumstances they face. This is the traditional model of a professional career. The 
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lawyers in these stories express some disenchantment, however, with the career buildin 
process. Although they do not state this frustration blatantly, and I interpret this as 
professional solidarity, lawyers do work the tone of disenchantment into their career 
stories. Lawyer I describes her career as a series of steps that surprise her as she looks 
back, but also frustrate her: 
There are three things I said I would never practice coming out of law school -
securities, family and tax and I've done all three. In focus, too... I was at a family 
boutique, I'm doing securities regulation, and I did tax for the feds. So I mean... 
you're hungry enough you take what comes your way. I mean there's so many 
variations; it could be that you started out at a big firm, didn't work out for 
whatever reason - you hated it they hated you or whatever it was (she laughs) and 
then you just go out on your own. (Lawyer I) 
"Serendipity " 
This excerpt from the focus group discussion between two male and two female 
lawyers summarizes the career development of lawyers: 
Lawyer J: you've got a hungry article clerk looking for a job and all of a sudden 
he or she who wanted to be the corporate securities lawyer is now going to be an 
insolvency lawyer ... that's the spot you're plunked into and that's the path that 
you go down. 
Lawyer I: can you imagine coming out of law school and saying I'd really like to 
do insolvency work? (group laughter) 
Lawyer C: how do you know? 
Lawyer J: but there's people like [Lawyer B] who say that, right? 
Lawyer B: (he laughs) nobody came out that way. It's all serendipitous. You 
bump into something you do it or don't; you do it well or you do it badly; you get 
some more of it or you don't. And that's it, that's a career. 
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The focus group jokes that Lawyer B fits a stereotype of lawyer who knows 
from the start of his career what he wants to practice, and that practice is dull: 
insolvency work. The reality for most lawyers in private practice is a circuitous route 
to a speciality that takes along period of time. 
"A long slog" 
There is no glamour or prestige associated with the first steps in building a legal 
career. Many lawyers describe long hours of "grunt" work learning the culture and 
technique of legal practice, and paying ones dues to older members of the profession. 
The relationship with older members of the profession, described in more detail below in 
the discussion of knowledge transfer, is a key instrument for maintaining closure in the 
profession. The hierarchy of lawyers from junior to senior is one way of transferring 
professional norms to incoming generations of lawyers. The career building process is 
also a long one, and is described this way in both private practice and public sector 
employment. 
A lot of people I talk to say that the first ten years of the profession is extremely 
difficult because you're still climbing that learning curve and it's a really steep 
learning curve. Oftentimes it's not even until the very end of that first 10 years 
that you're really starting to remotely focus because the first big part is when 
you're getting all the dog files from all the senior lawyers that they don't want. 
Or if you're in the government then you're just junioring on files or you're getting 
anything that they throw at you that they think you can even remotely handle. 
They're just throwing it on your desk and saying "have a good time" and running 
out of the office... you definitely feel like you're all over the place and it's not a 
fun feeling whatsoever. (Lawyer I) 
And then when the work gets to be a certain point, you have enough work then 
you can choose the type of work you want to a certain extent. If you're fortunate 
as you get further on in your career you get more choice. (Lawyer C) 
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"Knowledge transfer " 
When I asked study participants about the knowledge they acquire in law school, 
and their readiness to practice law upon graduation, those in private practice reiterate the 
learning curve theme. These stories have an overtone of maintaining the profession's 
mystique. The mystique arises from the way professionals apply their specialized 
knowledge. Technical knowledge of the law may be very current in the minds of law 
school graduates but new lawyers do not know "anything about practicing law". A long 
process of mentorship is necessary in order to mould the lawyer into a fully formed 
professional, and I would argue, to protect the mystery and exclusiveness of the 
profession as well. 
I know I remember the first three years of my practice I don't think I ever did 
anything twice so everything was stressful in terms of, it wasn't that I didn't know 
the law -just the judgments right, making those decisions and trying to figure 
out... once I knew where I was heading it was ok. (Lawyer C) 
This male lawyer in a medium sized firm of approximately 20 lawyers describes 
his work mentoring a junior lawyer, an approach several others echoed in the course of 
this research: 
I would say that process is very experiential and the teaching part of it is very 
Socratic. Because what you have to do is say to the younger lawyer go, go out 
and experience something and then come in and tell [me] before we risk the 
whole client's future existence on what you've accomplished so far. Come and 
share that with me and then you trim it up and shine it around or say no you're 
completely flawed go back out, experience some more and come back in and 
show that to me again. .. .so you're trimming them, guiding them, shaping them, 
but ... it's still an experiential process for the learner. (Lawyer B) 
This mentoring approach endures through the changing profession: 
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The world that my mentors lived in is a really different world than the one that my 
juniors are going to live in... there are some things that remain static: the ability 
to identify your assumptions and be critical in your analysis and arrive at a logical 
conclusion and those are core; that's a core legal ability that remains ... human 
relationships, human dynamics doesn't [sic] change. [I]t just seems that 
everything else is a different world for the generation below me. (Lawyer B) 
Lawyers in this study reflect a strong sense of professionalism; they have 
internalized an identity as well as specialized knowledge in order to fill a specific role as 
lawyer. This identity persists through changes to institutional forms and market contexts. 
The mechanisms lawyers actively use to perpetuate their profession are focused, in part, 
on knowledge transfer. The theme of gradual build up is present in the career stories and 
the mentoring stories of lawyers in private practice. This theme is in marked contrast to 
the Crown prosecutors' experience, which I discuss in more detail in the following 
chapter. Prosecutors tend to know what type of law they want to practice and actively 
pursue it. They take up criminal law very early in their careers as a focused specialty and 
are not generally assigned a formal mentor. Prosecutors work independently, in court, 
from their earliest weeks on the job and they enjoy a strong peer support group which 
emerges as a function of their labour process. The peer group functions in lieu of formal 
mentoring and is an important instrument in the formation of occupational community 
and collective action. These important differences within the profession support the idea 




There are personal stresses in the profession, beyond the market situation and 
institutional changes. Certainly, lawyers feel the need to make wise financial decisions, 
but they are also attuned to the intrinsic rewards of their work: 
I was a sole practitioner, I worked in a medium sized firm, now I work with Nova 
Scotia Legal Aid, and for me the absolute pinnacle has been with Legal Aid . I've 
just really enjoyed practice. Not the most financially rewarding but nevertheless, 
in the grand balance of things, it's been the best. (Lawyer K) 
A significant subtheme for lawyers in private practice is the distinction between 
women's experience of the profession compared with that of their male counterparts. I 
take a moment to examine this aspect of the profession because it highlights another 
contrast with prosecutors. A male lawyer made the preceding comment. There is an 
unspoken flexibility in the way male lawyers describe their careers and choices. One of 
his peers summarizes the profession this way: 
[the legal profession has] been designed for me. ... there've been times that I've 
struggled in it, ... mightily, but it's actually been designed for your middle class 
white guy... not an awful lot of caregiver responsibilities and so I can go to 
breakfast meetings and I can join committees and I can be involved in all kinds of 
client development things and somehow make it all work. And that's not like 
classic, normal available to everybody. I've just been lucky to fit. (Lawyer B) 
Female lawyers are much more explicit in tying the challenges their gender 
presents with specific phases of their career. 
During that first ten years for women we're starting a family. You take a whole 
year out now. I mean how can I take, I don't know how you do it. It's wonderful 
to be able to do it but to take a whole year out of your practice when you've only 
been practicing two or three years? ... that would have been very difficult for me. 
(Lawyer C) 
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We get a hint from Lawyer C of an important difference related to employment status and 
which will be a major focus in the discussion of Crown prosecutors. 
It's different too if you're an employed lawyer; we have a young lawyer going off 
on maternity leave for a year ... my second child I was a partner and I got two and 
half months because that was all I could really squeeze given my circumstances at 
the time and the firm's circumstances. ... in private practice you're set up as... 
the associate who's an employee and the partner who's self employed; that tends 
to make a... big distinction (Lawyer C) 
Lawyer C's story reveals the choice that is at the heart of her gender dilemma. 
She feels that one must choose the lifestyle the profession offers and that makes you a 
real lawyer. She trades back and forth in her story between the term "want" and "don't". 
She indicates there is a choice for women to make yet there is an undertone in her 
maternity leave story that says real lawyers put up with the structure of the labour 
process. Newcomers are somehow different when they resist. She does not say new 
lawyers are less qualified, but she almost says this new breed of lawyer does not want to 
be a real lawyer. 
Well then you have a lot of women who leave the profession ... I mean people 
who just don't want that lifestyle basically... they can do the work, they can 
understand the concepts, they've gone through the training, they don't want to be, 
to live the law. They don't find that welcoming and therefore they choose not to 
do it. (Lawyer C) 
In addition to gender, there is a work-life balance issue in the profession that is being 
felt in most workplaces and it appears tobe based on age. Newcomers to the profession 
are markedly diffrerent from their older peers. 
... up until about 1990 you could assume fairly comfortably that new lawyers 
would come in, they would ... ascribe to the norms of the profession and would 
very much behave like the clones that they were seen to be. So law firms hired 
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people that they thought would perpetuate their image... so the structures of law 
firms, the structures of law practices going back several generations changed little 
up until the 1990s. And then in the 1990s we did truly begin to see the impact of 
generational change... even those of us who grew up in the 60s ... we didn't 
really change the way practice was then. We still worked incredibly hard and we 
still did all those things. That's changed in the last 15, 18, 20 years. [W]e're 
beginning to see some fundamental changes and it's not played itself out yet. 
(Lawyer G) 
These stories from lawyers reveal that the legal profession in Nova Scotia is 
similar to that in other jurisdictions described in the literature. The profession is 
undergoing rapid change as a result of market and regulatory factors. A profession 
dominated by men for centuries is now under pressure from women and younger workers 
to change in order to permit better work life balance. Employment status is shifting from 
self-employment to dependent employment. The profession has become a collection of 
sub-professions and the notion of 'difference' has been introduced into lawyers' sense of 
what it means to be professional. There is no longer a unified "professionalism" that 
lawyers embrace. There is scope for different interpretations of the lawyer identity and 
we will see how this translates into an occupational community for prosecutors in 
Chapter 5. Crown prosecutors exhibit different career paths, a slightly different labour 
process, a different knowledge transfer mechanism, and a markedly different sense of 
professionalism. 
Specialization in the Legal Profession 
We also see from these lawyers' accounts of their careers, and their reflections on 
the career potential of those they mentor, that there is a de facto specialization or limiting 
of scope of practice that occurs. This specialization is a product of what work "walks in 
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the door". Specialization is also a function of what one excels at, what a lawyer chooses 
to pursue, and what one turns down. 
I can do, I'm allowed to do family law and criminal; I am permitted by the Law 
Society to do all those things and the only thing that will actually prevent me: 
necessity. If I was hungry enough and I had nothing else to do, .. .1 guess I'd do 
a criminal law case. (Lawyer B) 
I think people develop specialization when they leave law school and they enter a 
law firm, a major law firm or a government department or wherever. Where 
people aren't generalists... and so you end up gravitating by your inclination or 
your abilities and so on to a particular practice. (Lawyer F) 
As lawyers reflected further on the broad implications for the legal profession, 
they all came to rest on one common message: perhaps the most significant change to the 
profession is specialization in practice area, and in expertise. With specialization comes 
an invisible barrier; the closure effect of expertise is felt within the profession as well as 
beyond it. Lawyers do not move easily between areas of specialty once they have 
invested their time in building a practice and a specialty in one area. This sentiment was 
true whether respondents had more than 40 years at the Bar, or less than ten. However, 
other divisions are also clear: a bifurcation on rural/urban, large/small, public 
sector/private sector, and along gender lines. This is almost an anthem among lawyers in 
private practice, and even those in the public sector: 
I think it's changing over time... lawyers are becoming more, are required 
[emphasis added] to become much more focused in their expertise and so .. .there 
aren't that many general practitioners. You sort of specialize - litigation, 
corporate ... labour-employment, then within those there are countless sub-
specialties (Lawyer L) 
I think the most profound change is the growth in the concentration of specialized 
lawyers in large, in larger firms. Like even my firm is a small firm, 14 lawyers in 
total, but we're completely specialized in one or two areas and I think that's the 
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biggest change Pve seen over my career. There were a lot more generalists 30 
years ago. (Lawyer F) 
most people in practice are specialized, in fact it's very difficult not to be 
specialized. (Lawyer K) 
But specialization is not without its regulatory challenges. In Nova Scotia, for 
example, the Barristers' Society does not permit the use of the term 'specialist' in 
advertising for legal services. The rationale for this restriction is due to the difficulty 
of measurement. 
a special ability in your practice is problematic because how do you measure it? 
How do you measure an individual lawyer's ability to excel or to do an above 
average job in a particular field of law when the governing body has no means in 
place of evaluating or measuring or quantifying your ability? Now the difficulty is 
that that the consumer of legal services is looking for that information. (Lawyer 
A) 
Consumers start asking for information about specialty at a very early point. Lawyer 
I says "I remember even when I was in law school everybody would say 'what's your 
specialization?'" The regulation of professionals is a provincial matter and the rules 
vary; some provinces permit lawyers to advertise areas of specialization. The "specialist" 
designation becomes more complicated in light of inter-jurisdiction mobility agreements. 
A firm or individual lawyer can advertise in their home province and complete work in 
another. Advertising media, such as national newspapers, extend across provincial 
boundaries and so the formal, structural restrictions on advertising have little practical 
impact. In practical terms most lawyers do concentrate their practice in a limited number 
of practice areas; they do specialize. The real advertising (in the sense of formal versus 
real control) is by word of mouth and reputation. This is another instance of the agency 
of individuals superceding the structural limitations of the profession. 
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Thus the profession appears to be a loose coalition of sub-professions, with 
very little to bind them together; not financial results, not experience, not practice 
content, nor even interest in governance. "So I don't know what we really do have in 
common other than we're all lawyers" (Lawyer F). All lawyers in Canada begin at the 
same point, with a general law degree. They pass through a common socialization 
process. These processes of acculturation give lawyers a shared sense of 
professionalism. Despite the differences in the content of their work, the professional 
project still excludes outsiders effectively. 
'Specialization' .. .is another basis upon which the profession has broken into 
different segments. Because you have those who are highly expert in their areas, 
they lose the commonality of what the profession historically had, which is that 
lawyers did everything. [W]hen you actually start to drill down, the knowledge, 
the aspirations, the way people practice, the financial realities, are all quite 
different. (Lawyer G) 
This concluding comment hints at what we are going to discover among 
prosecutors. The structure of the labour process as well as the sense of professionalism 
and the ideology that binds prosecutors together forms a sub- profession unto itself 
(Podmore, 1980). The varieties of workplaces, their unique cultures and ways of 
organizing work result in different ideologies and definitions of professionalism across 
the legal profession (Nelson & Trubeck, 1992). Prosecutors have developed closure 
strategies based on their specific expertise in order to preserve their professional 
autonomy. It is difficult for other lawyers to cross into their domain and prosecutors in 
turn seldom venture beyond their realm of expertise. They are a bounded group within 
the profession and specialization emerges as a dominant theme in prosecutors' stories. 
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The following section details the development of the prosecution function in Canada. 
The function has evolved from autonomous agents of the Attorney General to dependent 
employees in bureaucratic structures, governed by policy manuals and layers of 
managerial supervision. This section includes a discussion of the Nova Scotia Public 
Prosecution Service. This organization context highlights another element that 
distinguishes prosecutors: their dependent employment. This discussion sets the stage for 
the stories of career and collective bargaining that follow in Chapter 5. 
Prosecution in Canada 
Historically prosecution was a private concept of wrong between two parties. 
When private vengeance gave way to judicial decisions in law courts, it still required a 
wronged individual to bring charges. The transition to public prosecution was long and 
colourful, with folk methods of proof giving way to prosecution of the monarch's 
interests and ultimately a public office of prosecution (Ma, 2008). The Canadian system 
of prosecutions is based on the federal responsibility for criminal law and procedure, and 
the delegation of the administration of those proceedings to individual provinces. The 
Canadian system is patterned on the British one, where private prosecutors appointed by 
the Crown are removed from investigatory roles. In Canada, private prosecution was 
common until the expansion of the public service in the 1960s. Prior to 1966 all 
prosecutions in Canada were managed by part time prosecutors appointed by the 
Attorney General and these were often political patronage appointments (Grosman, 
1970). Increasing urbanization and consequent crime resulted in greater demand for 
prosecutorial services. Lawyers in private practice appointed by government as 
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prosecutors found they had to hire per diem lawyers to conduct prosecutions on their 
behalf as the volume of work increased. In 1966 the first full time prosecution staff were 
hired into the civil service marking the forerunner of today's public prosecution units. 
Employment has since evolved into a permanent complement of civil servants, appointed 
under the authority and the protocols of the provincial of federal legislation governing the 
civil service (Stager & Arthurs, 1990). The path to the current state of affairs has not 
been smooth. 
This move to employing permanent Crown prosecutors highlights tensions in the 
underlying relations of production of legal services and the public good of prosecution. 
Contemporary Crown Attorneys retain all the rights and privileges of practicing barristers 
with full membership in the regulatory charter body. At the same time, they are subject 
to management control. In the case of Nova Scotia prosecutors, there is a tension 
between professional independence and employment dependence. Employment creates 
pressure from bureaucratic controls that can reduce the professional's autonomy and 
interfere with professional discretion, while it binds them to financial benefits and divides 
their loyalty between profession and employer. 
Grosman (1970) describes the evolution of a specialized knowledge relating to 
prosecutions, despite the fact that lawyers are all trained in the same way (Bull, 1962; 
Stager & Arthurs, 1990). There still persists in rural areas the independent practitioner 
who takes on prosecution of files, but these files are prepared by the civil servants and 
delegated to this external party for the execution of court room activities and related 
decisions. Bull (1962) is one of the first publications to mention a 'career' as a 
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prosecutor, and he notes that in urban centers prosecution was becoming more than just a 
stop on the way to a more prolific career at the criminal bar or a "stage" in developing a 
rounded independent practice; it is a legitimate career. The fact that gradually all 
prosecutions are undertaken by a permanent prosecution service of civil servants, means 
that this type of practice is no longer available to lawyers in private practice.7 One 
impact of specialization is isolation. It is very difficult move back and forth between 
specialties, as the stories in the preceding section indicate. Permanent employment 
brings with it golden handcuffs. Crown prosecutors often cite the public sector pension 
plan as an employment benefit that cannot be duplicated in the private sector. With 
several years invested in public practice, most prosecutors find it almost impossible to 
return to private practice. 
Pink and Perrier (2007) outline in layman's terms the criminal law system in 
Canada. Contributors to this volume are drawn from Nova Scotia for the most part. 
Almost all of the lawyers who contributed chapters and/or edited chapters are graduates 
of Dalhousie University's law school. The book thus gives a good overview of the 
criminal justice system from the Nova Scotia perspective. The chapter describing the 
players and roles in a criminal trial emphasizes a neutral, impersonal professional 
(Hoskins, 2007). Hoskins takes pains to illustrate the relationship between individual 
lawyers as executors of specific functions in relation to the law and the system of 
7 Some private sector lawyers do take on "per diem" work prosecuting cases for the prosecution 
service. In June 1998, when Nova Scotia Crown Prosecutors walked off the job, per diems were retained to 
ensure a Crown presence in matters that were already scheduled to come before the courts. In many cases 
those per diem lawyers simply asked for adjournments. Per diems have been greatly reduced in recent 
years, in favour of funding more permanent positions. 
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criminal justice, and not as individuals with personalities and opinions. In fact, personal 
opinion is clearly not to enter into the practice of prosecution nor defence, and though the 
criminal law system here is an adversarial one, the combativeness is engendered in the 
process and not the individuals. "The adversarial criminal justice system does not create a 
contest between the Crown prosecutor and the accused" (Hoskins, 2007, p. 194). The 
lawyers are pitted not against each other, but against the arguments and the case 
presented by opposing counsel. The role of the Crown is to present the evidence and 
ensure a fair trial on its merits (Hoskins, 2007). 
Prosecutors as Specialized Lawyers 
The role of the prosecutor in Canada is to "bring out impartially all the evidence 
in their possession (favourable or unfavourable to the prisoner), leaving it to the tribunal 
of trial to render its decision or verdict" (Common, 1952, p. 4). Common extolled the 
centralized Canadian system as one where politics have been kept separate from the 
administration of justice. Moss (1960) calls for a "professional prosecutor", one with 
specialized training, professional development at the public's expense and a national 
association for prosecutors. In Canada, prosecutors' initial training remains the same as 
that of all other lawyers and expertise in prosecution is developed once a lawyer begins 
prosecuting (Grosman, 1970). This is still the way that prosecutors are prepared for their 
roles, as every one of the participants in my study attested. However, in contrast to the 
mentoring that occurs in private practice, described above, prosecutors explain their 
training as being "thrown right in" to the work. There is also a difference in the 
prosecutor's application of expertise compared to lawyers in private practice. 
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There is a distinction. Prosecutors, [are] governed the same, there's no question, 
the ethics rules are the same; they're applied a little differently if one of is 
exercising prosecutorial discretion. And that makes sense because people would 
make a complaint and hope that someone would not prosecute them. (Lawyer D) 
Hoskins (2007, p. 195) speaks directly to the idea of professional discretion when 
he states "Generally, a Crown prosecutor's discretion is exercised without reference to 
fixed objective standards. ... The Crown prosecutor exercises a public function involving 
much discretion and power". Yet at the same time he says "[T]he Crown prosecutor 
plays a very responsible and respected role in the conduct of criminal trials. The Crown 
prosecutor ... must act fairly and dispassionately, with an ingrained sense of duty" (Ibid). 
Here we see the autonomy and creative aspects of the profession at play along 
with the norming influences of the profession, influencing the presentation of the self and 
the Crown prosecutor's behaviour in the trial. Hoskins goes further to say the personal 
opinions of prosecutors "should never be expressed" (Ibid), leaving the impression that 
Crown prosecutors are somehow less than human. Personality and personal opinion 
cannot enter into their work at all. The ideal prosecutor is perhaps interchangeable with 
any other in the execution of their duties. They do not address other people in their work, 
but rather challenge positions, arguments, and the adversarial system, ensuring that the 
system works well. Cast in this light prosecutorial work is disembodied, but not 
necessarily Taylorized. It is specialized work, but not yet reduced to the status of 
commodity as Susskind (2008) predicts for other branches of law. 
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Professional Discretion/Prosecutorial Discretion 
Professionals enjoy freedom to use discretion in applying expertise; this is one of 
the cornerstones of the professions, as discussed in Chapter 2. Such freedom comes from 
the self-regulation of the profession, but also from the way in which work processes are 
prescribed. The legal profession is renowned for the extent to which it values individual 
autonomy; but this autonomy has been closely tied to traditional legal practice and self-
employment. As a result, lawyers have been very reluctant to embrace any form of 
collectivism in the workplace. The legal profession's values are expressed as codes of 
ethics and a duty to the public interest (Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, 2007). These 
values are nurtured in students from the earliest days of law school training. 
Socialization of new lawyers to a common worldview perpetuates the professional norms 
and upholds individual discretion in decision-making and independence as the 
profession's highest ideals. All lawyers admitted to the practice of law embrace some 
form of individual discretion. 
Professional discretion takes the form of prosecutorial discretion for Crown 
prosecutors. The Supreme Court of Canada defines five elements of prosecutorial 
discretion (Krieger 2002) and summarizes them as "whether a prosecution should be 
brought, continued or ceased and what the prosecution ought to be for" (Ibid, p. 46, 47). 
However, Bull (1962) describes the discretion as reaching beyond the decision to 
prosecute and into the manner in which trials or prosecutions, more broadly, are 
conducted. Prosecutors make decisions about which witnesses to call and what evidence 
to present (yet governed by the ideas that all evidence, even that which helps the accused, 
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needs to come forward and cannot be suppressed). They present for the judge the fullest 
and fairest case to enable a decision to be made. Discretion then involves not only if a. 
case is prosecuted but also how it is pursued. In short, discretion is at the heart of the 
prosecutor's labour process; "the essence of criminal justice lies in the exercise of 
discretionary power" (Davis, 1969, p. 18). 
There is significant literature (Bellemare, 2007; Common, 1952; Grosman, 1970; 
MacFarlane, 2001; MacNair, 2002; Note, 1955; Whitley, 2004) and case law (Boucher 
1955; Krieger 2002; Miazga 2009; Nelles 1989) on prosecutorial discretion and the idea 
that prosecutors must be independent in their supervision and control of the progress of a 
case. This is especially true in Canada where the Nova Scotia, British Columbia, and 
now the Federal Prosecution Service have embraced statutory models of independence. I 
will return to the reasons for separating the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service from 
direct control of a government Minister in a later section. Comparatively little, however, 
has been written about the limits set on prosecutorial discretion as a result of dependent 
employment (Gomme & Hall, 1995). Scholarly journals do not address the relationship 
between employment and prosecutorial independence nor the role of collective action as 
a means to preserve prosecutorial independence. Yet administrative control of 
discretionary power is a very real concern in bureaucracies (Davis, 1969). 
Two important changes occurred in Nova Scotia between the early 1950s, when 
the first literature on the career prosecutor emerges, and the late 1990s. Management of 
the prosecution function was embodied in a management team of Regional Crown 
Attorneys (Public Prosecution Service, 2010). These prosecutors take on the full range of 
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bureaucratic supports and expectations as managers in the civil service. The management 
of prosecutors is general and overarching in nature, compared with the file specific 
management exercised in private practice. Although prosecutors remain independent in 
the courtroom, the formal organization structure of a management hierarchy imposes 
limits on prosecutors' decision-making. Prosecutors describe this limitation in detail in 
their workplace stories. In addition to organization positions, the Nova Scotia Public 
Prosecution Service has developed a policy manual of prosecution and administrative 
guidelines (Public Prosecution Service, 2006). This tool further supports an overall 
management of the prosecution function rather than a case-by-case, mentor type of 
supervision. The imposition of organization policies narrows prosecutors' range of 
discretion. 
I turn now to other professions for a moment, in order to demonstrate that lawyers 
are not unique in their command of expertise and in their insistence upon having 
discretion to exercise that expertise. Nurses provide an interesting point of comparison to 
prosecutors because they are also employed professionals, and in Nova Scotia some 
nurses were also civil servants until the 1990s. Nurses and prosecutors share several 
occupational traits. Both are held to a high standard of professional care in a duty to 
protect the public interest. Individual care is also paramount. Nurses give very tangible 
care; they provide care for the physical and emotional well being of patients. Prosecutors 
have the accused person's freedom and the rights of alleged victims in their care. The 
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Nova Scotia Barristers' Society Legal Ethics Handbook contains section 17 that 
recognizes prosecutors have a special duty to the court as quasi-ministers of justice. 
Prosecutors are held to a different standard than other lawyers in terms of their duty for 
fair and ethical conduct; "the ethics rules are the same, they're applied a little differently 
in the context of one of is exercising prosecutorial discretion" (Lawyer D). Both 
prosecutors and nurses are subject to administrative rules and control over their job 
functions. 
Control by rules takes similar forms in professional workplaces. Nurses follow 
protocols for "delegated medical acts" and prosecutors are subject to the Public 
Prosecution Service policy manual. Each of these documents specifies what the 
respective professional is to do in certain circumstances. My interviews with nurses and 
prosecutors revealed that there are members of both professions that embrace these rules 
and see them as helpful instruments that provide structure and consistency in the 
workplace; structure without fettering their professional discretion (Davis, 1969). 
Likewise, there are those who see the rules as a hindrance in the exercise of professional 
discretion. Many non-professional employees may feel this way. A bank employee, for 
instance, may feel hampered by workplace rules. However, if a bank employee makes a 
mistake there are likely personal discipline consequences; if they have acted in good faith 
and not contrary to disclosure and other ethical guidelines, the bank protects them from 
personal liability. The standards of nursing practice on self regulation clearly state that 
Section 17 is included as Appendix C 
nurses assume personal accountability in their practice (College of Registered Nurses of 
Nova Scotia, 2003). In the case of self-regulated employed professionals employers 
appear to delegate functions away from the institutional level, to the individual level of 
responsibility. The nurse, for example, accepts responsibility for her actions by accepting 
delegated functions, and is personally liable for any mistakes as a result. There is an 
imbalance between the employer's power to impose behaviour, supported by the practice 
standards of the professional body, and the agency of individuals to accept or reject the 
delegated function. 
This dilemma is deepened when nursing practice standards (College of Registered 
Nurses of Nova Scotia, 2003 s. 6.4) require nurses to report situations that may be 
adverse for clients or health care providers including incompetence, incapacity, 
misconduct on the part of other nurses or other healthcare providers. Not only are nurses 
personally liable in the case of a mistake, and subject not only to employer discipline, but 
they are also open to professional censure. Nurses also have a disciplinary responsibility 
within the profession. They take on a management-like role in policing their peers. This 
disciplinary role among peers can undermine solidarity in the nurses' union. This role 
places nurses in the awkward position of breaching solidarity in order to preserve 
professional integrity. Professional employees are held to a higher standard of 
performance than other types of employees in exchange for the privilege of self-
regulation. 
The comparison between nurses and prosecutors illustrates an important 
difference between professional and non-professional employees in the workplace. 
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However there is an important contrast as well. Nurses have been dependent employees 
for as long as they have existed as a professional occupation. Their relationship with 
management and the rules of their profession are bound up in the structural context of 
their employment. Their nursing standards refer to the individual, reflection of the 
atomization of the workforce under large, powerful stakeholders such as the medical 
profession and state-run hospitals. Prosecutors have only come to dependent 
employment more recently; the foundations of their profession lie in self-employment 
and self-determination. And yet the practice standards for prosecutors, as for all lawyers, 
is framed in terms of the profession (Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, 2007) rather than 
the individual. There is some safety and shelter in the profession as a collection of peers 
and its members perhaps do not feel individually threatened or imposed upon in the same 
way nurses do. Lawyers may feel they have less need for collective protection outside 
the professional body, such as a union would provide. However, specialization in the 
profession and evolution to dependent employment in one specialty, prosecution, results 
in a new setting that the language in the profession's standards and ethical requirements 
does not address. Language that distinguishes employer/manager functions from 
individual lawyer functions is necessary either in the profession's practice standards, or 
in the workplace in the form of policies. Section 17 of the Nova Scotia Barristers' 
Society Legal Ethics Handbook was added in the early 1990s to recognize the different 
circumstances of Crown prosecutors. A former managing prosecutor explains it thus: 
At the Public Prosecution Service, we had ... an internal review process that was 
similar to that of the Bar Society, but the Crown prosecutors were subject to both. 
So, if a complaint would come in,... I would have it investigated and processed, 
similar to how it was on the Bar side. So you could complain about a Crown 
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Attorney .. .and have parallel investigations. [Prosecutors] are not immune from a 
peer review, but they're treated differently because of that section [s.17 of the 
Legal Ethics Handbook]. (Lawyer D) 
Legislation governing the Nova Scotia legal profession specifically defines the 
profession. In addition to a list of tasks that lawyers are permitted to undertake, the Act 
defines the profession in terms of skill and education (The Legal Profession Act 2004). 
Because the law actually limits what lawyers can and cannot do and because they are 
officers of the court, Crown prosecutors accept a limit on their professional power. The 
limitations are achieved through the text of law and the code of conduct of the Barristers' 
Society. Management and organization pressure, especially public scrutiny of the civil 
service and the resulting implementation of policy further impedes the exercise of 
professional discretion. At this level, the prosecutors and nurses seem to be similar in 
their need for collective representation within the workplace to help them resist the 
erosion of professional discretion. However, this is more than a matter of the application 
of bureaucracy theory; management ranks to the very top of the Public Prosecution 
Service are filled with members of the profession who specialize in prosecution. There 
are no other professions that wrestle for jurisdiction in the prosecutors' workplace. 
Although prosecutors operate in a hierarchy of junior and senior peers, this is not the 
same as the hierarchy of doctors, nurses, technicians, and allied health professionals in 
medicine (Witz, 1992). Prosecution Services are homogeneous professional workspaces 
within a larger bureaucracy yet kept at arm's length from centres of power. The 
overlapping allegiances to profession, organization, and public service are underscored in 
the paradoxical relationship between management and prosecutor; they are peers in a 
professional sense, but subordinate/supervisor in employment relations. No single 
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instrument of closure available to lawyers up to the early 1990s satisfactorily addresses 
this paradox. They were receptive to supplementary forms of closure to protect their 
professional discretion, and to resist the rules of emerging from dependent employment. 
The Employed Prosecutor 
Hodson (1995) states that defence of autonomy is the most common reaction to an 
incursion of bureaucratic control, and is particularly so for professional employees in 
bureaucracies. Through the creation of a new organization, several phases of 
negotiations culminating in collective bargaining, as well as job action and a 
communications campaign, the message of independence and protection of professional 
autonomy is a clear and dominant strategy for Crown prosecutors in Nova Scotia, as we 
shall see in their individual stories. The individualism on which professions are built, and 
the corresponding accountability for one's own performance over the long term is at odds 
with the collective and often short run aims of unionism (Raelin, 1989). But when the 
individual autonomy and goals are jeopardized and injustice is perceived, workers 
sharing these conditions, even though they are highly professionalized, are mobilized to 
act in self defence (Kelly, 1998). It is important to note that the Dartmouth office of the 
PPS was a key physical site of mobilization. In this location management style seems to 
have played an important role in the success of the prosecutors' struggle for collective 
bargaining. In the Dartmouth office there were concerns over poor management. These 
concerns were verbalized and the situation was compared with the conditions in the 
Halifax office, lending momentum to the Crown prosecutors' fight to redress these 
injustices. In the regional office it was contact with the leadership of the Prosecution 
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Service that rankled, particularly when the core role of the prosecutor, to determine 
whether or not to proceed with a prosecution, was challenged. 
I was in [the region] as a trial Crown and there was some case and for some 
reason I had to write a letter to the director. I put in the letter 'in my view... it's 
not in the public interest in this case to proceed', which is one of the things the 
individual trial Crown is supposed to look at; reasonable prospect of conviction, is 
it in the public interest? [the director]'s in our area having a... regional meeting 
just coincidentally around the time of that letter had been written. And after the 
meeting... he says, 'oh yeah, can I talk to you for a minute? .. .1 got your letter 
and I just want to be clear about one thing, I'm in charge and don't ever tell me 
when it's in the public interest to prosecute something.' ... Well, first of all, I 
had—even at that point—more experience than he ever had, but more 
importantly, it was just the demeanour. 'Never tell me what to do, just give me 
facts' or whatever. [ T]his is our job though, every day, to decide this. ...and 
that's just one incident. (Lawyer M) 
A senior lawyer in private practice claims the labour process of associates in 
medium to large private practice firms is similar to that of employed lawyers in the public 
sector, or anywhere else, but then quickly contradicts that with what he sees first hand 
when meeting with government lawyers. 
Our associates are managed the associates in the firms downtown are managed you 
have to have management. .. .to ensure there's overall quality control in terms of 
what the work is and .. .to ensure that people do enough work to bill what's needed 
to be billed... and then there's the continuing education which at the third level of 
management. 
I don't imagine an associate here would for example go and do an arbitration on 
their own, certainly not in the first couple of years. They would always be working 
in a team with a more senior lawyer and they'd have a lot of responsibility in that 
team, but they're not the person who's the leader of the team. [T]he idea that any of 
us are sort of autonomous ... that's not really right. We often work in teams and we 
work for the same clients and I think it's probably the same in big firms, the same 
in government. 
The government, ironically they, lawyers are more on their own in government. 
[T]hey get hired, they get a job, they get an assignment, .. .and that's it. I know that 
they call on each other talk to each other... but you ... rarely see a double team of 
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lawyers coming from government or big organizations, so if anything they're more 
autonomous than they would be in a in a regular law firm. (Lawyer F) 
This lawyer is referring to government lawyers generally. The employment of 
lawyers in large heterogeneous organizations such as the public service puts pressure on 
the labour process. The attention to public sector cost-saving and public accountability 
results in streamlined labour process, where one task is assigned to one individual rather 
than the luxury of a team approach as found in private practice. Prosecutorial work is 
conducted in the public sector environment, but has also traditionally been a solitary 
undertaking; prosecutors are alone in court for the most part. However, in contrast to 
many non-professional employees and in contrast to the situation of employed associates 
in the private law firm Lawyer D describes above, prosecutorial work is not supposed to 
be subject to measurement and conviction rates. Its quality is supposedly indicated by 
the fairness of each trial. What does performance appraisal measure in such an 
organization? What role does management take when the ownership aspect alluded to in 
the quotation above is absent? The files are scrutinized in a peer review fashion. In fact, 
much of the management function alluded to above is undertaken by peers. 
Well you're on your own but certainly reputations spread quickly because 
everybody in the criminal bar [gossips]. And also [people see your work] when 
the files come back. So you do a file, you don't carry your files. You might have 
12 different Crowns look at the same file. So certainly if you do something in a 
file and then someone gets it the next time they'll see any mistakes that you made 
and that kind of thing. There's sort of the peer file review. Also just I think in this 
job you learn a lot by talking. I often laugh. People say 'oh you going to coffee?' 
But you learn more sitting around a table with a bunch of Crowns at coffee than 
anywhere else because all they do is talk about work and the cases (laughs) and 
just by them saying 'oh I you know I have this issue and how would you handle it 
well I handled it this way I had that last week,' and that kind of thing. So I think 
that's how they [management] get to look at you. (Lawyer H) 
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In Chapter 2 I discussed proletarianized work. I pause here to consider whether it 
makes sense to talk about Crown prosecutors as being proletarianized. Hoskin's (2007) 
disembodied professional prosecutor seems like an automaton, governed by policies and 
organization structure in the application of his discretion. The tasks of prosecution 
appear to be broken in small segments with many hands touching them, almost in 
assembly line fashion, as Lawyer H just described. And yet measurement of 
effectiveness is difficult. Lawyer F describes managing his employed associates in 
private practice and tells me in the interview that he reviews their written work and 
corrects it. This type of management scrutiny does not apply to prosecutors. Lawyer F 
even draws a distinction between his colleagues and prosecutors when he says "[lawyers] 
don't appear in court or I mean most lawyers don't anyway". Prosecutors spend a 
significant amount of time in court, and on their own, so performance appraisal, and 
control, is challenging. Prosecutors' stories of their work experience probe the nature of 
their labour process in greater depth in Chapter 5. For now I conclude that there is not 
enough evidence to support an argument that prosecutors' work is proletarianized, nor is 
it deskilled in a Taylorized sense: 
So you would organize the assembly line for the pop in a way that a person can sit 
there and watch and see if the machine is doing the job; it's not a very high level 
of skill. At the same time you'll have a machinist who has to adjust the machines, 
make sure they work in a certain way. So I don't think that kind of deskilling, 
[like] that of the pop machine guy, exists in the legal profession. (Lawyer F) 
At this point I will summarize the discussion. The legal profession is casually 
described as though it is a unified institution, but authors and my research participants 
indicate that this is not the case. Segmentation in the professions, law as a case in point, 
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is extensive due to pressure from managers, consumer markets, professional regulatory 
bodies and public scrutiny (Freidson, 2001). The result is distinct, cohesive sub units that 
may in fact act like competing professions or else range themselves in a hierarchy like 
subordinated members of the broader profession (Bucher & Strauss, 1961). In a 
dependent employment relationship, these segmented groups still seek the status and 
financial security promised by the broader profession, but must seek alternate means in 
order to obtain these benefits. For example, the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society has 
declared Crown Prosecutors are affected differently by their public service and 
relationship to government (Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, 2007) and thus the Nova 
Scotia Barristers' Society Legal Ethics Handbook restricts the application of professional 
discipline to prosecutors under section 17 . Nothing further in the Barristers' Society 
governance instruments sets prosecutors apart from the rest of the profession, so that they 
have the same training and professionalization with the resulting expectations of prestige 
and professional power (Larson, 1977). Prosecutors feel the nature of their work and the 
application of their special expertise sets them apart from the rest of the profession. This 
distinction is reinforced by institutional rules. Prosecutors even distinguish themselves 
and hold themselves apart from others in the union movement. Describing the decision 
of what to call their bargaining association one prosecutor said "Yes there was a big 
debate. We had a referendum on that. We decided to stay as a little kind of a niche 
rather than go the union route and perhaps get sucked into a bigger union" (Lawyer N). 
The civil service bureaucracy, with its accountability structures and performance 
measures, is incompatible with the practice of law and the independence of prosecution 
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(Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). This incompatibility presents an intriguing field of 
tensions. The extent to which prosecution is only loosely coupled with the broader 
profession may have enabled changes to some aspects of the institutional form of the 
profession that in turn nurture collective bargaining. A series of external pressures as 
well as shocks from within, which will be described below ,made prosecutors receptive to 
redefining their niche in the profession (DiMaggio, 1988). 
Collective bargaining has not been part of the tradition of the legal profession, nor 
have the institutional forces supported it for the most part. An ethos of independence and 
autonomy, self-employment, and practice codes that use language of public interest rather 
than focussing on individual rights combine in a way that does not nurture collective 
action. Forces were brought to bear on prosecution that were more powerful than the 
professional norms. These forces were tied to the employment situation of prosecutors 
but sufficiently different from the employment context of their private sector peers that 
occupational closure begins to look very different for prosecutors (Muzio & Ackroyd, 
2005). 
In the following section I will examine the way prosecutors moved to dependent 
employment and the difficulty the employer seemed to have in defining structure and 
control over prosecutorial discretion. This struggle over control and discretion 
contributed to an erosion of Crown prosecutor's professional power. Some of the 
mystique of the profession was undermined and as a result some loss of status was 
experienced. The extent to which Crown prosecutors could control their work process 
and the position they held relative to their professional peers within and outside of the 
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public service were all challenged in a period of organization restructuring and public 
scrutiny. 
The public lost faith in the prosecution function after a series of high profile 
failures and controversial prosecutions, in particular the Donald Marshall Jr. case and the 
Westray mine disaster. Royal Commissions and other reviews of the Service (Hickman, 
Poitras, & Evans, 1989; Kaufman, F., 1999a, 2002) specified the nature of Nova Scotia 
prosecution's shortcomings. Prosecutors are singled out, almost isolated in the 
Barristers' Society Legal Ethics Handbook (Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, 2007) as a 
special type of lawyer. Section 17 of the handbook recognizes the heavy burdens on 
prosecutors to disclose all relevant evidence in a trial, however they are distanced from 
the disciplinary aspect of the Barristers' Society by the force of Section 17 and the case 
law that preceded it. Prosecutors are insulated from challenges of professional 
misconduct when they exercise prosecutorial discretion. Organizational attempts by the 
Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service to quantify the distinct status of prosecutors were 
not all successful. Prosecutors turned to new means of regaining control over terms of 
employment that would also enable them fully to realize their professional power. 
The Nova Scotia Crown Prosecutors' Struggle for Collective Bargaining. 
The work of prosecuting alleged criminals on behalf of the people - public 
prosecution - has evolved over time in the province of Nova Scotia. The early 
appointments to prosecution roles were through an Order in Council and were political 
patronage appointments, not the result of an open job competition. Employees thus 
appointed served "at pleasure", which means they could be dismissed when one 
government fell and another Attorney General was elected. Over time and with 
increasing public scrutiny and sophistication in the public service, more and more 
prosecutors came to positions through a civil service competition and following the 
proclamation of the Public Prosecution Act of 1990, all remaining Order in Council 
appointees were converted to civil service status. All new full time hires from that point 
forward have been civil service appointments, through competitive job posting. Crown 
Attorneys are thus relatively recent civil servants and have enjoyed a regular, permanent 
employment relationship with their employer as a cohesive group for barely two decades. 
Other occupations, such as teachers and nurses, have been in structured permanent 
employment relationships with a public sector employer for much longer periods. While 
it is of some value to drawn inter-profession comparisons, the circumstances of 
prosecutors are unique in important ways. 
In the late 1980s Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors took control of the Government 
Lawyers Association, renaming it Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys Association (NSCAA). 
This was a break with traditional forms of professional representation and the NSCAA 
went on to engage the employer in collective bargaining. Half of the provincial 
jurisdictions in Canada currently have collective bargaining for Crown prosecutors and 
the rest are moving towards this status with the support of a strong national association9. 
9 The Canadian Association of Crown Counsel. Membership includes existing public sector civil 
and prosecution lawyers' associations from all provinces and the federal government. (Canadian 
Association of Crown Counsel, 2009) 
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The story of how the Nova Scotia prosecutors achieved collective bargaining reveals 
specific characteristics of the working conditions of the employed professional. An 
analysis of the way that prosecutors framed their concerns and how they describe 
professional and employment roles will help us to understand the structural aspects of a 
profession and the nature of the relationships between professionals and their employers. 
When a group protects itself and its activities through rules and restrictions on 
access it practices closure. Some groups both restrict entry to their profession and 
simultaneously challenge the entry restrictions of other groups. The classic example is 
trade unionism. The Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys also practice this dual form of 
restriction, called dual closure. As members of the Nova Scotia Barrister's Society they 
participate in control over who can enter the profession in general and, as prosecutors, 
challenge the limits and rules of the employer through collective bargaining. 
The increasing tendency to bureaucratize work and to subject the professional 
labour process to formal control leads prosecutors to rebel like other working class 
labourers. Prosecutors felt they were initially beyond having to deal with workplace 
issues like members of the working class. "I thought going to law school meant I would 
never have to do something like that! I thought going to law school just exempted me 
from labour issues." (Lawyer P) Prosecutors largely remain autonomous workers in their 
day-to-day practice, although the range within which they practice their discretion is 
confined by policy. Crown prosecutors are not seeking a change to the class structure. If 
pushed, they identify themselves as holders of an elite position, acting as "quasi ministers 
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of justice". They are conscious of the power they wield in society and of how lives are 
profoundly affected by the way they conduct their work. 
Crown prosecutors are not taking that large a step in their struggle. Their use of 
collective bargaining is largely instrumental. Part of the motivation for their struggle for 
collective bargaining rights was an attempt to regain some of the financial and status 
privileges of their profession lost through dependent employment. Prosecutors' choice of 
usurpationary closure through bargaining is not an emancipation project (Murphy, 
1984)designed to overthrow the class structure. They seek redress in the balance of 
power in the workplace, but not in society in general. No one I spoke to indicated they 
were willing or interested in changing the formal alignment of the power of the state to 
set rules and enforce them through the criminal justice system. 
Prosecutors are kind of the reverse of the embourgoisement of the working class. 
They are members of a profession that enjoys elite status and the privileges of social 
class, as well as the economic benefits of private professional practice. However, 
prosecutors also experience the disenfranchisement of blue-collar workers in their 
dependent employment. Wage restrictions, codification of work practices, and public 
scrutiny of the exercise of their professional discretion have led to a move away from the 
individualism of the professional and the bourgeois, to a collective identity and collective 
action. Prosecutors have in a sense become the inverse of Goldthorpe's (1966) affluent 
worker where they continue to embrace the norms and values of their position of 
privilege and yet use the tools of their new circumstances to further their goals. 
Goldthorpe found that as workers became more affluent they did not automatically join 
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the middle class, in ideology or social settings, despite their increased income and 
potential for change in lifestyle. This study reveals that prosecutors are not de-
professionalized nor proletarianized in their move to dependent employment. Rather, 
they adopt the tools of the working class to achieve their professional goals. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Parkin (1979) and Wright (1978) offer the suggestion 
that class introduces a contradiction in the actions of prosecutors. They are caught 
between two opposing logics of action (Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980) in their simultaneous 
pursuit of professionalization and collective bargaining. However, if we consider that 
closure is an evolving process rather than a given state of affairs, these two forms of 
closure are actually compatible and in some instances mutually reinforcing. A closer 
examination of the prosecution service in Nova Scotia will illustrate how these competing 
logics are articulated and then reconciled. 
The Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service 
"I think it is fair to say that controversy has plagued this Service on a number of 
fronts, including its effectiveness, organizational structure, level of resources and public 
confidence." (MacFarlane, 2001, pp. 20-21) MacFarlane, in his review of prosecution in 
Canada, describes the widespread challenges that face the Nova Scotia Public 
Prosecution Service. This section discusses the history of that Service and the response 
of prosecutors to those organization challenges. With reference to the preceding 
discussion of the professions and dependent employment, I conclude that there are two 
forms of power available to employed professionals - their labour power and their 
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professional power. The professional power stems from specialized knowledge and is 
manifest in the license to practice. Labour power stems from the social relations of 
production, and is realized in the daily application of professional discretion as workers 
apply their knowledge to unique situations and work challenges. In the private sector, 
firm ownership is a factor in the power dynamic because owner/partners in a law firm 
may exert some control over some resources necessary to production, but the principal 
activities are knowledge and not capital- based. Prosecutors face a different situation. 
The public service "capital" comes from taxpayers and ownership is a much broader and 
more nebulous notion. Public servants are not directed to generate profit (at least not 
overtly) and workplace control is based largely on normative power of professionalism. 
In fact, the Canadian public service is held up as a model of professionalism. This is a 
very desirable characteristic of public service because it implies neutrality and freedom 
from undue influence; policy advice and delivery of programs is based on the merits of 
evidence. Independence and evidence based decision making is very much in keeping 
with the prosecutor's worldview. 
In Nova Scotia, changes in both structure and in process of prosecution led to a 
shift in the workplace power available to Crown prosecutors. Their labour process 
control was overtly eroded, but their professional power and especially their credibility 
was severely damaged. In the early 1970s, a young Nova Scotia Mi'kmaw man named 
Donald Marshall Junior was accused, tried, and convicted of a murder that he did not 
commit. New evidence came to light in the early 80s, and after spending eleven years in 
jail, Marshall was freed when his conviction was overturned. The wrongful conviction 
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of Donald Marshall and the subsequent Royal Commission of Inquiry brought public 
prosecutions under close scrutiny. The case held significant overtones of bias in police 
and prosecution handling and highlighted political interference in prosecutions. (Hickman 
et al., 1989). The result was creation of an arm's length agency of government, the 
Public Prosecution Service (PPS) {The Public Prosecutions Act 1990). The PPS was 
created to eliminate any political interference that restricted professional discretion and 
autonomy, particularly in making decisions to prosecute or stay charges. The PPS 
structure is independent of the Dept of Justice. The Director of Public Prosecutions 
reports directly to the legislature. The Act requires the Minister of Justice to publish in 
the Royal Gazette any direction he gives the PPS. 
This change in structure was designed to remove the daily operation of 
prosecution services from the direct influence of an elected official. The problematic 
prosecution of political figures had highlighted the need for this distance. However, the 
incumbents in the prosecution service then had to determine what sort of relationships 
they should forge with their political master, the Attorney General, and with other 
elements of the public service: the Public Service Commission, which is the employer, 
and the Department of Justice, which was prosecution's former home. This took a good 
deal of time, and a number of challenges came forward regarding the structure of the new 
PPS. For example, at the request of the Director of the PPS in the early 1990s, human 
resource services initiated a large review of all the job classifications of prosecutors. 
This review spanned several months, I was directly involved in extensive meetings and 
informal negotiations between the Department of Justice, the PPS and the Public Service 
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Commission. It triggered discussion of classifications and rates of pay for all lawyers in 
government, including Legal Aid lawyers. This file extended in various forms right up to 
the point of collective bargaining for Crown Attorneys. At several points it was unclear 
which body held authority and power to control the working conditions of prosecutors. 
This theme emerges in prosecutors' own stories as we shall see. 
While the move to a PPS, modeled on the Australian prosecution service, was an 
innovation in Canadian public prosecution, it created an organization of professionals that 
was at once more and less fettered than it had been. The structure was designed to give 
the Director of Prosecutions more independence in making the fundamental decisions of 
whether and what to prosecute, which in practice are made by individual prosecutors 
(Ghiz & Archibald, 1994). This would enhance the professional power of prosecutors 
through the exercise of professional and prosecutorial discretion. However, the new 
structure and the need to build new relationships within a bureaucracy meant that the 
service was treated in some aspects as a junior partner to the Department of Justice, an 
upstart organization that did not know its own mind. I recall from my experience in 
government at the time, that the PPS suffered from a reputation of an overinflated ego 
based on the way prosecutors interpreted Independence in the "independent prosecution 
service". 
The labour power of prosecutors was fettered through a severe lack of resources 
and an expanding caseload, combined with increasingly complex work post-Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. Finally, and ironically, a lack of structure in the form of policies 
and guidelines meant that individual prosecutors were subject to arbitrary and restrictive 
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management practices based on the preferences and personalities of individual managers. 
Lawyer M's story about making decisions about the public interest is a poignant example. 
The failure of the Westray, Dr. Nancy Morrison and Gerald Regan prosecutions through 
the 1990s brought the activities of the PPS under scrutiny and criticism again. 
The new PPS had the potential to reinforce the professional status and power of 
prosecutors, while improving the administration of justice in Nova Scotia, and thus 
raising the value of the public good the Service provided. Structural weaknesses and 
individual actions prevented this potential from being realized for some time. 
Bureaucracy grew up around this structure, however. There was a proliferation of 
management positions, administrative roles, duplication of communications and 
administrative support, all in support of independence, but not affecting the daily decision 
making of prosecutors. Limited resources continued to hamper prosecutors. A schism of 
interests arose between courtroom prosecutors and the Director of Public Prosecutions 
over pay. The Director's salary is tied to that of the Chief Justice of the Provincial Court 
while prosecutors remained in the civil service pay plan. 
Meanwhile, the new, focused supervisory structure dealing solely with 
prosecutions brought individual employment relationships into sharp focus. A series of 
radical changes in management style brought on by a series of short term Directors from 
outside government (Public Prosecution Service, 1998b, 1998c), followed by long 
periods of uncertainty with acting management indicated that government had not a clear 
sense of what it expected of this new service, nor quite how to achieve it. A series of 
reviews of the PPS continued for some time. A follow up to the Marshall inquiry was 
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completed in 1994 (Ghiz & Archibald, 1994), then Justice Kaufmann completed a two 
part review of the PPS operations and human resource management practices in 1999 
(Kaufman, F., 1999a, 1999b), which in turn required a follow-up survey of PPS 
employees. The results of the survey clearly indicated a schism between management 
and courtroom prosecutors. 
The province of Quebec, the federal government and British Columbia achieve a 
similar level of structural independence from the elected Attorney General. For example, 
in B.C. the Crown Counsel Act designates the Deputy Attorney General to supervise 
prosecutions. Policy matters must be put in writing and both the Attorney General, who 
ultimately retains the ability to direct prosecutions in his role as an elected official, and 
the Deputy AG must publish in the British Columbia Gazette any direction he gives on 
specific cases {Crown Counsel Act 1996). MacFarlane (2001) notes that such direction is 
seldom given. In Ontario, where such structural transparency is not prescribed in statute, 
one prosecutor describes the relationship with the senior management of the Attorney 
General's office as "going downtown to meet with officials and communications people 
to brief them, give them updates, and respond to 'what are you doing about this case?' 
particularly in violent crimes." MacFarlane argues that structural measures are not 
necessary for independence and cites the informal cooperation in other provinces that 
achieves many of the same ends. 
Prosecutors cannot practice prosecution as a full time career in a stable 
employment relationship unless they are member of the prosecution service. One study 
participant indicated they did manage a stable income by doing per diem work, but they 
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invested heavily at first on a pro bono basis and forged a personal relationship with one 
mentor. This relationship lead to an offer of full time employment within months. This 
approach might not stand up to the scrutiny of today's civil service appointments 
procedures. In addition, many of the contract and per diem positions have been 
converted to full time prosecutor positions. This was a goal of the NSCAA in its attempt 
to ensure employment stability and to reduce the employer's ability to undermine 
membership in the NSCAA by continuously turning over prosecutors. 
Now I have shown that the Public Prosecution Service is a bounded entity in 
which its member lawyers develop an occupational community. This community is 
founded on the distinct sense of professionalism that prosecutors develop. They develop 
this professionalism through the structure of their labour process, the nature of their 
expertise, the requirements of the Criminal Code, and exigencies of government policy, 
as well shall see in more detail in the Chapter 5. 
Setting the Stage for Collective Action: Working Conditions 
Prosecutors expressed dissatisfaction with a number of working conditions. 
There were no offices, no computers, no digital legal references to assist with research, 
no paralegal support, and no automated court records. Prosecutors were uncertain of the 
PPS leadership given its frequent turnover. Workloads were increasing, work itself was 
becoming more complex and prosecutors needed more and better professional 
development in order to cope. Human resource practices appeared inconsistent, 
especially in regards to hiring and salary setting. And prosecutors were extremely 
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unhappy with pay rates. "Well if you base it on pay rates, the Crown attorneys are at the 
bottom! Government lawyers are at the bottom. Civil lawyers are at the top, in private 
practice. The Barristers who go to court. Corporate lawyers would be next." (Lawyer 
O) 
It was easiest for the NSCAA to rally support and discussion over the pay issue, 
especially when the comparison, as Lawyer O points out, was with other lawyers who 
regularly attend court. Their struggle would eventually lead to a negotiated salary setting 
mechanism (Province of Nova Scotia, 2000) but the course of that struggle was long and 
challenging. Prosecutors had to overcome a reluctance to embrace a collective approach 
to wages because collective bargaining goes against many of the professional norms in 
law. It is also difficult to sustain support for a strategy aimed at higher wages when one 
is already earning a salary well above the labour market median and when exit is a viable 
alternative (Hirschman, 1970). 
Prosecutors were also dissatisfied with the appointment process, which had been 
criticized in reviews of prosecution (Archibald, 1989) and with the arbitrary nature of 
promotions. They took issue with the specific negative treatment of some individuals and 
with the preferential treatment shown to management favourites. These are the 
procedural and substantive injustices that triggered dissatisfaction among prosecutors, a 
necessary condition for collective action (Hannay, 2002; Taras & Copping, 1998). I draw 
the details of the account that follows from research interviews and participant 
observation. 
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The Story Unfolds: Marginalization and Negotiation 
Collective action did not build overnight but began in 1988 with the formation of 
a Government Lawyers Association that was open to all lawyers employed by 
government. This association included the civil lawyers in the Department of Justice as 
well as prosecutors and was open to other lawyers in advisory or counsel positions in 
other departments and agencies. Over time, the civil lawyers withdrew. Prosecutors 
remained active in the association throughout the organization change that took them out 
of the criminal division of the Department of Justice and into the PPS. They renamed the 
association the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association (NSCAA). This body took up 
the role of representing the interests of prosecutors and dealt with both the management 
of the prosecution service and the employer over their concerns. There was much grist 
for the mill. The variety of appointments meant that prosecutors enjoyed differing levels 
of job security and some had negotiated pay beyond the salary scales applicable to civil 
servants. Wages were rolled back 3% across government in the mid 1990s and the 
Provincial Court judges' salaries that had traditionally been comparable to prosecutors, 
began to climb with the advent of tribunals to set judicial compensation. Finally, the 
salary of the Director of Public Prosecutions was set by statue to match that of the Chief 
Judge of the Provincial Court highlighting the wage gap between prosecutors' salaries 
and those of judges. 
In addition to concern over wages and increasing case loads (Hayes, 2007), the 
prosecution service came under considerable scrutiny. First the Inquiry into the wrongful 
conviction of Donald Marshall, Jr. laid much of the blame for that miscarriage of justice 
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at the door of the prosecution service (Hickman et al., 1989). Part of the Inquiry included 
a research study of the conditions of employment in the prosecution service (Archibald, 
1989) which produced a series of recommendations to address what were deemed 
significant ills in the administration of personnel and policy. Part of the Archibald report 
was based on a survey of prosecutors. The recommendations read like a laundry list of 
working condition woes. Several recommendations relate to the need for clear 
descriptions of job duties and guidelines for use of prosecutorial discretion. The report 
recommends a revised organization structure and a review of salary levels and increased 
physical and research facilities for prosecutors, including significant investments in 
computerized resources; a system of promotion based on merit; a continuing education 
program. Finally the report presents an outline for what was to become the Public 
Prosecutions Act of 1990 (Archibald, 1989). 
Several of those recommendations would be implemented, the first and most 
important being the creation of the PPS with an arm's length relationship to the Attorney 
General. However it would be ten years before a salary review was undertaken with the 
full participation of the NSCAA and the PPS management staff. The policy manual was 
not revised in a comprehensive way until 2002 (Public Prosecution Service, 2002). Three 
more reviews and audits would be needed, two of which recommended collective 
bargaining, before collective bargaining was finally achieved. Throughout this period, 
the NSCAA was an active association. Members paid dues and met regularly to conduct 
association business. The executive took a lead in communications with outside 
agencies, such as the Barristers' Society, when needed. Management employees of the 
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PPS were members, and some had held leadership roles at various points in the 
association's history. 
Frustration at the lack of progress on working conditions and salaries led the 
NSCAA to organize a two day work stoppage that began on June 1, 1998. A small 
market adjustment had been made to salaries for lawyers in government. A similar 
adjustment had been made for Information Technology workers in light of the pressures 
of the Y2K compliance crisis. The market adjustment for lawyers was developed without 
NSCAA input and was not a long term solution to the prosecutors' concerns, given the 
temporary nature of the adjustment and the complete discretion of management in 
applying or withdrawing the stipend. The structure of this salary intervention replicated 
the systemic inequities felt by prosecutors. 
The prosecutors were careful to place their professional interests first, protecting 
them, before they staged their collective job action. The NSCAA sought a labour law 
opinion on their ability to withdraw their labour, and a decision from the Barristers' 
Society on professional ethics before staging a two day illegal strike. The PPS comprised 
approximately 80 lawyers at the time, and all but six individuals and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions walked off the job. Some of the dissenters maintained an 
individualistic approach to their employment, and believed they could negotiate 
individually with management. Their stories appear in Chapter 5. The unity of the 
profession and the shared work between managers and prosecutors forged a solidarity 
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that resulted in a comprehensive picket at the legislature and brought the court system to 
a virtual standstill10. 
Following the strike, Cabinet approved a series of working groups. These groups 
included PPS management and NSCAA participation and were chaired by Department of 
Human Resources (later to become the Public Service Commission) representing the 
employer. The groups were tasked with developing a salary setting mechanism and the 
NSCAA pushed for a comprehensive agreement including a grievance mechanism and a 
collective agreement that spanned all terms and conditions of employment. I acted as 
chair for these discussions. 
Initially the NSCAA indicated they would be happy with a salary tribunal similar 
to the judges'; however government was unwilling to allow financial control over civil 
service wages out of the range of direct control. Inclusion of a grievance mechanism in 
the agreement became a deal breaking issue in light of the discipline meted out to 
prosecutors who participated in the walk out in June 1998 (Public Prosecution Service, 
1998a). An early tentative agreement met with resistance from the employer and 
government, and a renewed mandate from Cabinet sent the parties back to the bargaining 
table. I acted as chief negotiator to broker a new deal in one intensive bargaining session 
in December 1999. The Memorandum of Agreement that was signed in February and 
March of 2000 took seven drafts in order to clarify what was negotiated on the December 
10 Steps were taken to ensure coverage of cases already in progress and those with scheduled 
dates. Prosecutors who had already begun a trial were bound to continue it, and did so. Several per diems 
were retained to represent the Crown and most charges were dropped in matters that came before the courts 
on those two days. Four individuals objected to the walkout on philosophical grounds. 
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day, but all parties signed the final version and the government of the day proceeded to 
laud the occasion in press releases and congratulatory messages (Public Prosecution 
Service, 2000; Sullivan-Corney, 2000). Following the work stoppage in June 1998, the 
Government had commissioned retired Justice Fred Kaufmann to conduct a review of the 
Prosecution Service (Kaufman, F., 1999b). His recommendations were lengthy, and 
many echoed those from an earlier review (Ghiz & Archibald, 1994), including a call for 
collective bargaining for prosecutors. Finally, it seemed, prosecutors achieved collective 
bargaining. 
The record of the 2000 negotiation is the Framework Agreement and it contains 
three distinct phases. The first phase provides for salary negotiations with recourse to 
binding arbitration. The second phase is an agreement to conclude a dispute resolution 
process and finally the third phase sets out an agreement to discuss other non-salary 
issues (Province of Nova Scotia, 2000). Since 2000, the NSCAA and Public Service 
Commission have bargained three times over salaries. The parties have never reached a 
settlement by bargaining and have always resorted to interest arbitration in order to reach 
agreement. Salary increases have been above the rates negotiated by other civil servants 
in recognition of the gap in prosecutors' wages compared to their peers across the country 
(MacLellan, Hayes, & McDougall, 2008). The latest award addresses performance 
assessments. However, the grievance procedure mentioned in the 2000 Framework 
agreement took a decade to achieve. Prosecutors achieved all of these gains without 
statutory protection for collective bargaining rights. 
195 
Repeated approaches by the NSCAA to move into the second and third phases of 
the Framework agreement were frustrated. The employer did not respond to their 
overtures. The NSCAA hired the Professional Institute of the Public Service on a 
contract basis to act on their behalf, and PIPS met with similar unresponsiveness. The 
employer took the position that the framework agreement did not intend for the parties to 
negotiate a grievance mechanism. The employer had unilaterally revised the dispute 
resolution process for all civil servants in the meantime, and deemed this process to be 
adequate for all employees, including prosecutors. A series of intrigues involving 
management of the PPS and planned and boycotted meetings resulted in a court challenge 
for breach of contract (Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association v. The Province of 
Nova Scotia 2004). This action, launched by the NSCAA in 2004, was finally resolved in 
2009 with an agreement just hours before the action came before the Nova Scotia 
Supreme Court. The BC Health Services decision (BC Health Services 2007) likely 
influenced the government to accede to bargain a grievance mechanism. Nova Scotia 
labour legislation {Trade Union Act 1989) writes grievance provisions into every 
collective agreement that is silent on the matter, and if challenged under the Charter, the 
Prosecutors' agreement would possibly have resulted in these provisions in any event 
(Tilley, 2009). 
Since 2000 the NSCAA has staged a further information picket and launched a 
Human Rights complaint over the denial of salary progression for those on maternity 
leave (CBC News, 2006; Woodburn, 2008). They have threatened a walk-out over 
security and job safety concerns in provincial courtrooms (Bruce, 2009; staff, 2008), 
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calling for metal detectors and closed prisoner docks (Bruce, 2009; Crowns threaten to 
walk 2010). They have also boycotted duty phone assignments and a proposed weekend 
bail court. Many issues are brought before the employer, but others are taken up with 
management of the Service who are themselves prosecutors, and thus the labour relations 
for prosecutors is complex; prosecutors' management superiors are also their professional 
peers. Managers are also still welcome in the NSCAA though they do not participate in 
automatic dues check off and are not represented by the NSCAA in bargaining. 
The story of public prosecutions in Nova Scotia illustrates two distinct aspects of 
closure, as well the effect of structures and individual agency on workplace relations. 
The instruments of exclusionary closure, including the Barristers' Society, were used to 
good effect to shore up lawyers' exclusive domain over prosecutions. As prosecutors 
moved into dependent employment, the system of patronage appointments undermined 
the procedural justice in access to prosecution work. The employed prosecutors 
continued to use their Society to protect their professional interests. The addition of 
Section 17 to the Code of Conduct after the Marshall Inquiry signalled the profession's 
recognition that prosecutors were special. Public sector lawyers including prosecutors 
participated in growing numbers in Society governance roles and liaison roles between 
the Society and the criminal courts were enhanced (Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, 
2009). The promulgation of the Public Prosecution Act and the reports calling for 
improved direction and policy for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion further 
protected and legitimized the exclusivity of the prosecutor role. The fact that public 
confidence in the prosecution service waned over the period of the 1980s and 1990s 
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highlighted the need for these structural protections. The use made by the NSCAA of the 
arguments of independence and autonomy in their discussions with the employer 
(MacLellan et al., 2008) and the steps they took to protect their professional integrity 
during the job action illustrate their individual and collective willingness to act in defence 
of their exclusionary closure. Of course management has benefitted from the struggle as 
well. Each time that wages rose, wages for managers were adjusted accordingly, beyond 
the management scale for other civil servants. The link between the Chief Judge and 
Director of Public Prosecution's salaries remains intact. 
It is also undeniable that the conditions were ripe for usurpationary closure. 
Although by statute the NSCAA is not a union, it behaves as one, as do all the 
associations of Crown counsel across the country where bargaining is in place. Some 
other provincial lawyers' bargaining agents intentionally do not use the label of union, 
and others see the name as a trivial matter. The prosecutors' terms of employment 
improved as each public review and report was issued over the past twenty years. They 
all now have personal computers in their office and access to electronic databases, email 
and office communication technology to support their research and collaboration with 
colleagues. Some ground has been lost in recent years with the cancellation of one of the 
two semi-annual education conferences and the implementation of additional duties 
through a new bail court (Woodburn, 2009), but their ranks have steadily grown with the 
conversion of temporary positions to full time, and thus automatic membership in 
NSCAA through dues check off. The NSCAA is practicing usurpationary closure and at 
an advanced point along Krause's continuum of closure. The NSCAA is actively 
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engaged in the broader labour movement as the current president is also the Vice 
President of the national body, the Canadian Association of Crown Counsel. 
The Situation in Other Canadian Provinces 
The strains of prosecution work are not unique to Nova Scotia. A study of 
Newfoundland Crown prosecutors indicates high role overload (Gomme & Hall, 1995). 
Both Nova Scotia and British Columbia prosecutors have relied on the argument that they 
are quasi-judicial officers of the court and thus enjoy a measure of independence similar 
to judges, in a quest for higher wages. Other provinces have also experienced similar 
discord and collective action among Crown prosecutors. In Ontario, both the civil and 
criminal government lawyers bargain at a single table, for two separate agreements. In 
Quebec the negotiated agreement has been suspended along with bargaining in the public 
sector as part of a broader public sector austerity initiative. The Quebec struggle is 
landmark in two ways: the prosecutors have lodged a complaint with the International 
Labour Organization over the government's refusal to bargain, claiming their labour 
rights have been denied; and the provincial government invested significant resources in 
a comprehensive review of wages and working conditions across Canada in 2002. This 
review resulted in a public report that has been widely used in collective bargaining and 
salary arbitration cases (Vecerina, 2002) in other provincial prosecution services. 
In British Columbia, the government had recognized BC Crown Counsel 
Association and negotiated three agreements between 1992 and 1998, at which point it 
refused to recognize the Association for bargaining purposes, despite nearly all 
199 
prosecutors being members of the Association. Government lawyers in BC did not have 
statutory protection of their union and of collective bargaining. It would take four years, 
a change in government, work stoppages, and several rounds of mediation and 
brinksmanship to finally achieve resolution in 2001, only to begin again with an attempt 
to renew the agreement in 2003. The matter was settled in 2005 through an arbitration 
award (Jones, 2005) and the prosecutors in BC now enjoy a twelve year agreement with 
periods of negotiation on non-monetary issues. All negotiations in BC were under 
pressure to sign deals to maintain labour stability through the 2010 winter Olympics. BC 
also sought a tribunal similar to the judges but then pushed for third party binding 
arbitration because government had rejected recent judicial tribunal recommendations. In 
BC, Ontario, Manitoba, and Quebec both civil and criminal lawyers who are employed 
by government bargain over terms of employment. In Nova Scotia only the criminal 
lawyers do so. 
The Ontario criminal defence lawyers, who are not government employees but 
take public defender work on a certificate basis, recently implemented a work slowdown 
and withdrawal of services over rates of pay for legal aid cases (Wingrove & Appleby, 
2009). Legal aid funding has been a concern in Alberta as well (Sadava, 2010). The 
Canadian Association of Crown Counsel groups together the provincial associations of 
prosecutors and civil lawyers to lobby and support collective bargaining strategy and 
tactics. All provinces are represented in this organization, although Nova Scotia has only 
a prosecutors' association. The broader criminal bar is also chafing at restricted budgets 
and funding. 
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Freeman and Medoff (1984), in describing what unions do, suggest that unions 
have two faces. On the one hand, unions have monopoly power to force wage increases 
and on the other hand, they offer collective voice to give weight to worker demands for 
improved working conditions. Collective voice also provides anonymity for individual 
workers when expressing discontent with their working conditions. It is clear from the 
preceding discussion that professionals achieve many of the monopoly goals through 
their professional project. When professionals become employed, the collective voice 
face of unionism fulfills their need to balance the power of the employer in setting 
working conditions. The employer's ability to set working conditions can extend to the 
way in which professional duties are executed. Certainly, the employer provides some of 
the tools necessary to do professional work. A major complaint of the lawyers in the 
Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service was lack of proper tools to do their jobs, 
including offices, computers, and electronic data management tools. Beyond this, a 
collective voice can pressure the employer for effective dispute resolution mechanisms in 
order to protect the rights of individuals faced with arbitrary management actions. The 
prosecutor's story of reprimand for determining what was in the public interest is an 
example of such a situation, and explains the motivation of Nova Scotian prosecutors to 
seek a grievance mechanism. Beyond the management-employee relationship issues, 
however, is the employer's response to bargaining by prosecutors. In the absence of 
statutory bargaining rights negotiated agreements have been arbitrarily reinterpreted and 
disregarded by governments in Nova Scotia and British Columbia. The government's 
resistance to bargaining with prosecutors has been ironically and surprisingly 
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"unprofessional", considering that all the players involved, except for a few human 
resources staff, are lawyers! 
Discussion 
Specialized areas of practice forge collectives among lawyers (Kritzer, 1999). 
But specialization is one of the three elements (along with loss of exclusivity and the 
growing use of technology to access information) of what Kritzer describes as post-
professionalism in his arguments for a fundamental shift in the legal profession. 
Prosecutors, however, have been somewhat insulated from this shift in the following 
ways. Though prosecuting work is segmented as a specialty within the legal profession, 
the day to day work of prosecutors remains largely unchanged. The individual lawyer 
takes a file and conducts the work of the day in an autonomous fashion, with complete 
responsibility for the work. The file as a whole shifts to another individual if a second 
court date is required, but could easily fall to the same prosecutor in the weekly court 
rotation. There is also evidence from study participants that an increasing number of files 
are "assigned" to a specific prosecutor to ensure continuity and because these require 
extended amounts of preparation and are best completed by a single individual. 
Prosecutors handle these assigned files with complete autonomy. Thus at the individual 
level the prosecutor retains significant autonomy, however the organization constraints of 
management and policy limit the range of discretionary options available. 
The PPS has not become post-professional through the loss of exclusivity. The 
reverse is true with the gradual elimination of per diem prosecutors and contract 
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employees in favour of increased number of permanent staff. Between 1989 and 2009 
the number of permanent prosecutors grew by almost 30%, from 68 to almost 90 (Public 
Prosecution Service, 2006). Prosecutors demanded increased access to technology to 
facilitate their research and communication with peers and it does not appear from study 
participants that the self help and do it yourself approach found in other realms of life and 
legal practice has extended to criminal prosecution. The practice of prosecution in Nova 
Scotia cannot be considered post-professional and closure is still a relevant framework 
for analysis of prosecutors' collective actions. 
Wallace and Kay (2008) show that work setting alone is not the sole determinant 
of lawyers' professionalism; it is not even necessarily the most important factor. These 
authors found that salaried employment does not erode professionalism among lawyers. 
Even when specialization and changing organizational and practice setting have eroded 
professional unity, there is still strong evidence of professionalism among all types of 
legal practice (Wallace & Kay, 2008). This sense of professionalism counteracts the 
argument that salaried professionals are proletarianized because their interests as 
professionals are subsumed in the institutional interests of the state as their employer 
(Derber, 1982a). Lawyers in public service then may have the potential to hold both very 
strong professional ideals and at the same time seek a collective voice over working 
conditions, and thus achieve two forms of closure. 
Nelson and Trubeck (1992) challenge the proletarianization thesis on the grounds 
that it gives inadequate emphasis to ideological motivations of workers. While it may be 
true that work becomes fragmented and divided among less skilled workers in dependent 
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employment settings, and professionals become subject to administrative control over the 
way they work (Archibald, 1989), Braverman's (1974) premise that capital and workers 
are fundamentally opposed is too simplistic a device for examining professionals' 
workplaces (Nelson & Trubeck, 1992). The relationship between workers and owners in 
legal service firms is not as simple as the industrial model on which labour process theory 
was built. The ideology of professionalism is an important element in the labour process 
of organizations where legal work is accomplished (Giddens, 1973; Nelson & Trubeck, 
1992). The public sector setting is even more challenging to understand the relationship 
between professional ideals, protecting the public interest, efficient management, peer-
based discipline, and quality control. Those workplaces in turn are a basis of social 
relations from which arise many of the benefits of professional project. Both forms of 
closure appear to be necessary in order for prosecutors to fully achieve the benefits of 
professionalization. 
Prosecutors use two forms of closure to address the unique nature of their 
employment. Their exclusionary closure is initially complete and expressed through 
membership in the Barristers' Society. Part of the justification for closure is the 
protection of a public good or public interest. Prosecutors have a very powerful cachet in 
protecting public safety and bringing wrongdoers to justice. Exclusionary closure is 
incomplete because it does not guarantee benefits to all members; it merely sets a 
minimum threshold. The benefits of professional practice are eroded when prosecutors 
become employed and are subject to bureaucratic and managerial control. We can then 
say that prosecutors' membership in an organization moves them into a different place in 
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the class structure (Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980). They move from deploying their expertise 
as autonomous professionals to selling their labour to an employer (although not a 
capitalist in the classic sense). The forms of association available to employees are 
different than those available to independent practitioners (Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980), 
and thus collective bargaining, while contradicting the values expressed by so many 
lawyers (see Chapter 5), is actually a logical outcome of the structure of social relations 
in the prosecution service. The particular details of the Nova Scotia experience further 
mobilized the prosecutors in that province to seek collective bargaining when and how 
they did. 
I position the legal profession within both streams of theory - as a collective of 
actors striving for goals, embedded in the structure of the medieval guilds and pre-
modern society, but evolving to meet the challenges wrought by contemporary markets. 
The institutional form of the profession achieves much of the initial power and prestige 
enjoyed by its members. Yet professionals hold the institution at arm's length and 
minimize its power of discipline and sanction for misbehaviour. You will recall Lawyer 
B's comment about 'them' being 'us' earlier in this chapter. The exploratory focus 
groups in my fieldwork indicate this quite clearly. Lawyers describe the 
professionalization process as a personal exchange and as a mentoring process. 
Professionalization for lawyers is also an incredible exercise of self-discipline and 
determination on both the part of the mentor and the student. But it no longer makes 
sense to speak of the legal profession as a single, uniform entity. 
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The civil and criminal government lawyers make up a significant part of the legal 
profession, but a very silent one. Few come into direct contact with government 
lawyers; their contact is largely with senior management and government officials, 
persons accused of crimes, and their alleged victims. 
The biggest law firm in Nova Scotia is the Federal department of Justice ... they 
have 80 lawyers in their office [in] downtown Halifax. That's totally invisible to 
the public ... and the [provincial] government lawyers: there's not just the Crown 
attorneys there's a whole bunch of solicitors and advocates and so on, and then 
you have legal aid which is another organization that employ lawyers [in the] 
public interest. ( Lawyer F) 
The balance of the legal profession is not unified as a private bar either (Arthurs et 
al., 1986). They are all lawyers, but: 
There's common values, the core values of the legal profession are often referred 
to. I mean integrity, avoiding conflict of interest, loyalty to client, and so; there 
are common values... Nova Scotia is a small place, but until I became involved in 
the Barristers' Society, I didn't know any lawyers outside of Halifax. I knew a lot 
more lawyers in Fredericton, in Toronto, and that wouldn't be particularly 
unusual in people who have developed specialties in their work. (Lawyer F) 
The foregoing analysis of the legal profession in Nova Scotia illustrates the use of 
the two parallel streams of the closure continuum. The professional project is 
underscored by the functioning of the NSBS and its development of special code of 
conduct guideines for prosecutors. The development of these guidelines offers 
recognition and protection of the special role prosecutors play in society. Their status is 
acknowledged and enhanced through these measures. The various reviews of the 
prosecution service were conducted by members of the profession. In the case of the 
Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution, the Archibald, and the Ghiz-
Archibald reports, these reviews were by members of the Nova Scotia Bar and the 
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Dalhousie Law School. In both subtle and overt ways the boundaries of this professional 
speciality were redrawn and reinforced. The subset of the legal profession we know as 
prosecution redefined its relationship with the State, achieved a greater distance and a 
greater independence from Ministers of the Crown. The market for services was further 
tightened with the reduction in contract work by members of the Bar and pulling most 
prosecution work into the civil service permanent staff. Governance of the broader 
profession drew upon prosecutors in an increased manner, with consultative committess 
of the NSBS and participation on governance committees (Nova Scotia Barristers' 
Society, 2009). 
Through this same period, the NSCAA exercised usurpationary closure to 
establish a bargaining unit and negotiate with the employer and with management 
signficant changes to working conditions and wages. The NSCAA moved from an 
informal group of all government lawyers to a clearly defined association of Crown 
prosecutors, now part of a national group of prosecutors and Crown counsel with broad 
aims to support bargaining for lawyers across the public sector (Canadian Association of 
Crown Counsel, 2009). The NSCAA have achieved a monopoly over prosecution; all 
permanent prosecutors are required to pay dues to the association (Province of Nova 
Scotia, 2000). The scope of workplace concerns they bargain has grown, albeit slowly 
and with many upheavals, over the past decade. 
Employment also underscores a need to control the exercise of professional and 
prosecutorial discretion and the application of skills in the labour process. Collective 
bargaining by prosecutors achieves a special position for Crown prosecutors within the 
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civil service; they are able to use the mechanism of collective bargaining available to the 
majority of government employees, though they remain excluded from legislative 
protection. It is also a means to differentiate Crown prosecutors from other government 
lawyers and more generally from other lawyers paid by government for legal services. 
This last point begs the question: Why does government not contract out this service? 
There is a significant history and current practice of the per diem Crown prosecutor. 
Capacity exists in the criminal bar and in the general practice of law in the region to 
provide independent licensed prosecutors supervised by management employees of the 
Public Prosecution Service (Hayes, 2007). Contracting out would completely undermine 
the power of the NSCAA, breaking solidarity and reducing bargaining power to nil. Why 
did management not follow this route when faced with the collective action of the Crown 
prosecutors? I contend that the usurpationary strategy was effectively another form of 
professional project closure, solidifying and enhancing the specific expertise of Crown 
prosecutors within the context of employment by the PPS, a power that the employer 
could not match. 
Clearly, the dual closure projects have been successful for Nova Scotia 
prosecutors. Both have required considerable time and effort and have drawn upon 
resources beyond the scope of the six to eight dozen individual Nova Scotia prosecutors. 
How has this been possible? To respond to this question we must look more closely at the 
nature of the stratification of the legal profession and the nature of criminal prosecution. 
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Occupational Community as an enabler of Dual Closure 
The discussion in Chapter 2 outlined how an occupational community emerges 
under specific circumstances. Within a profession and occupational community can 
emerge due to technical expertise, intense working conditions, and close social 
interaction. When gathered together in a single place of employment or under shared 
working conditions, the existence of an occupational community can foster collective 
action. This is the case for prosecutors. 
The legal profession is becoming more and more a collection of specialists and 
there is little that unites the entire profession . There is rather more that binds specialists 
together across jurisdictions. Prosecution is a distinct subset of the legal profession and a 
coherent community of practice. 
Crown Attorneys, Legal Aid - they are experts, outstanding people... in court all 
the time... [they] deal with criminal law all the time. There aren't really any 
dabblers in private practice... it's changing. There are fewer and fewer dabblers. 
More are focusing on it. (Lawyer O) 
Furthermore, prosecution exhibits characteristics of an occupational 
community within the broader profession, particularly the intensive nature of the 
work, the strong social support within the work, and the reach of social bonds beyond 
the workplace. 
It's an area of practice [where] a small group of individuals come together and 
work together closely and interrelate on a daily basis. And you do develop a little 
niche; it's a specialty. And you become insulated or isolated from the greater 
practice of the law. [Y]ou have different issues, you don't have the same issues as 
the private practitioners would have. So the group [prosecutors] works together 
much more cohesively and socially are close because of the smaller number. In 
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Nova Scotia at least. [I]t's a very close, warm bar because of the nature of the 
business. (Lawyer D) 
The work of prosecution predates the organizationally defined job of Crown 
prosecutor. The occupational community also has a history of its own. Characteristics of 
prosecution work and not the PPS as an organization initially created and defined the role 
of prosecutor. The setting of occupational community is not "organizationally limited" 
(Van Maanen & Barley, 1984, p. 291). Two logics emerge in the profession (Van 
Maanen & Barley, 1984, p. 292): the independent, individualistic, and competitive 
practitioner, and then collective community. A new organization, the Nova Scotia Crown 
Attorneys' Association, emerges as the rational expression of the community, but only 
after the work culture forged the occupational community to begin with. 
Occupational communities arise out of loneliness (Salaman, 1971a). Salaman's 
study of railway workers reveals an isolating work schedule that was the opposite of to 
what most members of their towns and villages experienced. The prosecutor's isolation 
comes from the nature of the work rather than the physical circumstances of the work 
itself. Prosecutors work day jobs, for the most part, although the profession demands 
long hours. They have contact with other professionals in their area of specialty: Legal 
Aid lawyers11 and criminal defence lawyers in private practice. However, Bellemare 
notes: 
It is not easy to be a prosecutor. It is often a lonely journey. It tests character. It 
requires inner strength and self-confidence. It requires personal integrity and 
11 In Nova Scotia, employed in the public service 
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fortitude, and a solid moral compass. In the heat of the moment, after a suspect has 
been arrested, the prosecutor must always be guided by the evidence and by public 
interest not by public outcry [emphasis added]. (Bellemare, 2007, p. 5) 
We will see in the following chapter how these characteristics of prosecution 
supported the drive for collective bargaining. 
Conclusion 
The lawyers' professional project (Larson, 1977) is as complete as possible in that 
no one other than a licensed barrister can assume the prosecutorial role (Stager & 
Arthurs, 1990). Prosecution is different from the rest of the legal profession in structural 
ways. The task of prosecution is completed only by those in dependent employment with 
the exception of contracted overload to per diems, whose numbers are dwindling in 
favour of permanent employees. Those who join the ranks of the prosecution service 
usually stay there for their careers. Prosecutors describe their career paths less in terms 
of chance and circumstance and more by choice, as we shall see in Chapter 5. 
The PPS is unique as an organization for several reasons. It is operationally 
independent of the Government, reports to the Assembly, and is under superintendence 
only of the Attorney General. Its leader is a Deputy Head, serving at pleasure with all the 
risks and rewards that this has come to represent. The prosecutors and management are 
all members of the same profession, and all practice in the same realm. As a group they 
are slightly set apart from a large professional service firm where areas of specialty may 
be more divisive. Prosecutors closely resemble the boutique law firm and describe 
themselves this way. However, the ownership aspect of private practice is missing and 
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management staff are also employed by the State. Thus the Crown prosecutor is located 
at an interesting intersection of organizational form and interest representation. It is an 
intersection of the bureaucratic and occupational forms of control (Freidson, 2001) and in 
this a thoroughly contemporary dilemma, but one which seeks a traditional solution. 
Dependent employment of Crown prosecutor highlights their monopoly over 
competence and practice within the criminal bar. Crown prosecutors could have taken a 
number of routes - they could have resigned and formed an external organization, 
contracting back services to the Crown, for example. The privatization of government 
services is an established trend, as is the whole scale devolution of government 
departments of arms length agencies. They could have opted for individualized contracts, 
a form of employment currently available in the civil service. They could also have 
opted to move strictly to the per diem format of prosecution, as many regions support this 
form of service delivery now. Each choice would have different implications for Offe 
and Weisenthal's three principal concerns of workers, and also have implications for the 
professional project of prosecutors as a specific subsection of the legal profession. By 
choosing to stay employees in a specialized unit, they in fact reinforce the status of 
prosecution as a discrete and controlled body of knowledge, and enhance their potential 
to control their work through the exercise of discretion built upon this specialized 
knowledge. However, the project is incomplete without the complementary collective 
action to address the organization reality of being civil servants, employed in a 
homogeneous division of a heterogeneous organization. They have sought an (old) new 
way to control their work. 
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Prosecutors across Canada develop an identity that distinguishes them from other 
lawyers. Prosecutors cast themselves as "organizable" (Isler, 2007) and become further 
distanced from the private practice lawyers who hold a negative view of unionized work. 
They are distanced, in Nova Scotia, from the Department of Justice lawyers who 
originally did not want collective voice and left the earlier version of the government 
lawyers' association. However, prosecutors situate themselves firmly within the 
profession. As we shall see in Chapter 5, they refer to their employment as "my practice" 
and they embrace an idealized form of legal practice in the way they protect the public 
interest. Ironically, the prosecutors are managed less and have greater autonomy than 
new recruits have in private practice. 
Lawyers are the last of the traditional liberal professions to unionize (McHugh & 
Bodah, 2002). Are they any different from other employees? Prosecutors sought 
collective bargaining because working conditions were poor, their respect and socials 
status had been eroded, and their earning power diminished. What does the profession do 
for them or how does being a professional make a difference in their collective action? 
How is it they were able to achieve bargaining and adopt a usurpationary strategy while 
still maintaining a strong professionalism and increased participation in Barristers' 
Society roles? Prosecutors engage in collective bargaining in order to secure their status 
and related benefits of their position in a prestigious profession. The following chapter 
explores how this is achieved through an occupational community. 
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Chapter 5 Trials and Files: The Role of Occupational Community and the 
Discourse of Fairness 
Chapter 5 takes its title from two prominent ideas that emerged in the stories told 
by prosecutors: the notion that trial work is "real lawyering" and the movement of the 
case file from one prosecutor to another, with limited management oversight. The job 
requirement to do trial work sets the prosecutor apart from much of the rest of the legal 
profession that does "solicitor" work. This requirement also sets prosecutors apart from 
managers in the Crown prosecution service, as we will see in the sections that follow. 
Although civil litigators and labour lawyers, for example, also go to trial, prosecutors 
perceive such trial work as a minor component of other lawyers' work. Trial work 
dominates the Crown prosecutor's day and identity. The file is a window into the 
independent autonomous work of the individual. It embodies both the solitary 
application of professional discretion as well as connection with the community of 
prosecutors. Connection arises either by working directly on the same file at a later point 
in time, or else by conferring over coffee on the issues and concerns of a particular case. 
Finally, the assignment of files and review of the content of files represents the 
imposition of management control. "Real lawyering" embeds the prosecutors firmly in 
their profession yet their struggle with management over control of the labour process 
leads them to embrace collective bargaining as they resist incursions into the application 
of their professional discretion. 
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Chapter 2 laid out three different instruments of worker control: 
professionalization, collective bargaining and occupational community. These 
instruments are drawn together in the case of Crown prosecutors and revealed in their 
personal stories. In Chapter three I described narrative analysis and the manner in which 
I collected the stories of Crown prosecutors. Chapter 4 addressed the professionalization 
of lawyers in Canada and the evolution of the role of Crown prosecutor. My discussion 
of the organizational setting for prosecutors in Nova Scotia highlighted the presence of an 
occupational community among prosecutors. This brief discussion of OC in Chapter 4 
left us poised to examine the question of 'how'. How do prosecutors embrace a strategy 
of usurpationary closure such as collective bargaining and use it to reinforce their 
professional status and privilege? Chapter 5 moves forward using the stories of 
prosecutors to explore how these specialized lawyers interpret the issues raised in the 
theoretical and chronological discussions of the preceding chapters. This fifth chapter 
presents a subjective ordering of prosecutors' experiences of career and collective 
bargaining. Prosecutors' own stories give meaning to the events they encountered and 
my analysis presents these stories in a structured fashion. I begin with a detailed analysis 
of the characteristics of occupational community among prosecutors and identify unique 
characteristics of this particular OC. I then look at the stories surrounding collective 
bargaining that illustrate how occupational community links the other two forms of 
worker control. 
Chapter 4 examined the stories from prosecutors and the broader legal profession 
that illustrate where the occupational community boundaries lie and how they are formed. 
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This chapter explores the relationship between occupational community and mobilizing 
collective action among prosecutors in order to achieve bargaining. Below I set out and 
discuss the data collected from prosecutors in response to the two primary interview 
questions: "Tell me the story of your career" and "Tell me the story of the struggle for 
collective bargaining". A number of themes emerged in the stories that reveal how 
prosecutors developed an occupational community. Some of these themes are strong 
involvement, intensity of work, marginal status, and fairness. The stories also reveal 
characteristics of narrative structure that provide some insight into how prosecutors use 
their occupational community in the struggle for collective bargaining. The stories of the 
struggle for collective bargaining reveal that the theme of independence was crucial to 
the quest. In addition, an ideology of fairness became evident as the foundation of the 
prosecutors' sense of professionalism. The chapter concludes with an examination of 
how prosecutors used their occupational community to mobilize members for collective 
bargaining. 
Occupational Community Revisited: The Possibility of OC Among Prosecutors 
At the outset of this discussion, I turn briefly to Van Maanen and Barley's (1984) 
comprehensive review of the literature on occupational community. In their synthesis, 
the authors reach three conclusions important for this study. Firstly, they reflect that 
certain kinds of work bind people together; there are identifiable characteristics of that 
work, which enable researchers to locate occupational communities. The values, norms, 
and perspectives that arise from the work context extend beyond it in a normative way, 
and this encourages members of an occupational community to form social bonds outside 
the work context. 
Van Maanen and Barley (1984) further state that there is compelling evidence to 
consider the professions as very successful occupational communities and not as a unique 
phenomenon separate from other occupations. Trait theories (Greenwood, E, 1957) that 
sought to distinguish professions as a unique form of organizing workers have evolved to 
processual theories. These latter approaches describe the manner in which professionals 
organize, and the strategies they use. From a process perspective professions are simply 
another version of the same mechanism of community solidarity that binds all sorts of 
workers. They are just located further along the Krause-inspired continuum of closure, 
with sophisticated market and state relationships. In fact, the distinct boundaries and 
self-interest elements of occupational communities are also themes in the sociology of the 
professions. There is nothing inherent in the work of professionals that distinguishes an 
occupation from a profession. I conclude that the concepts of occupational community 
apply to the professions, if the criteria defining an OC are found among professionals. 
Van Maanen and Barley go further, quoting Bucher and Strauss (1961) in their notion of 
"professions as loose amalgamations of diverse segments pursuing different objectives in 
different manners and more or less delicately held together under a common name at a 
particular period of history" (1961, p. 326). Thus I conclude that a profession is not in 
and of itself an enduring occupational community, but an OC may exist within a 
profession. 
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The possibility of occupational community in the legal profession is suggested by 
the general discussion in Chapter 4. The profession, divided into specialities, creates an 
environment where the close identification with specialized work may foster an 
occupational community, though specialization does not guarantee OC. We will see in 
the case of prosecutors that a number of elements coalesce to support an occupational 
community, and that distinct characteristics of that community further support the 
struggle for collective bargaining. 
Finally, Van Maanen and Barley(1984) address unionization and 
professionalization as parallel strategies of self control. They claim the difference is one 
of means, not ends (p. 318). This echoes the labour process literature, upon which the 
authors draw to distinguish the way that bureaucratic control limits professional control 
in dependent workplaces. Unionization is thus a quest for labour process control in 
addition to a pursuit of economic self-interest. The theoretical framework of 
occupational community reaches the same conclusions that a review of closure theory 
does, with the same deficiencies. Unionization and professionalization are juxtaposed as 
alternate strategies, with a common purpose but differing values and ideologies. The 
literature does not address why both strategies might be needed to achieve an 
occupation's desired ends. Nor does the literature discuss how the two strategies can be 
pursued simultaneously without a loss of the values underpinning both. Furthermore, 
although occupational community is perhaps a forerunner of a fully realized professional 
project, the independence and autonomy that accompanies professionalization actually 
works to isolate individual practitioners. Finally, there are few examples of how 
occupational community arising within a profession mobilizes workers to resist 
bureaucratization and employer domination while reinforcing the professional niche they 
occupy. 
The Data Reveals Occupational Community 
This analysis of prosecutors' narrative accounts reveals several key themes. I 
have organized the themes into those that describe aspects of the occupational community 
and those that deal with the struggle for collective bargaining. I discuss each theme in 
turn, below. In addition to the presence of thematic material, each narrative contains one 
or more critical events. Specific characteristics of occupational community and 
collective action emerge from an analysis of the setting, complicating action, and 
resolution of the critical events. These stories deal with power, respect, relationships 
with management, and government as the employer. The stories address individual 
motivation and attitudes toward the profession and collective bargaining. From an 
analysis of critical events I have identified where the solidarity for collective action 
draws its strength. The selected quotes in this chapter come from critical events within 
the narratives and each in turn reveals an aspect of the key themes and dimensions of the 
occupational community. The stories reveal how prosecutors reconcile their instruments 
of closure. They absorb the usurpationary strategy into their professional project, 
drawing on an ideology of fairness. 
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Defining Boundaries of the Occupational Community 
Well Understood by Insiders 
Occupational communities are well understood by insiders. Lawyers adopt a specific 
identity through the socialization that occurs in law school and in the articling experience, 
culminating in their admission to the Bar. Those within the profession share a common 
understanding of what being a lawyer entails. The Public Prosecution Act, changes to the 
Barristers' Society Legal Ethics Handbook, and the Legal Profession Act lay out the role 
of the prosecutor for all members of the legal profession. Members of the defence bar 
and broader legal profession know what to expect and how to relate to prosecutors in 
daily course of business. 
We did something very unique in Nova Scotia ... when the Legal Profession Act 
.. .was enacted. The practice of law is something done by somebody who has the 
skills and the education and the training necessary... [and] there's a list of things, 
whereas the previous Barristers' Society Act [had] no conceptual framework for 
lawyering. Now there are certain things only lawyers can do. It's a combination 
of education and skills as sort of the defining thing, plus a definite boundary with 
other people who have overlapping skills. (Lawyer F) 
This speaker goes on to say "we work in the same areas... people tend to end up 
being in practice areas" and this specialization feature is common in large private 
practices and in the public sector. Even if non-prosecutors do not know the details of 
what is entailed in prosecution work, they have an awareness of the context and the tools 
that are used in doing this work, and have some rudimentary exposure to it through their 
articling experience. 
220 
Organization boundaries also define the boundaries of the occupational 
community for prosecutors. Gathering prosecutors into a single organization established 
structural boundaries that define who is and who is not a prosecutor. Even in instances 
where per diem prosecutors are taken on, they are hired under the authority and budget of 
the Public Prosecution Service and employed within it for the short periods they are 
required. Prosecution as a function and as a community of practice is well understood by 
those within the criminal bar and within the civil service. Prosecutors have the structure 
of workplace, regular meetings, and administrative supports that reinforce their 
membership in this prosecutorial subset of the legal community; they are also 
distinguished from other government lawyers. The dependent employment of 
prosecutors probably did more to isolate the community in a formal sense than any other 
single structural factor. 
Practice norms also contribute to closing off an occupational community for 
prosecutors. Continuous work in the speciality is important for success as well as 
credibility, and dependent employment means that the employees of the Public 
Prosecution get most of that work. One lawyer explains the justification for continuous 
work in the speciality this way: "I would say 10% is probably just regular, what we call 
dabblers, who are civil-type lawyers or people who are non-litigators who are in court 
because... they have a big client that's got into trouble. They usually make a mess of the 
courts." (Lawyer Q) 
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Well Defined Boundaries Understood by Outsiders 
The boundaries of prosecution are also well defined for outsiders, especially 
following the Marshall Inquiry and subsequent reviews of the Public Prosecution Service. 
The purpose and status of the Service was well publicized with regular updates on 
staffing, negotiations and policy development (Public Prosecution Service, 1998a, 1998b, 
2002, 2006). These communications emphasize the notion of independence. This 
emphasis echoes the recommendations of the Marshall Inquiry, reinforcing the message 
that prosecution needs to be free from political interference. The statutory requirement 
for the Minister of Justice to publish any direction he gives on prosecutions in the Royal 
Gazette ensures that elected officials know the boundaries of prosecution. This 
requirement helps define boundaries of prosecution work; it explains how elected 
officials might relate to Crown prosecutors and the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
Prosecutors across the country cite the notion of independence as a critical element of 
their labour process, saying "we are left alone to do our work" (Lawyer R). Nova Scotia 
prosecutors use the idea of independence and the quasi-judicial aspect of the prosecution 
function (Bellemare, 2007; Grosman, 1970) to ground their arguments for autonomous 
grievance and salary setting mechanisms. Prosecutors compare themselves to judges in 
their ability to stop a case at any point. They use this comparison to argue for an 
independent salary setting mechanism similar to the panel that reviews judicial salaries. 
Prosecutors cite a need to distance decision making in the Prosecution Service from that 
of Government whether the topic be legal/procedural or administrative. Independence 
clearly defines the boundaries of prosecution for most stakeholders; however, it comes at 
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a cost. One prosecutor sums up independence as the isolation of prosecutors from the 
general public as "the public don't get what we do" (Lawyer P). Prosecutors and 
legislators invested their energy in defining a niche within the legal profession at the cost 
of public misunderstanding. This development is ironic given the public outcry over 
prosecution's previous lack of independence. 
Determinants and Dimensions of Occupational Community 
The structural elements defining the boundaries of the occupational community 
are in place and well understood by various stakeholders in public prosecutions. 
Salaman's (1974) identifies six elements of occupational community. Three of the 
elements are determinants of OC, necessary for and occupational community to form. 
The other three elements are components of occupational community, aspects found to be 
present in OC but not causes of it. Salaman says that strong involvement, marginal 
status, and inclusiveness of the work situation are the three determinants of OC. He notes 
that one alone is a necessary but insufficient condition for occupational community. The 
three components of an occupational community are role perception, reference group, 
and fusion of work and non work lives. These elements are also present in prosecutors' 
stories, although importance of social relations captures inclusiveness of work situation 
and fusion of work and non-work lives more accurately in this case. 
The analysis of critical incidents in these stories reveals several key themes that 
relate to different elements of OC. The dominant themes tied to strong involvement 
include career choice, work intensity, and courtroom experience as active and authentic 
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'lawyering'. The tone and style of the narratives reveal the social role of prosecutor and 
a clear set of guiding values as additional subthemes. Marschall (2002) addresses 
marginalization when he discusses how outsiders become insiders and what instruments 
they use to give voice to this need, and thereby create belonging. In the case of Crown 
prosecutors, a subtheme of 'dirty work' underlies their marginalization. The structure of 
the work organization also supports formation of the prosecutors' occupational 
community. The following section presents each element of occupational community, 
illustrated by the themes from the stories. 
Strong Involvement 
Prosecutors' strong involvement with their job tasks and the responsibility they 
feel about their role is the first indication of an occupational community within this 
specialized niche of the legal profession. Van Maanen and Barley (1984) elaborate on 
involvement and role perception to note that sharing the same type of work and 
identifying positively with the work, recognizing common values as well as participating 
in tasks that have a symbolic significance all support the development of occupational 
community. 
Career Choice 
Prosecutors reveal a strong involvement in their work. To a certain extent this 
involvement has its root in their career choice and personal values. In contrast with the 
lawyers in private practice discussed in Chapter 4, many prosecutors reveal that they are 
drawn specifically to criminal law and many directly to prosecution work from the outset 
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of their careers. Many prosecutors have either known since an early age this was their 
career choice or else law school and articling revealed that prosecution is the speciality 
they wanted to pursue. This is in contrast with the focus group of private and public 
sector lawyers on the civil side. Those stories of career reflected a search for the right 
niche long after law school. Many lawyers make choices based on market realities, as 
revealed in this comment made by a Legal Aid lawyer. 
I see a lot of people over the years that, and myself in my own experience, get 
into ... certain practices a lot that just are not part of your niche and often it takes 
a long time to find your niche in the practice of law. [F]or myself I was a sole 
practitioner; I worked in a medium sized firm, now I work with Nova Scotia 
Legal Aid. (Lawyer K) 
Whereas prosecutors more consistently told stories that revealed a certainty about 
criminal law as their career choice from an early point: 
When I was probably about eight years old I had decided that I wanted to be a 
lawyer. It's from family. My uncle was a Supreme Court Judge, so I basically 
had that background or that will to get there, and I used to walk around the house 
with his robe, trip all over it... but I knew that's what I wanted to do. .. .1 wanted 
to defend criminals. (Lawyer S) 
I was called to the bar, and I knew from law school that I was destined for 
criminal law, there was never any doubt. All my focus was on criminal law. 
Coming from Saint Mary's [University], then it wasn't the criminology 
department, but it was sociology with an emphasis on criminology. So when I 
went to law school, I knew what I wanted to do. (Lawyer D) 
One lawyer describes his move from a previous area of academic study to law school 
as a 'calling'. 
This was more of my calling, right? I was really quite excited about it 
[philosophy] so I wanted to continue on, kind of finish what I started and I knew I 
was pretty good at it, but I knew my true calling was law, so I went to law 
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school.. .1 always wanted to be a Crown, always, always wanted to be a Crown 
attorney. (Lawyer Q) 
My interest was in doing defence work and that's what I did. I articled in a 
criminal firm and then I worked for the [provincial] Legal Aid program for one 
year and then I went into private practice. .. .exclusively criminal practitioner... 
I've just always been interested in it and still have no interest in doing anything 
else. (Lawyer P) 
Prosecutors do not explain their careers as a difficult choice, but rather centre 
themselves as decisive actors in their personal stories. 
Work Intensity 
Prosecutors are quickly drawn into an intense work environment. Once 
they chose criminal law, and then prosecution as a subspecialty, prosecutors very 
quickly embrace it. They are quickly socialized into the prosecution community. 
Rapid socialization is in part due to the structure of the labour process. Each 
individual works autonomously from almost their first day on the job, and faces a 
high volume workload. As a result, prosecutors develop strong involvement in 
their work, which prepares the way for occupational community to thrive. "Boy, 
you have to be prepared going into court, and you have 6-7-8 trials a day" (Lawyer 
O) says one. Another describes her early career as a rapid immersion: "Before I 
actually got on the per diem list I got a few days in court that she [another 
prosecutor] helped me with and then she actually went off for maternity leave" 
(Lawyer H ). The speed of socialization in prosecution work build confidence 
among practitioners as this male lawyer indicates. "As soon as I was in the job 
after a couple of weeks I thought, 'I'm gonna be fine'. I was on my own for a jury 
226 
trial my first time. My boss asked if I wanted someone to go along ;no way' [I 
said] I was fine" (Lawyer O). Prosecutors consistently describe the impact on the 
rest of their lives of the high volume and mental intensity of their work. 'The best 
way to be competent was to be well prepared...I put in weekends and evening 
because I dreaded being unprepared in court" (Lawyer O). This lawyer sums it up 
eloquently when she says: 
And the work so spills over in to your life, like, there's like, as my daughter 
would call it, there's always homework... They [files] physically come home but 
it's also it's in your head because it's demanding what we do; you're thinking 
about the issue and how you're gonna handle it or what you should have done or 
the pile of work on your desk you didn't do. (Lawyer P) 
Prosecutors transition to fully autonomous practitioners at a dramatic speed 
and with remarkable intensity. This transition is also dramatically different from the 
experience private sector lawyers describe. Other aspects of prosecution work also 
nurture an occupational community. 
Prosecutors Practice in Court 
One of the appeals of prosecution work seems to be the active nature of both the 
apprenticeship and the job. Several prosecutors describe their discovery of prosecution 
work in terms of a courtroom experience during their articling year. All prosecutors 
described how quickly they were left to work on their own in the courtroom. Some felt 
this independence before they were even called to the bar. The activity of being in court 
on a regular basis reinforces the prosecutors' engagement with their work and their 
commitment to their occupational community. Prosecutors gain a sense of identity as 
"true lawyers" from their court work. Several identify their first independent trial or first 
jury trial as a defining moment and the point at which they "really felt like a lawyer". 
The engagement with courtroom setting also differentiates prosecutors from other 
lawyers. One prosecutor described an annual event he has attended with his wife who is 
a civil litigator involved with the provincial Trial Lawyers' Association. He draws 
attention to the irony in the title of the association when most of its members settle 
matters out of court. 
.. .she used to make me go to this dinner every year and I'd sit there bored out of 
my mind. And there was a guy there, he's now a provincial court judge, he was a 
criminal lawyer and we'd sort of giggle 'oh trial lawyers', yeah, 'they never go to 
trial' (laughs). (Lawyer R) 
This individual stresses the fact he has nothing in common with other lawyers 
because they have no courtroom experience; courtroom experience is a defining 
feature of his practice. Furthermore, the only person he relates to at the event is 
another criminal lawyer. Lawyers quoted in Chapter 4 also highlighted the fact than 
many in private practice do not spend much time in court. The true statistics on court 
time will doubtless vary from province to province, and from practice to practice. The 
important point is that prosecutors perceive their courtroom experience as a feature 
that distinguishes them from other lawyers. This effectively is a form of 
demarcationary closure within the profession. The features of professionalization and 
occupational community run in close parallel but we will see shortly that these two 
forms of work control are not interchangeable. Occupational community among 
prosecutors has features that contribute a unique element to workplace control. 
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Uniting Paths and Perspectives 
It may be tempting to paint prosecutors as professionals who share a common 
outlook. However, the diversity in career paths and political perspectives indicates 
otherwise. Certainly, these interviews with prosecutors indicated they are an amazingly 
diverse group of individuals in terms of their life paths, their interests, their socio-cultural 
roots, their leisure habits, and educational backgrounds. Some started in defence work, 
some in legal aid. For those who experienced defence work first, they describe 
camaraderie across the criminal bar that leads them to job opportunities in prosecution. 
In another instance, a defence lawyer explained how his defence of a client in a 
particularly horrific crime turned him away from defence work to prosecution. 
Prosecutors embrace different political perspectives, from the conservative to the 
liberal; "somewhere to the right of Attila the Hun" to "me on the left wing of the 
continuum". These different perspectives are highlighted in their stories and are used 
often to explain their choices, their friendships, and their struggles. 
Well there's a continuum of the way Crowns think. You know, just like how 
there's probably, .. .if you're a doctor you must have some people that are brave 
and out there and try anything and some that are much more conservative in their 
approaches. Do you know what I mean? Well Crowns are no different than that. 
(Lawyer P) 
Shared political perspective, then, is not a unifying feature among prosecutors. 
As one prosecutor said, they cannot be lumped together as a single group and they are 
"not on the side of angels". Rather, it is the requirement for fairness in the prosecution 
process that unites them and the strength of their beliefs. 
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.. .people who are in the private bar now, most of them have business degrees, 
financial degrees, economic degrees, all of that. Where as in social, in criminal 
law, I can tell you we've got poli-sci, soc, history, geography, music, much more 
of an arts, liberal arts, kind of background. Which makes things a little bit 
different when you look at perspective. I'm sure that there are people that have 
business degrees that are in criminal law but I found that in general, when you 
start talking to people, the attraction to criminal law is the social justice 
background. So if you don't have that interest, why would you be in criminal law? 
(Lawyer S) 
As an occupation, prosecutors appear to have less in common than the railway 
workers (Salaman, 1971b) and dentists (Salaman, 1974) in past studies of occupational 
community. However, prosecutors' predisposition to seek intense experiences and 
practical, active work hints that they share underlying characteristics that unite them. 
The structure of work and the nature of work relationships contribute to the intensity 
and strong involvement prosecutors feel for their chosen career. Long hours of work 
reduce the amount of time prosecutors have to socialize with others. They spend the 
workday in contact with a limited number of individuals and they seldom gather in 
teams. The difficult content of criminal cases and the need to respect confidentiality 
through investigations and ensuing prosecutions makes it difficult for prosecutors to 
share their work with outsiders. This work intensity makes it easy for prosecutors to 
develop other aspects of occupational community: shared values, a clear reference 
group, and significant social relations, as we shall see below. 
Values and Sense of Social Justice 
Many prosecutors talk about being drawn to criminal law because it appeals to 
their values, morals, or sense of justice. Prosecutors explain many stories about decision-
making and career choice with reference to their personal values. Something perhaps just 
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short of a moral code binds them together; "my ideals of justice" (Lawyer S); "I have a 
moral compass, value, set of values and it's been consistent throughout my lifetime in 
terms of what I've chosen" (Lawyer U). 
I took a position with a law firm doing personal injury law. So I completely got 
out of criminal law.. .because financially I was looking for stability and I just, I 
couldn't make it any more .. .for a junior coming in, the challenge of being a 
business person is almost impossible if you don't get into a firm. Now, I'm very 
stubborn and very hard headed, but at some point sometimes you have to admit 
defeat. So, I went and I took that job knowing full well that I would come back to 
criminal law because the personal injury field wasn't for me [emphasis added]. 
So I stayed there six months and then I was finally offered a position with the 
Government. (Lawyer S) 
Many prosecutors allude to a faith community, a family network, or a political 
affiliation that spurs them to action, or a personal values framework that helps them or 
has drawn them specifically to prosecution work. These values range from the 
conservative to the liberal as noted above, but in the critical events, values give a strength 
and purpose to the storyteller's career path. Lawyers in my preliminary study focus 
groups shared occasional 'lawyer jokes', poking fun at their profession for its reputation 
as financially motivated, perhaps slightly amoral. There does not seem to be any such 
thing as a 'prosecutor joke', however. A keen sense of natural justice and procedural 
justice permeates prosecutors' career stories. Their work is an expression of the way they 
feel the world should run, rather than a way to earn a living. 
Independence 
Prosecutors describe "a completely different mindset" in criminal law. One 
prosecutor describes this as "thinking outside the box" and using creativity at work. 
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Salaman claims creativity is necessary for an occupational community to thrive and 
distinguish itself from surrounding work and community. Prosecutors explain that they 
view the world differently and they describe a social element that draws them to their 
work. "I think it takes a particular kind of person or a particular kind of lawyer to 
practice criminal law. It's not your "Average Joe" .. .very distinct people go into 
criminal law" (Lawyer S). Describing their personal experiences, male and female 
prosecutors reflect this same theme. 
Articled back here with a midtown firm that did no criminal work .. .they did 
commercial, real estate, civil litigation—really didn't enjoy it —didn't suit my 
personality, didn't see myself there and so that's when I said, well, I want that 
court room experience, I like criminal law. My disposition is more as a 
prosecutor than a defence lawyer. (Lawyer U) 
[prosecution] is not driven by money and I find that makes a big, big difference, 
because it's much more of a social situation. Because it's either the protection of 
the public or the protection of the rights of an individual. .. .you don't think about 
how much money you're going to get for this client or how much you will be 
rewarded financially. So the mindset is different from the private bar which is 
much more business oriented and money oriented. (Lawyer S) 
The forgoing is an example of what Van Maanen and Barley call "holding a 
symbolic trust" (1984, p. 303). Protection of the public interest and ensuring a fair 
criminal justice process are duties beyond what is usual for many other lawyers. 
Prosecutors consistently describe themselves as quasi-ministers of justice, and being 
beyond direct control of any one body. The theme of being similar to judges reappears in 
prosecutors stories several times. Prosecutors use this idea to stake the boundaries of 
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their speciality and to build an ideology that binds them together in an occupational 
community. 
In arbitration Crown Attorneys argued that they are making quasi-judicial 
decisions and should be recognized for that and paid for that. The Crown makes 
quasi-judicial decisions and can't be influenced by outside bodies such as the 
Court or the Bar Society. They can't say on the one hand you're independent, we 
trust you to be independent from political interference, but not from the Bar 
Society? No! The Krieger13 decision says this clearly. (Lawyer O) 
Voicing their need for independence further isolates prosecutors from the balance 
of their profession, from other civil servants, and from society whom they ultimately 
serve. Prosecutors describe their decision making process as being like no other. 
Prosecutors share almost complete individual discretion in the exercise of their duties and 
they say this is a very special type of work. Prosecutorial discretion needs to be 
exercised independently without a lot of second-guessing, although individual 
prosecutors need to know where to turn for assistance when needed. One prosecutor says 
her peers are not that hard to manage and that lawyers do good work if they have a 
supportive and collegial environment where they know they can come for help, guidance, 
and suggestions. However, the most significant characteristic of prosecutors is the 
obligation for disclosure in their work. The Criminal Code sets out the requirement for 
prosecutors to share all information about the case with defence counsel. A series of 
Supreme Court of Canada cases have tested aspects of prosecutorial discretion, including 
12 The prosecutor was referring to salary arbitration for Crown prosecutors. 
13 The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Krieger established protection for prosecutors' 
exercise of their prosecutorial discretion. It states that the Law Society cannot interfere or judge the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
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Krieger, Nelles and most recently Miazga. The need to disclose information about a 
case is an important aspect of the prosecutor's role. Prosecutors must be, and must be 
seen to be, neutral in a case, and free from undue influence. The decision making process 
regarding whether or not to prosecute define the practice of prosecution work to a great 
extent. Boucher is the oft-cited Supreme Court decision that establishes these principles 
of prosecution: 
"It cannot be overemphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is 
not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be 
credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to 
see that all available legal proof of the facts is presented; it should be done firmly 
and pressed to its legitimate strength, but it must also be done fairly. The role of 
prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of 
public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged with greater 
responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the 
dignity, the seriousness, and the justness of judicial proceedings." (Boucher 1955). 
Prosecutors I interviewed take this aspect of the role extremely seriously. They 
are not subject to Barrister Society discipline over the way they exercise this discretion, 
but the independence such discretion conveys is at the heart of how prosecutors portray 
themselves in their stories. 
14 Nelles and Miazga deal with malicious prosecution and contribute to a legal test for assessing 
how a prosecutor has applied prosecutorial discretion. 
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I think if you were to go back 25, 30 years the presumption was if a charge is laid 
you prosecute it. Well, we understand now that that's just not right. That the job 
of a Crown attorney is more than just a prosecutor, the job is to see that justice is 
done. And sometimes that means deciding to stop a prosecution when you know 
it's not right. ... [T]he fact that Crown attorneys see that as a part of their jobs I 
think is important because if we were to adopt the perspective that our only job is 
to take the charge and run it in court, that could have a tremendous negative 
impact on people's lives and society in general. (Lawyer A) 
The other thing is that we have to be fair and objective. So we're always taking 
the high road, no matter what. Everything is always full-disclosure. .. .when 
we're talking to somebody on the phone, I will tell them everything about the file, 
leave out nothing... They know everything. Defence lawyers don't have to tell us 
anything they don't want to. There's no surprises, when I come to the court, for 
the other side. You can surprise me all you want. You can manipulate, you can 
do what you want as long as you stay within the ethical boundaries. But we're 
bound by different rules. (Lawyer Q) 
The legislative requirement for disclosure coupled with the culture of 
independence unites prosecutors and sets them apart from the rest of the profession. 
They share a strong value in their support of the criminal justice system and a defining 
motivation to work in criminal law, despite their variations in political perspective. 
Role and Reference Group 
Lawyers are trained to think in a certain way, and they stick together. They see 
themselves as the members of society who specialize in the rules governing society. 
They share a certain understanding of the way contemporary society is built, functions, 
and is controlled. 
but you know every society has a concept of rules or norms which either formally 
or informally are a law and then with you know with the progression of time there 
develops a group of people who have specialized expertise in making that work, 
representing people in reference to it representing it to them, right? (Lawyer E) 
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Lawyer's high level of social exclusion is underscored by their off-work 
socialization with others in the legal profession: "it's very difficult to have a 
conversation, not difficult, but it's easier to have a conversation with a lawyer in a lot of 
ways than it is to have a conversation with a non-lawyer" (Lawyer C). For prosecutors 
this off-work socialization occurs with other members of the criminal justice system. 
Many prosecutors noted their closest friends are drawn from the ranks of prosecution 
services. Because they work alone in court, prosecutors regularly seek each other out 
beyond the courtroom and draw on the occupational community for technical support. 
Lawyer H noted this when she described how much she learned from other Crown 
prosecutors simply sharing coffee together. Another prosecutor describes her work on 
the proceeds of crime team, which dealt with organized crime cases: 
When I was on the proceeds [of crime] team, which have very specific issues, it 
was very common to see a question go out to all the proceeds counsel across the 
country. Or you might know that somebody in Toronto had argued on an issue 
that was similar to yours and email them or call them up and have a chat. 
(Lawyer P) 
Prosecutors across the country tend to see themselves as purists in their legal 
practice. They do not worry about billable hours, administration, or the opinions of their 
supervisors for the most part. They work very autonomously and focus almost 
exclusively on the law and its application to specific cases. This prosecutor describes his 
management experience this way: "Crown Attorneys will come to you for advice, and 
they will think 'I won't go and ask him he's not been in court for 5 years.'" He goes on 
to explain that technical skills and knowledge are critical for credibility in a management 
role, and are easily eroded if one stays out of active practice for any time. This is a theme 
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that recurs when we examine the stories of collective bargaining later in this chapter. 
Lawyer O brings the demands of the job back to the identity question for prosecutors 
when he says "you have to keep up to date and keep your skills up to date. It is important 
as a professional." 
Those with a significant amount of experience reveal that they can process more 
of their work quickly as time goes by, and thus contribute to internal committees and 
policy forums on specific aspects of policing and other matters. Criminal litigation is 
also markedly different from civil and family litigation, as prosecutors are quick to point 
out. There is a sense of 'us versus them' among prosecutors, where "them" refers to 
other lawyers, civil lawyers, and members of management in the Prosecution Service 
who do little if any court work. Only colleagues' opinions matter because they have the 
"real view" of prosecution. These colleagues form a strong referent group for 
prosecutors. The referent group becomes critical in the collective bargaining stories 
because they share working conditions and perceive similar injustices in their labour 
process. 
Marginal Status 
Marginalization, or a diminished sense of status, was noted in Chapter 2 for its 
role in forming occupational communities (Salaman, 1971a). Members of marginalized 
groups form a clear definition of their profession and will stress its importance when 
describing their role (Salaman, 1971a). Marginalization is evident in the way lawyers 
describe employment status. Lawyers in this study draw a distinction between self-
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employment and being employed, even if that employment is in a private practice. "[I]t's 
different if you're an employed lawyer.. .there's a big distinction there too in terms of 
your lifestyle." (Lawyer C) Lawyers in this study from all types of practice talked about 
excellence and how the best level of legal work takes more effort than simply working 9 
to 5. The implication is that the work product of employed lawyers is perhaps not as 
good if they are working a forty-hour week. 
In the focus group containing lawyers from the public and private sectors, a 
discussion around maternity leave reflected a similar notion. A year's leave of absence is 
readily available to employed and public sector lawyers. This was contrasted with the 
situation facing private practice lawyers where they cannot take time off for financial 
reasons as well as for business continuity: 
There's... a lot of pressure on female associates to get back - we're not going to 
take care of your files, you know - you've got to stay in contact - you're the one 
that needs to maintain these, we've no one to cover off so you need to keep... 
stay on top of this stuff while at the same time you're trying to figure out your life 
with a new baby. (Lawyer I) 
Lawyers in private practice perceive the extra effort required to stay on top of 
files and in touch with clients as an investment in the practice, whereas among public 
lawyers, this effort is described as a sacrifice. Self-employed lawyers speak of "building 
my practice" whereas public sector lawyers use language of conflict and tension. A 
further distinction between self employed and the employed lawyer relates to risk. The 
employed (and the public sector lawyer) bears less business risk and enjoys the protection 
of employment standards law, which further distinguishes them from owners of private 
firms who feel both the burden and the prestige of owning their practice. 
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The work pressure in public law is not that different from that in private practice 
"you still have the same pressures of the work" says one public sector lawyer, but the 
perception of some study participants is of public law as a second-class type of practice. 
Private sector lawyers in my study held notions that public sector lawyers faced less 
strenuous work demands and enjoyed far greater benefits than those in the private sector. 
Public sector participants in my focus groups quickly point out that this is not in fact the 
case, but their responses are defensive in tone. Some study participants mention that 
individuals who may have struggled in the private sector can now realize their 
professional potential in the public sector. These comments were made in the context of 
work-life balance discussion with the implication that female lawyers stand a better 
chance of success in the public sector, as evidenced by their growing numbers in that 
field. The work hour and extra-curricular demands of legal work clearly discriminate 
against some workers, notably those with family commitments. Family responsibilities 
are perceived as a liability in the profession. The presence of parental leave and work life 
balance initiatives in the public sector contribute to the reputation of public sector law as 
'cushy' or less demanding than other types of law. Prosecutors are very aware of the 
marginalization of public sector work, as one commented "you were just considered as 
.. .throw-aways. And if you couldn't get a job, then you were a Crown attorney; if you 
couldn't get a job, then you were government lawyer" (Lawyer Q) 
It is also clear from within and outside the profession that public sector lawyers 
earn markedly less money than lawyers in private practice. Some public sector lawyers 
in my study compare their earnings with law school classmates and see tens of thousands 
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of dollars' difference in annual salary. One prosecutor directly attributes the 
marginalization he feels to financial earning differentials when he says "and frankly, it 
has to do with money." Though there is a wide range of earnings in private practice, even 
the solo practitioner I interviewed in a small town with a population under 100,000 made 
more in private practice than he does now in the public sector. Money is a proxy for 
status and prestige. One participant put it this way when asked if there is a hierarchy in 
the profession "Well if you base it on pay rates, the Crown attorneys are at the bottom! 
Government lawyers are at the bottom" (Lawyer O) Another prosecutor stated "If you're 
a lawyer and you're making $30-$40 000 a year, which [was the case] ten years ago, and 
other lawyers in private firms are making $300 000, you're viewed as obviously you 
can't make a cut in the real world." (Lawyer Q) 
Like all public and para-public employees, public sector lawyers were subject to 
wage freezes and then a 3% rollback in earnings over the early to mid 1990s. The 
earnings gap between private and public sector workers in general and lawyers in 
particular increased significantly during this period. Also, Nova Scotia prosecutors' 
wages were traditionally higher than the provincial court judges, but with the advent of 
tribunals to set judicial incomes, this gap widened dramatically, even with the suspension 
of tribunals in 1994-1997 as part of public sector austerity measures. Prosecutors felt 




As mentioned in Chapter 4, the work in court is 'dirty work'. Prosecutors are 
dealing with some of the least desirable aspects of human life. Their working conditions 
may be mostly office and courtroom-based, but they are required to work with the police, 
the accused, to visit police stations and jails, and to interview victims of crime. "[I]t's 
hard what we do for a living" Lawyer P says, "Right in the meat grinder courts, you 
know, where it's really, where it's busy" says Lawyer O. Although courtroom 
experience is vital to prosecutors' occupational community it is also the attendance in 
court, the direct confrontation, and the nature of crime that prosecutors describe as 
unpleasant. They acknowledge that crime has a marginalizing effect on their status in the 
profession. 
Nova Scotia Prosecutors describe their working conditions as below the standard 
for other civil servants and much poorer than those enjoyed by lawyers in private 
practice. "We didn't have any support staff. We didn't have computers. We used to have 
to .. .document notice saying you want to admit probation orders and stuff into evidence, 
and we used to handwrite them" (Lawyer H) 
The physical facilities were a problem. And of course that is the largest criminal 
court house in the province and about a third of the prosecutors would be there. I 
mean the office space was cramped and inadequate, there weren't enough support 
staff, there were no computers. The criminal records and the file keeping were all 
done on a recipe card system with drawers of recipe cards. (Lawyer T) 
The infamous recipe card system consisted of index cards kept in a library card 
catalogue drawer. Each card was inserted into a typewriter and the name of the accused 
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was recorded along with codes for the criminal charges and the next court appearance 
date. The cards were photocopied and included in the case file sent to the prosecutor. 
Each time a new appearance date was set the old date was covered with liquid corrector 
fluid and a new date was typed in. An accused person could have multiple cards based 
on clerical error, varying police records of name, and multiple charges. It was virtually 
impossible to obtain a complete record on an individual's contact with the criminal 
justice system. 
These working conditions deepen the feeling of marginalization, and the fact that 
such conditions were cited in the reviews of the prosecution service (Archibald, 1989; 
Ghiz & Archibald, 1994; Kaufman, F., 1999a) give the prosecutors' complaints 
credibility, but also help to further marginalize them in relation to the rest of the 
profession. The recipe card record keeping system noted above has become legendary in 
the service, and several participants highlight this as one of the important stories in their 
narrative. It is an important story for the way it reflects the ludicrous amount of manual 
labour and the risk of inaccuracy and delays involved, as well as for the prominence 
given to it by the Kaufman report and the media. 
I was here in the recipe card days. I mean that's even in the Kaufman report and 
it's in the media, well it's just a filing cabinet for recipe cards. ...if a file came in 
that was ongoing they'd white it out every time and [type] the new date. You 
couldn't keep track [of court appearances]. (Lawyer H) 
Boje (1991) says that storytellers focus attention on events that have the 
greatest impact or require the most effort to make sense. The appearance of the file 
card story in almost every prosecutor's narrative indicates this is a key event in their 
work experiences and one that they struggle to understand, to make sense of. The file 
card story comes to represent the physical limitations prosecutors face in their work 
lives. Prosecutors explain the persistence of these manual systems through multiple 
reviews of the Public Prosecution Service as management's failure to act in the 
prosecutors' interests and Government's failure to accord appropriate resources and 
status to the prosecution function. The relationship between prosecutors and their 
management superiors is featured shortly in my discussion of collective bargaining; 
however, the file story clearly illustrates the prosecutors feel marginalized within their 
profession and within their organization. 
The Importance of Strong Social Networks 
Not all prosecutors were extremely focussed in pursuit of their career. A minority 
indicated that they decided to pursue a law degree as an adult, after an initial university 
degree. All of these lawyers were strongly drawn to criminal law with the exception of 
only one who was uncertain what branch of law to pursue. In the stories from this 
minority of prosecutors, the role of friends and social relations plays an important part in 
making a decision to pursue a legal career, giving an early hint at the strength of social 
relations for these individuals. Once they are exposed to it, these lawyers also exhibit a 
strong commitment to prosecution work. Some of them tell stories of graduating at the 
top of their class after an inauspicious start, like this individual: 
My career, well I certainly didn't have any plans growing up to be any kind of 
licensed professional. Neither of my parents finished high school, but.. .my 
friends were going to university, I went to university. [I] did my undergraduate 
degree, and I knew people who were applying or had applied to law school and I 
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thought I would try it. Thought about quitting early on... I was in the top ten 
percent in my class when I graduated. (Lawyer T) 
Other lawyers who did not initially have a strong motivation to pursue law describe the 
influence of family and friends. 
Yeah. I never had any desire through school to become a lawyer. In fact, I was 
thinking of going dentistry, medicine, that route. It was almost by default that I 
got into the profession. [I] had family who were lawyers who I respected and as a 
result, I think that's why I went towards the law profession. (Lawyer U) 
I don't think I had any ambition to be a lawyer starting out but.. .surrounded by 
some friends of mine at university who were studying law .. .1 applied. [S]o I 
went to law school and then I graduated ... and again had no real idea what I 
wanted to do. (Lawyer V ) 
These stories reveal that future prosecutors are sensitive to a strong support 
network that includes their peers and family members. Not only is the social network 
strong at the very outset of the prosecutors' academic pursuit of their profession, but it 
endures through their career. "Like I say it didn't matter if you were a lawyer or a judge 
or a police office or a base officer or a court clerk, there was a real camaraderie here 
which I really enjoyed. And as a consequence was able to kind of be relaxed and learn 
the job at the same time" (Lawyer V). 
Many studies of occupational community address workers' social relations that 
extend beyond the workplace. Studies of railwaymen, architects, ship builders, police, 
fishermen, and jazz musicians described by Salaman (1974) reflect the merger of work 
and non-work lives. More recently, studies of cruise line workers (Lee-Ross, 2008), 
hotel workers (Lee-Ross, 2004), pub workers (Sandiford & Seymour, 2007), and 
computer programmers (Marschall, 2002) describe the inclusiveness of work situations 
that Salaman (1974) says is a determinant of occupational community. For example, 
organizational embrace may be so extensive that all life activities involve workers at 
work. Cruise ships, some jails, and formerly nurses' residences are instances of this 
inclusive nature of work situations. Pervasiveness of norms and activities may also bind 
members together and the professions clearly establish this pervasiveness through 
training and education, testing, and apprenticeships. Restrictive factors such as time or 
travel can also limit non-work activities, resulting in workers being out of synch with the 
rest of their social world and thus completing their non-work activities together or in a 
similar manner. 
Prosecutors certainly experience the pervasiveness of the profession; their 
behaviour in many work activities is influenced by their training and the conduct 
guidelines of the Barristers' Society. But as the literature (Salaman, 1974; Van Maanen 
& Barley, 1984) and the preliminary study described in Chapter 4 indicate, pervasive 
norms alone are insufficient to forge an occupational community. Furthermore, 
prosecutors do not exhibit any extraordinary restrictive factors beyond the long work 
hours many professionals experience in the current economy. There are variations in 
travel requirements depending on rural or urban assignment; however these appear to be 
neither divisive nor uniting factors. 
The organizational embrace of the Prosecution Service does not extend to non-
work activities; however it does restrict the practice of prosecution to those who are 
employed by the service, closing off prosecutors from the rest of the profession by virtue 
of their employment. Thus gathering prosecutors together in a single place of 
employment is an important structural feature of the occupational community; a feature 
that reinforces the behavioural norms that govern the work of prosecution. Prosecutors 
share close proximity to others practicing the same speciality and also share working 
conditions. These commonalities foster a sense of identity among prosecutors that codes 
of ethics and membership in the profession's regulatory body alone could not achieve. 
This is an example of Giddens' (1979) structuration, where the structure of the institution 
and the actions of individuals are mutually reinforcing. The employment structure 
gathers the prosecutors together, and in so doing they grow a bond based on working 
conditions and on shared professional circumstances. Employees of the Prosecution 
Service grow together in their unique experience of prosecution and they turn to one 
another for support and in-house continuing education. This internal mutual support 
further reinforces the normative power of criminal prosecution and of the employing 
organization. Prosecutors begin to develop an organizational culture to accompany their 
professional practice by virtue of being dependent employees. In contrast to the 
prosecutors' situation, the civil lawyers in the Department of Justice are dispersed across 
government, often as single solicitors in a client department. The civil lawyers did not 
develop an occupational community during this period of struggle. 
Prosecutors do not experience inclusiveness of work situation in the same way as 
other occupations cited in the literature; they do not live among their colleagues and are 
not forced to conduct their non-work activities in unusual times or places. Many 
contemporary workers find themselves in alternate work arrangements or working 
extended hours so this dimension of occupational community is much more difficult to 
interpret and analyse than has been the case in the past (Lee-Ross, 2004). The impact of 
social relations on prosecutors' occupational community seems limited to a single aspect 
of inclusiveness, close friendships. Both qualitative and quantitative studies have been 
done of the number of friends and the type of contact members of occupational 
communities have with other members (Cannon, 1967; Gerstl, 1961a; Lee-Ross, 2008; 
Salaman, 1974). Almost without exception prosecutors interviewed in this study indicate 
the majority of their five closest friends, and especially their two closest friends, are also 
prosecutors. These friends are current or former coworkers. In only one instance, that of 
a very newly appointed prosecutor, the participant's closest friendships were established 
through her private law practice and her best friend was a lawyer, but not a prosecutor. 
In general, women appear to draw friends from more diverse members of the criminal 
justice system, counting police officers among their friends, for example. Women also 
have friendships built around other life roles than that of prosecutor. The role of parent 
in particular appears to draw female prosecutors to other women in the criminal justice 
system, broadening the scope of their closest friendships beyond prosecutors. 
Probing the dimension of friendship a little further, we see again the theme of 
strong values emerge. Prosecutors base their stories of friendship on the idea of a shared 
set of values in a manner that echoes the way in which they describe their choice of 
career. Underneath these strong values lies an ideology of justice and fairness that crosses 
over from the work practices to other aspects of life. 
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Occupational Community "Plus": The Presence of a Uniting Ethos of Fairness 
The foregoing discussion of the elements of occupational community indicates 
that OC determinants: strong involvement in job tasks, shared values and norms and 
marginal status, are present among prosecutors. The components of occupational 
community, namely a clear role perception, reference group, and, to a limited extent, the 
fusion of work and non-work lives are also present. I conclude that an occupational 
community exists and contributes to reinforcing the culture of uniqueness and the social 
closure of prosecutors. However, there is an additional aspect of the prosecutors' 
occupational community that the literature has not extensively explored. The notion of 
strong core values is hinted at but not explored in any of the studies mentioned above. I 
have discovered that among prosecutors there is an affinity for intense work situations, 
coupled with a definitive stance of almost ideological proportions. Not all prosecutors 
share the same political perspective, but they share a strong dedication to their chosen 
perspective. Prosecutors' occupational community is forged through difficult subject 
matter and strong professional norms. Members of this OC are united in a single 
organization and subject to administrative control by a bureaucracy perceived to be 
outsiders. These circumstances present rich ground for an ethos to grow which can 
further unite the occupational community. The presence of such a unifying force that is 
sustained by the occupational community explains how prosecutors successfully move 
between a professional mode of closure and a strategy of collective bargaining. 
Prosecutors base their identity on the notion of fairness. They unite when this fairness, 
and with it their professional discretion, is threatened. 
Conflict Between Strategies 
With the existence of an occupational community thus established, I now turn to 
examine how this community helps to mobilize members to push for collective 
bargaining. On a tactical level, prosecutors expressed difficulty in reconciling their 
professionalism with collective job action. One person interviewed said that he could not 
agree to a work to rule campaign; doing part of the job was unacceptable from a 
professional ethics standpoint. Another said she thought that by pursuing a professional 
degree and career she was leaving behind all notions of labour and labour strife as well as 
the need for collective action to protect her rights: "I thought law school exempted me 
from labour issues." A third said "Hey, Mclnnis Cooper [a large local law firm] doesn't 
have [bargaining], why should we have that here?" 
However, prosecutors draw heavily on the fairness argument when they describe 
their treatment at the hands of government. They express powerlessness and disbelief 
that members of the civil service community and the legal fraternity could treat them with 
such disdain, disrespect, and what they claim were outright lies. Prosecutors contrast 
their Legal Ethics Handbook that demands full disclosure and non-personal, rational 
review of facts with the targeted, secretive, and unfair treatment by those who manage 
them and by the employer over working conditions and collective bargaining. Fairness 
becomes their rallying point, almost their anthem, and unfairness the target and behaviour 
attributed to the other side. 
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An Ethos of Fairness 
A general sense of unfairness (Kelly, 1998) and discord mobilized the prosecutors 
to push for collective bargaining over a salary mechanism in 1998. The unfair treatment 
of specific individuals was used to build solidarity for the collective action campaign that 
culminated in achieving the second phase of collective bargaining: the grievance 
procedure. The discovery of a discourse of fairness within the occupational community 
strong enough to unite the opposing notions of 'collective' in unionism and 
'independence' in professionalism explains this mobilization. My analysis of the stories 
of collective bargaining highlights this ethos of fairness. 
In their stories, prosecutors describe how the occupational community coalesces 
around staff prosecutors as managers withdraw from regular courtroom work. The 
stories are filled with prosecutors' attempts to reconcile their professional norms and 
beliefs with their work circumstances. They also struggle to reconcile their belief in 
collective action with the employer's overwhelming negative response. Prosecutors 
depend upon an ethos of fairness to reconcile collective bargaining and their professional 
status and beliefs. The fairness discourse bridges the occupational community of the 
professional prosecutor and the world of dependent employment, providing both with 
language and meaning to express their struggle and to situate their role in a broader 
context. Krause (1971) says "an inevitable part of any group's action on its own behalf is 
an ideology which summarizes the meaning of its action and gives reasons why others 
should support it" (p. 88) Krause goes on to describe ideology as "texts, theories, 
doctrines, phrases or concepts" (p. 89) that a group uses to unite and focus group 
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behaviour in relation to other groups. A shared ideology forges an occupational 
community (Elliott & Scacchi, 2008) and such an ideology, or ethos, exists for 
prosecutors; it is evident in their stories. The requirement of disclosure and the ethos of 
fairness permeate prosecution work, especially since the advent of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms imposed on Crown prosecutors a duty to ensure the rights of defendants 
are protected. Prosecutors are able to shape a notion of fairness to meet both their 
professional obligations and their workplace goals. 
Collective Bargaining Stories 
The critical events in prosecutors' stories deal with their work environment and 
the workload: how work is assigned and how it is managed in small group settings. 
Management roles and relationships are an important part of these stories. There is a 
level of middle management between prosecutors and the senior leadership of the 
Prosecution Service. These managers supervise prosecutors and play a role in assigning 
major cases. This management group, a dozen in number, are promoted from the ranks 
of prosecutors. Management control of the labour process forms a unifying theme 
through the prosecutors' narratives. That is not to say that all the stories are the same nor 
that all prosecutors have similar experiences with management and their labour process. 
But the presence and the power over the labour process is a central theme in the stories 
and in the way story tellers present their tales. Distrust of management and workplace 
frustration are other themes that emerge in the stories. One story in particular illustrates 
how these themes coalesce and support an occupational community: the illegal strike of 
June 1998. Underpinning the stories of career and the stories of collective bargaining is 
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the theme of fairness. This theme takes on the power of an ideology in the occupational 
community and is a fundamental force in the struggle for collective bargaining. 
Power over the Labour Process 
Prosecutors are autonomous, independent professionals in the course of their day-
to-day work. "Each Crown prosecutor is assigned to a court. They are one of a court 
team of two partners. And they are on their own in the court room" (Lawyer O). 
Prosecutors' courtroom work is solitary; they individually review files, interview 
witnesses, conduct discussions with police, and examine evidence without the input or 
oversight of other lawyers. 
Here we've been told since the beginning that we're all equals. So, when you take 
a file it's your file and you run it the way you want. If you want other people's 
opinions that's fine, but nobody will second guess you, or tell you that you can't 
do things that way, or whatever. (Lawyer S) 
This organization of the labour process reinforces the independent nature of the 
prosecutor. The autonomy of prosecutors contrasts with the private practice lawyers' 
description of a mentorship process. It is common in private practice to send a novice 
lawyer out and then recall them to check their work, shape it, then send them back out to 
work once again. Senior lawyers express a desire to "put my stamp on it" (Lawyer F.) 
when referring to their juniors' work. 
Workplace Frustration 
Prosecutors express workplace frustration over two major issues. Working 
conditions were discussed above. Prosecutors are also concerned about work control. 
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Prosecutors' feel that their autonomy is threatened by the policies of the Prosecution 
Service and they are frustrated by this lack of power in the labour process. This 
frustration is particularly evident in their stories about the Prosecution Service policy 
manual. The manual is perceived to fetter the exercise of professional discretion. Study 
participants use stories about the policy manual to illustrate a divide between managers 
and prosecutors. Prosecutors describe the manual as a tool for managers to "cover their 
back". Managers challenge prosecutors to explain deviance from the manual rather than 
demonstrate excellence with a reasoned argument and defensible position - which is at 
the heart of what prosecutors prepare and execute in their daily work. One prosecutor 
recounts her manager's close scrutiny of case files, another had a direct reprimand over a 
decision not to prosecute a case. There is a direct contrast here between the professional 
norm and the organizational requirement, a contrast that seems illogical to prosecutors, 
and which they cannot resolve within their perceived role. Though this is just one 
example of many issues in the workplace, prosecutors' frustration with a structure and 
culture that impedes their ability to function as professionals leads them to resist. When 
policy directives come from senior management or from the Attorney General, these are 
noticeable and challenged if they do not conform to the prosecutors' view of their role in 
the labour process. At the heart of this resistance is the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. If this discretion is infringed, the prosecutors perceive a direct challenge to 
their labour process. This challenge is particularly evident in the domestic violence 
policy, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
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In prosecutors' stories about resisting policy they often describe their need to 
resolve other illogical issues they see in their labour process. Chief among these issues is 
salary setting and third party grievance resolution. In turn, this demand for resolution 
leads them to push for a venue for resolving these complaints. Prosecutors embrace an 
ethos of fairness and turn it from a normative instrument of control in their labour process 
into a tool for their own ends. At first fairness is imposed by the institution of the legal 
profession and the court system, most obviously as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
The fairness requirement is supported by the case law dealing with disclosure. However, 
over time the ethos of fairness is appropriated by prosecutors as their own means of 
reclaiming power over their labour process. They internalize fairness and incorporate it 
into the identity of prosecutor. As a result, in their stories prosecutors describe the 
imposition of policy as unfair formal control of their labour process and worthy of 
resistance. 
Policy Manual as an Instrument of Formal Subordination 
Many examples in the stories of work and collective bargaining deal with policy. 
The policy manual for prosecutors features prominently in many of the interviews I 
conducted, in Nova Scotia as well as in other provinces. As described in Chapter 4, the 
policy manual in Nova Scotia was revised and enhanced as a direct result of 
recommendations in the various reviews of the Prosecution Service. The policy manual 
was both necessary to ensure independence, by making direction and decision making 
more transparent and uniform. "The policy manual reduces the appearance or the actual 
unfairness in the process" (Lawyer O). At the same time the manual also represents a 
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fettering of that independence. The manual provides direction to prosecutors in the 
conduct of prosecutions (Public Prosecution Service, 2006) as well as ensuring some 
fairness in the justice systems through uniform handling of issues. 
We're all trying to be on the same page because you have so many Crown 
offices... you get an impaired case in Yarmouth, well, and if you get an impaired 
case in Truro, you're technically supposed to be on the same wavelength. There 
shouldn't be such a huge margin or anything. So that's what our manual is 
supposed to do - keep us all on the same [page]. (Lawyer S) 
The Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service policy manual was re-
introduced as a completely revamped and updated tool in 2002. A specific individual 
was hired from another province to lead a revision of the existing manual, thus finally 
fulfilling the recommendations of the three reviews and reports on the Prosecution 
Service. The resulting manual, published on the PPS website, is an example of formal 
control of the labour process (Salhani & Coulter, 2009), where rules and structures are 
put in place to control behaviour. The revised policy manual was greeted by prosecutors 
with mixed reviews. Some prosecutors say that policies are needed, that clear guidelines 
support independence from political interference and provide transparency to the work of 
prosecutors. Both features move closer to achieving the organizational independence of 
the PPS and thus public confidence in the Service. However, at the same time the 
application of those policies restricts prosecutor's professional discretion. The debate 
over prosecution policy has been addressed in legal literature (Davis, 1969; Grosman, 
1970). 
The Domestic Violence instruction appears several times in my interviews as an 
example of how government sets policy direction on the advice of senior management, 
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and in response to a series of troubling crimes and public criticism of the prosecution of 
domestic violence. Lawyer Q gives a summary of how prosecutors feel this action 
undermines their professional and prosecutorial discretion. The application of discretion 
is fundamental to prosecutors' work. 
I can give you an easy one. Domestic violence. Right? We're to proceed on all 
domestic violence files, even if the victim is not cooperative. ...every single case 
is different but they put a blanket over the whole thing, removing our discretion 
from that [emphasis added]. (Lawyer Q) 
Management exerts formal control of the labour process in the form of policy and 
by the government through directives like the Domestic Violence instruction issued by 
the Attorney General. In such cases, directives are a reflection of public policy. This 
policy direction from government is detached from actual practice of prosecution, and 
prosecutors question policy advice from management. Management are not directly 
involved in prosecution work in many instances, which impacts staff prosecutors' view of 
the policies that management generates. 
The creation of policy by management is considered necessary but also 
disconnected from the reality of prosecution. Further than engendering a lack of respect 
of management by prosecutors, the policy forum becomes an arena for prosecutors' 
resistance. "We're guided by a plethora of policies that, you know, that kind of guide our 
work, right?, that restrict our movements in some aspects" (Lawyer Q ). He goes on to 
highlight the real and figurative distance between policy makers in management and the 
working prosecutor. 
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I mean the Minister of Justice came out a year ago and said, you know, in all 
cases of violence, we are to ask the person be remanded to jail, but we don't. 
[spoken in a whisper] You know why? Because it's stupid and my common sense 
trumps what somebody sitting in an office far, far away believes should be going 
on, and really, you know what? If you don't like it, come down and tell me. 
(Lawyer Q) 
Several prosecutors mention this domestic violence policy and their various means of 
dealing with the reality of individual cases. It is a complicated area of legal practice, as 
they indicate in comments like "every case is different" and "this is complex", however 
they are consistent in claiming that their professional discretion trumps any policy that 
comes from a realm removed from daily practice of law. Further than this, prosecutors 
view the policy as a scapegoat for public officials "because that directive is in place to 
cover their butts." Describing a hypothetical case of domestic violence one prosecutor 
elaborates: "they'll say, 'Mr. Prosecutor made a decision contrary to our directive'." 
Prosecutors feel quite strongly about the exercise of their professional discretion and act 
out their resistance daily. 
I could stand there and tell them [a panel of inquiry] that the directive should not 
have applied and I would tell them exactly why. .. .they could hail me with 
questions from wherever they want to and bring in stats, whatever... and I could 
stand there, straight-face. Part of knowing what I'm doing and doing my job 
properly. (Lawyer Q) 
Prosecutors use dismissive language to describe management's role. One 
prosecutor refers to the management function as "all that junk". Another prosecutor 
refers to the six regional supervisors this way: "Management really is the Chief Crown 
and he takes care of all the administration stuff, like travel expenses and vacation days 
and all that." Another states "Well, they [management] assign cases, they also do day-to-
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day operations, anything operational, they take care of." Management's distance from 
the daily work also affects prosecutors' perceptions of general management control. 
Prosecutors use deprecating language to describe managers' impact through 
policy making. One participant describes policies as 'commandments' that come from 
management: "certain commandments come down that we have to do this, we have to do 
that, depending on whatever. So, management's responsible for all that." Another 
prosecutor reflects on the several months it took management to develop a dress code 
policy, "give me a break" he says. Language such as "commandments" and "brick wall" 
strongly indicate the feeling that policy direction imposes a course of action rather than 
letting prosecutors assess each case using their professional expertise. While the policy 
manual is a fulcrum around which prosecutors build stories of discretion, fairness, 
identity and power, the manual also brings into relief the division between courtroom 
prosecutors and the management ranks of the Service. 
The Management Role: Division within the Occupational Community 
Management is a function distinctly removed from the practice of prosecution. 
Managers that I spoke to were very clear to demonstrate how they "keep their hand" in 
the practice of prosecution, although this is a challenge with their administrative 
workload. "What changes is you can't get in the court room as much, that's what 
changes!" (Lawyer P) Prosecutors deride the management role because they do not 
perceived it to be of value or necessary to the work of prosecution. It is ironic that the 
result of repeated reviews of the Public Prosecution Service is in an increase in the 
258 
number of management positions to twelve rather than the recommended decrease to 
seven. Prosecutors view the management role as somewhat of an unnecessary perquisite, 
with regular paid trips to Halifax and discussions that do not include the line prosecutors. 
In fact, the NSCAA now has regular meetings with the leadership of the PPS to address 
employee issues and concerns in a collective way. These meetings give prosecutors 
further reason to wonder at the utility of the monthly management gatherings. One 
prosecutor explained that employees come to the NSCAA with issues rather than deal 
with management themselves. At best prosecutors feel management fills an 
administrative role; at worst managers are a hindrance to conducting prosecutions. 
Somewhere in the middle lies resentment against the free rider syndrome that grants 
management salary raises each time there is a negotiated increase to prosecutors' wage 
rates. The comments from prosecutors regarding management are perhaps more polite 
today than they were are the height of the labour conflict in 1998. The feedback 
prosecutors offered to the Kaufmann inquiry were quoted as "real or perceived lack of 
direction, mistrust of leadership, suspicion of favouritism in senior positions, inefficient 
organization" (Kaufman, F., 1999b) 
One prosecutor talks about the 'middle mass' in the Public Prosecution Service. 
This group is comprised of the half dozen regional managers and slightly fewer head 
office managers. He describes the feeling of occupational community among the bulk of 
prosecutors and how prosecutors feel "closer to the middle mass" than the top layer of 
executive management. The top leadership, it seems, has always been isolated in terms 
of the occupational community. The middle management ranks were full members of the 
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Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association in its early days of the mid nineties. 
However, collective bargaining excludes managers from the collective agreements, 
although they are welcome to be associate members of the Association. This separation 
of the management layer from the Association creates a structural division in the 
community of prosecutors. The structural division is reinforced by the real division of 
labour in the Service and has an impact on the occupational community as well. The OC 
is where prosecutors do the "real work" and not the "junk" of managing; where lawyers 
exercise their professional discretion in legal files and not personnel files (with its 
attendant claims of arbitrariness); and where gains in terms and conditions of 
employment are the result of the Association's efforts alone. 
The divisive issue for management and prosecutors seems to be one of 
professional credibility. If managers have remained current in the law and have recent 
court room experience they retain the prosecutors' respect. Here is a typical comment 
from the manager's point of view: 
It is important to maintain your forensic skills. Crown Attorneys will come to 
you for advice, and they will think 'I won't go and ask him he's not been in court 
for 5 years.' [Y]ou have to keep up to date and keep your skills up to date. It is 
important as a professional. (Lawyer O) 
This notion of ongoing practice is echoed by non-manager prosecutors. " X [a manager] 
has never done a trial, he's only done very few appeals... and the experience was 25 
years ago or whatever, so it is a whole different world [now]" (Lawyer M). Another 
states: 
And there was a fellow who had done some appeals in the 70s and I think early 
80s, apparently... had never done any trials, criminal trials, and that was all 
before the charter of rights and that was all under the old juvenile delinquents act 
of 1906 and then he'd gone into the bureaucracy. (Lawyer T) 
Prosecutors are fairly consistent in their claim that lawyers make poor general 
managers, poor business managers and poor human resource managers as well. The 
worst case appears to be a single office where one manager went through prosecutors' 
court files with a red pen, circling items and writing comments directly into the files. 
This happened to some individuals and not to their court partners, so it was targeted 
harassment on professional grounds. Furthermore, it was claimed by one informant 
that senior management was aware of this manager's strict views and management 
style when the manager was appointed (the position was not competed). Following 
informal complaints from prosecutors, senior management still took no action to 
address this problem. Overall, prosecutors criticize managers for their silence and for 
not using the attraction and retention argument to support better wages and working 
conditions for the line prosecutor. 
Management Control: Informal and Formal Varieties of Subordination 
The development and application of policy is only one aspect of the prosecutors' 
frustrated labour process. Management practice in general and the idea of management 
as a regulating force in the workplace is contrary to the real practice of day-to-day work 
in the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service. Consultation with others is voluntary, and 
performance review is ad hoc, with recourse to direct observation through proxies; 
sometimes managers will ask judges for their informal assessment of a prosecutor's 
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performance. Although some managers say they review files, this is the exception in 
prosecutors' stories. Each day in court brings multiple files and the labour process is 
repeated in the same manner over and over. As a result, prosecutors internalize a 
discipline of disclosure and behaviour through repeated performance of their duties in 
court, with little overt external direction. Prosecutors rely almost exclusively on their 
peers for input and assistance on technical matters. Much of this consultation is 
conducted electronically, through the email system, and often those who practice in the 
regions never meet face to face with their advice-giving colleagues. "So I'll pick up the 
phone and call somebody and say, "What do you do in this case?" (Lawyer S) 
The actual practice of management is quite nebulous, and does not appear to have 
a well-defined set of tasks across the Prosecution Service. For example, the way case 
files are assigned varies from one office to the next and appears to depend on the personal 
style of individual managers. In some cases it also depends on the volume of high profile 
cases coming into a specific office over a specific time period. 
I know in our office we simply have a little office caucus every couple of times a 
week, just review the files that have come in, if there's anyone that would 
classified as a major file then we would agree amongst ourselves that, 'Okay, this 
one will go to whomever.' And it is quite informal. (Lawyer A) 
Another prosecutor has a very different experience. He says cases "are all 
assigned through management" in a process that resembles "Wheel of Fortune" (Lawyer 
Q). 
Control over the courtroom work process is partly autonomous and partly 
achieved through peer review. No management figure is present with the individual 
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prosecutor in court. Not only is direct supervision impractical but it would affect an 
individual prosecutor's confidence and ultimately their decision-making ability. 
Prosecutors are assigned files based on experience and personal development needs. In 
the absence of clear guidelines personal relationships between a prosecutor and her 
manager may also have an impact on file assignment. One manager describes it thus: 
I was assessing how they applied their discretion, looking at discretionary 
decision making, to determine how they made judgment calls. In the end they 
made those decisions on their own. I would not say no, I don't like the way you 
are doing this, or no don't do it that way. It is tough to do performance 
management for prosecutors. (Lawyer O) 
The files themselves are all that exist as traces of prosecution work and the 
decisions that prosecutors make. However, many different prosecutors will touch a file 
as a case makes its way through the courts, giving each worker a chance to see how 
others have dealt with the issues and also offering a chance to give feedback in something 
appears amiss. Such feedback is given in the guise of asking for clarification or raising a 
point about one's current work in the file that has been affected by some earlier decision 
or omission. Supervision is loose, and prosecutors describe it as democratic. "So 
certainly if you do something in a file and then someone gets it the next time they'll see 
any mistakes that you made. There's sort of the peer file review" (Lawyer H). 
Each office achieves a process for handling files through a type of consensus 
decision making. In some locations a senior person takes all initial court appearances, in 
others a regional office is managed like a small independent law firm. There are thus few 
tools available to management for exerting formal control over the labour process. Overt 
supervision is quickly noticed and severely resented; several prosecutors told stories of 
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being "micro managed" and how this led to their decision to seek new 
jobs/employers/work locations. The policy manual is one legitimate tool of managers. 
Prosecutors tell me that decision making on personnel matters is another tool of formal 
control. The threats of discipline, dismissal or disadvantageous file assignments in 
offices where a management employee assigns files are examples of how management 
exerts power over prosecutors. Hiring, promotion, and performance decisions with pay 
implications are other examples. Collective bargaining reclaims some measure of 
protection from management's arbitrary exercise of this power. 
Where a formal management role exists, these managers might take on the role of 
delegating cases to prosecutors. Sometimes they will take an overview, as noted above, 
handling every charge that comes in and sending each case to a specific prosecutor. The 
management role of delegating and controlling work is not consistent across the Service. 
In one office where the manager closely oversaw the work and reviewed the files, 
second-guessing the professional prosecutor, employees rebelled. Two prosecutors 
attributed their own departure and that of some of their peers to this style of management. 
The role of the manager in a prosecution office seems to be tacitly negotiated by the 
members of that office. The occupational community defines a limit on what type of 
supervision is acceptable, and the challenge for managers is to find a style that fits the 
OC. In many cases, however, managers explain the bulk of their work is dealing with 
personnel issues. Managers retain formal control through the policy manual; they 
develop its content and implement it. Over time managers in the Public Prosecution 
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Service seem to have taken up a traditional antagonistic relationship with the prosecutors 
in the bargaining unit. 
Management as a function in the bureaucracy, and management practices as they 
are applied in the workplace do not fit well with the norms and reality of prosecution 
work. Management is portrayed as an artificial barrier in prosecutors' stories; a function 
that is not necessary and that often gets in the way of doing the work. Prosecutors overall 
did not cite any instance of contact with management that drew on the typical 
management functions of training and development, counselling, coaching, or 
performance review. Their tales were full of peer interaction and support, and when 
asked specifically about management, described the rift that formal collective bargaining 
brought about in the membership of the NSCAA, when the middle managers were 
formally excluded from the bargaining unit. Prosecutors' stories relegate management to 
a minor role, though sometimes a major irritation. The prosecutors themselves are at the 
centre of the labour process, and they are "going it alone" against the bureaucracy and the 
Government, disappointed at the lack of support from their lawyer peers in management 
positions. 
The Strike 
I expected the June 1998 strike to be a major event in each narrative. In each 
province where I interviewed prosecutors, some form of job action is mentioned in 
stories. However, the two day illegal strike by Nova Scotia prosecutors is certainly not 
the central event in prosecutors' narrative in the way I expected it to be. The strike is 
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neither the beginning of stories nor does it form the climax of stories in any consistent 
way. The strike was simply one tactic, one incident among many in a much longer 
narrative. Stories about the strike do reveal the genesis of overt, collective solidarity and 
the beginning of the use of union-type tactics within the occupational community. The 
use of such tactics helped to mobilize the members towards the aggressive pursuit of 
collective bargaining. Up to this point in the overall narrative prosecutors had used 
discussion and persuasion to convince the employer of their need for improvements in 
working conditions. Prosecutors relied on their professionalism up to this point. Their 
arguments for better terms of employment were based on the belief that prosecutors are 
unique and this uniqueness warranted special consideration from the employer. The use 
of various tactics progressed from the more benign to the aggressive strike as prosecutors 
felt these were warranted and as earlier attempts failed to achieve the desired goals. 
"They'd threatened to go on strike in '96. I think there were just rumblings of, you know, 
'we're going to go on strike'; 'we're not going to show up' and that never happened" 
(Lawyer H). 
The [government lawyers] association, which was a combination, actually, of the 
civil and criminal people, that's how it started... for about ten years it was kind of 
a combined group flailing around, really not doing much but ideas and things, but 
not a whole lot actually happening. (Lawyer M) 
Considering a strike had been an almost intellectual exercise for prosecutors in 
their association meetings; they discussed it, debated it, but did not formulate any plans to 
take action. There were several debates and different philosophical viewpoints on the 
matter over a period of years until a definitive decision was made to strike in 1998. 
However, persisting through the initial decision is a bit of a sense that the prosecutors 
were "making it up as they went along". The hesitation to act seems bound up in 
professional inertia rather than lack of dissatisfaction with working conditions. 
In 1998, shortly after the Savage government's wage rollbacks and salary 
freezes, discontent reached a tipping point and found a voice through the Association. 
The membership agreed to stage an illegal strike despite misgivings. "Well, if it's a 
mass protest, then... let's hope it's not like Ronald Reagan, we're all gonna get 
turfed" (Lawyer M). There is a subset of the Association that formed an active 
nucleus, as described in this account of the strike meeting: 
I remember the meeting very well... it was April of '98 and there might have 
been 15 people at the meeting. At this time there's probably 65 Crowns around 
the province and we're just talking about are we going to work to rule or what can 
we do? And everybody kind of said look work to rule just doesn't work because 
if you're there you've got to give it your all. .. .so then someone said 'well let's 
just walk out.' Then it was kind of decided: ok we're going to walk out, 15 of us. 
(Lawyer H) 
When questioned about how solidarity was achieved, and how the other 45 
members of the Prosecution Service were encouraged to support the strike, the storyteller 
replies: 
Peer pressure (she laughs). You just kind of went back and 'this is what we're 
going to do', you know? Talked about why we thought we should do it and if we 
all stuck together it was going to be fine I think some people were very fearful of 
it. And [we] said no if we all stick together they can't get rid of 65 Crown 
attorneys. (Lawyer H) 
Even during the strike event itself members of the NSCAA are tentative. They 
describe their morning gathering on the first day of the strike and the uncertainty they 
felt. "You know, I remember the first morning we met downstairs in the food court here 
together and we were all sitting in the food court just waiting. ;Oh look, so and so came.' 
The day of the event, we still didn't know who was gonna show up" (Lawyer T). 
However, as the action gathers momentum, there is pride and enjoyment in the story. 
Prosecutors talk about support from Legal Aid "they brought us snacks". Prosecutors 
hear from the judiciary as well; "It got a lot of press I think there was you know nation-
wide press as I remember. One of the judges was in BC [and he said] 'I opened the paper 
and saw your picture in it. I was on vacation'" (Lawyer H). This same lawyer concludes 
the story saying "there was a picket, yeah, which was actually very fun. It was, yeah! " 
Not every prosecutor walked off the job. Varying accounts describe 6 or 8 
individuals who did not participate. Some non-participants had court responsibilities they 
could not put over, at least one person was reportedly threatened by his boss, and some 
individuals in the offices outside of the urban core did not support the strike. Some 
prosecutors "didn't believe in unions" and "wanted to go personally and negotiate with 
Cabinet". These prosecutors were seen as "black sheep", and apart from the Director of 
the Prosecution Service, support for the strike was almost complete. "The effect of [the 
strike] was a demonstration of unity, which we had never had on any real level before 
and that then solidified people's desire to do something more concretely insofar as, 
collective bargaining [was] concerned." (Lawyer M) 
Not every prosecutor who does participate in the strike finds the action easy. 
Intimidation was perceived by some, "One or two were threatened... X didn't show up. 
He was threatened by his manager. And then his manager showed up" (Lawyer T ). 
Others struggled with disillusionment and their sense of professional identity. 
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I saw myself as a professional who would be treated [fairly] I thought in private 
practice you would never have to do it [go on strike], or if you worked for 
government you would be treated fairly and with, you know, more respect than 
we were getting at the time and that it would just never, ever come to that, and I 
was absolutely horrified when it did. However, it was important that we did it and 
I participated completely and was docked the two days pay or whatever it was that 
happened. (Lawyer P) 
The strike altered relations with managers. Initially all those who absented 
themselves from the workplace received a written reprimand. The NSCAA fought this 
action and those letters of reprimand were eventually removed from employee files, not, 
however, before formal collective bargaining negotiations had begun. The Association 
had to gain formal status as a representative of the non-management employees of the 
Prosecution Service before it garnered enough power to push management to action. 
Early discussions in the various working groups on salary issues included 
management as partners in discussions with the employer and with the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. The advent of collective bargaining brought a traditional management-
worker divide which was enshrined in the text of the first agreement. The strike was thus 
a critical event in terms of the organizations involved: the NSCAA and the PPS. In one 
way it defined prosecutors as 'different' because they were lawyers represented by their 
specific Association, an association which no longer included the civil lawyers in 
government. Prosecutors were distinguished as individuals who were willing to take 
action and fight overtly to improve working conditions. The PPS also achieved some 
measure of differentiation from other departments of government through this special 
agreement to set salaries and working conditions. This last distinction was less 
significant for worker-management relations than the NSCAA perceived, because the 
Public Service Commission actually conducted bargaining and only consulted with 
management at PPS on issues and priorities. Though the strike in June 1998 achieved 
these structural changes, the strike was not as critical an event for individuals in their 
storytelling. Their professional and personal work stories dominate their narratives. 
Fairness 
The descriptions of collective bargaining clearly highlight the idea of fairness, 
particularly when prosecutors contrast their behaviour and code of practice with other 
lawyers. A prominent story in the prosecutors' narratives describes the bargaining table 
encounters with the employer's labour lawyers. Labour lawyers do not abide by the same 
ethics of disclosure or ethos of fairness in negotiations that prosecutors expect. 
But we're bound by different rules that don't allow us to do those kinds of things 
[surprise opposing counsel]. So my practice is geared that way, and .. .when we 
go into bargaining I have to change my mindset. Because when we first started, 
we would tell the government everything and give them everything, show them 
everything, and then they would say thanks and leave. (Lawyer Q) 
This open approach does not work in negotiations, where secrecy and hidden 
agendas and sometimes even prevarication are the norm. The practised labour 
negotiators in government left the bargaining table without giving any information away 
to the prosecutors. This happened repeatedly in the course of the first formal collective 
bargaining round. Hope sprang eternal among the NSCAA bargaining team: "well that 
wasn't very nice. Oh, well they'll come back next time and tell us everything." Of course 
that did not happen. The revelation that disclosure does not apply in collective 
bargaining marks a critical learning point in the Association's new role as bargaining 
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agent. This is also a significant point for the occupational community, which had to 
adjust its behaviour and move away from the norms of the profession into a new set of 
behaviours for bargaining. Collective bargaining highlighted the occupational 
community by its contrast with the community's prevailing norms. A member of past 
bargaining teams described keeping the two personas very distinct: prosecutor was one 
form of professionalism and bargaining representative another. The ethos of fairness 
permeates both, but is used in the execution of work in the former and as a reason for 
undertaking the latter. The 'disclosure dissonance' of the bargaining experience is also 
used as a training opportunity for new members of the bargaining team. "Anybody new 
I'd take on to the bargaining team, I'd bring 'em on just to see that one specific thing, 
where they just go, "what? What the hell's going on here? What do you mean, they don't 
have to tell—that's wrong." (Lawyer Q) 
Facing the challenge of disclosure in the first round of negotiations was a major 
hurdle for prosecutors as they navigated the unfamiliar bargaining culture and practice. It 
also was a turning point in the balance of power for prosecutors. Once they learned how 
to proceed in bargaining by establishing positions, using strategic revelation and not 
providing copious advance briefs, they describe a shift in the power balance. 
Oh, yes. They know exactly what's going on. They love it. But the last couple of 
years not so good for them, 'cause we caught on to all their little tricks, right? So 
things haven't been going so well. 'Cause their old basic tricks, you know, used 
on non-lawyers, might still work—Not anymore. (Lawyer Q) 
Underlying this "unlearning" of disclosure practice is an ideological theme as 
well. Prosecutors had difficulty understanding management's resistance to their demands 
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for bargaining rights, when those demands were presented in a full and logical manner, 
with research citing bargaining precedence in other jurisdictions. There was an obvious 
gap between the lawyer's paradigm or world view of carefully reasoned argument and the 
more politicized approach of collective bargaining. Government holds almost complete 
power in an employment relationship where there are no statutory bargaining rights and 
no right to strike. Government regularly acted without consultation with Crown 
prosecutors, as was its prerogative. Prosecutors interpreted unilateral Government action 
as a threat to the independence of the prosecution function. The ethos of fairness and the 
need to protect prosecutorial independence became a rallying point in the struggle of 
collective bargaining; a call that the creation of the PPS underscored and one that 
mobilized the occupational community. 
[we experienced] .. .just this continuous frustration... you'd think your fellow 
civil servants would act in good faith 'cause for a lawyer to act in bad faith you 
[could be disbarred] and especially in criminal law where you've got the Charter 
rights of fairness and so on. So it is just totally shocking to be continually treated 
this way. But I don't think the... Public Service Commission really cares, I don't 
think that's part of their mandate. (Lawyer T) 
Another prosecutor sums up the frustration with working conditions and 
treatment received from management and the employer as 'craziness'. Describing the 
climate during the lead up and aftermath of the 1998 work stoppage she says: 
The thing that bothered me the most during all of that [time] because it just kept 
getting crazier and crazier, was that people that practice criminal law spend their 
professional lives making sure that everybody gets their rules applied the same 
way to them. That's what we do for a living. We get paid to make sure that 
fairness and transparency and the rules of natural justice apply to the person 
charged with the most egregious thing out there and it didn't feel like we were 
getting that in return. It drove me crazy. So I supported [the strike] completely. I 
was never part of the bargaining team or anything, but I supported it and was 
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really quite surprised... that there was no grievance mechanism other than going 
back up through the same people that would have imposed the discipline. I mean 
it's crazy, it's just crazy. Anybody walking down the street would say, 'What? 
How can that be? That makes no sense to me.' So, the fact that we had to fight so 
hard to get such basic things was astonishing to me, just astonishing. (Lawyer P) 
The theme of fairness becomes an ethos that forms the basis for solidarity in the 
bargaining unit. Fairness is the instrument that allows prosecutors to move successfully 
between exclusionary and usurpationary closure strategies in pursuit of power to control 
their labour process. A sense of fairness abused is not uncommon in labour disputes. But 
prosecutors have honed it and raised it almost to the point of ideology to distinguish 
themselves from other lawyers, from their managers and from the employer. Not only 
does the prosecution process demand fairness in a legal sense, prosecutors are supposed 
to be fair as people too and they treat others fairly in court. They are united in their 
understanding of their duty of fairness. But rules from autocratic style leaders and 
managers - especially on policy matters are perceived to come from those with little 
experience in the trenches of prosecution. So when the work process is interfered with 
and employer treatment is perceived to run counter to the ethos of fairness, prosecutors 
resist and challenge their treatment and policies and they seek mechanisms of redress. 
At first the lawyers in government tried lobby and consultation with the Attorney 
General - as peer to peer, within the profession, advisor or counsel-type of discussion. 
However that effort achieved only minimal gains and did not to result in fundamental 
protection for lawyers from further arbitrary salary action. One individual recalls that 
period this way: 
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At the time of the Ghiz Archibald report [1994] we felt that 'man this is it' ... 
This is saying everything we've been saying for years. And now we have 
scholars and judges saying that these people are underpaid and overworked and if 
you don't do something you're going to have a major problem in the work place. 
I remember going to a meeting and Bill Gillis was the Minister of Justice at the 
time and I was devastated because I had great faith in our political master, and he 
looked at us and he said 'what do you think this is? The eleventh commandment? 
There's no money. Do more with less.' Do more with less... (Lawyer V) 
Shortly after this discussion, wages that had been frozen across the civil service 
were rolled back three percent. Prosecutors describe this as a period of "major 
frustration" for all the NSCAA membership. Some individuals in management positions 
were earning less than their direct reports. Individuals with several years at the bar and 
experience in prosecution found themselves earning less than new hires who were able to 
circumvent the wage freeze by negotiating inflated starting salaries. "[T]here were a lot 
of anomalies and unfairness in the system" and little motivation at the top to improve 
matters. The Director of Public Prosecution's salary is linked to the Chief Justice of the 
Provincial Court and is set by independent tribunal; he did not feel the impact of the wage 
roll back and enjoys a salary set at approximately five times the starting salary of 
prosecutors. Thus both at the immediate supervisory and at the employer level, 
prosecutors felt the injustice of arbitrary action - they railed against the unfairness of 
their treatment. 
Arbitrary Action and Reaction: Formalizing Organizations Around Resistance 
Civil and criminal lawyers were employed in separate divisions of the 
Nova Scotia Department of Justice prior to 1990. Each year the department held an 
education conference bringing both groups of lawyers together for two or more days of 
274 
professional development. The event also contributed to team building in the department. 
The first concrete unilateral Government action prosecutors relate in their stories is the 
division of the education conferences between civil and criminal branches of the 
Department of Justice. From approximately the end of the 1980s onward, the two groups 
held separate conferences. This division is isolated in prosecutors' stories as an 
important moment. It is not a pervasive story, because not all prosecutors have personal 
knowledge or experience of this event. However, several prosecutors describe the split as 
a divide and conquer tactic that spurred a strong response. Prosecutors mobilized the 
membership of the lawyers' association to create an organization to represent of 
prosecutors alone. The former Government Lawyers Association was faltering and 
prosecutors wanted to keep momentum going in order to maintain gains in overtime and 
working conditions. They were also in pursuit of larger salary goals and a permanent 
salary setting mechanism. 
Though the details vary in stories, all participants know the two groups of lawyers 
used to be together in one joint association, the Nova Scotia Government Lawyers 
Association. No one is clear why the civil lawyers faded away and there do not appear to 
be any documentary records of the Association. The current NSCAA record keepers do 
not have any of those materials. The head of public prosecutions was active in the 
nascent group and the current deputy minister of justice was president of the NSGLA in 
its early days. Different reasons were offered for the decline in civil lawyers' 
participation: lack of will, changed organization structure, an independent PPS identity, 
or loss of interest perhaps. The people leading the association were promoted to 
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management roles, which may have eroded some of the NSGLA impetus. The face to 
face meetings at which lawyers gripe about conditions and salaries was restricted to just 
prosecutors, and while this lowered the number of individuals involved, they were all 
facing the same work conditions and management team, and thus this became an 
excellent forum to express their occupational community goals. No matter the cause of 
the decline in civil solicitor participation in the government lawyers' association, the end 
result is clear: the prosecutors had a clear vision of their role and they had a goal which 
differed from that of other lawyers. Those other lawyers, civil solicitors, workers 
advocates, and legal Aid lawyers have been content as "free riders" on the coattails of the 
prosecutors wage gains. 
One key respondent frames all his critical events as acts of opposition to unilateral 
government action. A specific story blends the power of formal policy with conflict over 
personnel management. This story details how government changed the internal dispute 
resolution policy for all civil servants. An internal complaint process existed with a final 
step that ended with the Director of Public Prosecutions and Public Service 
Commissioner. The negotiated agreement (framework agreement) between the NSCAA 
and the Government had three phases, the first of which was a salary setting mechanism. 
Phase Two of the framework agreement called for a grievance procedure: "The Employer 
and the Association agree that there exists a mutual interest in having an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism... and makes jointly this statement of intent to implement such a 
mechanism in a timely manner" (Province of Nova Scotia, 2000). Prosecutors wanted 
third party resolution of conflicts. 
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The Public Service Commission developed a new grievance policy in the period 
between the 2000 signing of the framework agreement and the conclusion of the first 
salary arbitration in 2002. PPS senior management announced meetings to "consult" on 
the revisions without any prior discussion with the Crown Attorneys' Association. This 
initiative was purported to be the settlement of Phase Two of the Framework agreement. 
The new policy was not discussed or negotiated; it applied across the whole civil service, 
and in the view of the NSCAA was not joint as the agreement required it to be. This story 
epitomizes prosecutors' descriptions of unfair treatment and deviousness at the hands of 
the employer. It served as an instance of mobilization for the Association: members used 
email and phone calls to convince their peers to boycott the 'consultation' sessions. 
Resistance to forms of objective labour control reinforced the solidarity of the nascent 
bargaining unit. The ethos of fairness, which unites the occupational community, 
provided a basis for resistance and solidarity of the Association as well. Further 
examples of the employer's complete autonomy to impose working conditions are given 
in numerous other stories, some many years after the framework agreement was 
bargained. 
End of 2006 they converted all the terms to full-time positions. Without, 
apparently, a competition. Because it was the will. The will of the world, I guess. 
Management, PSC, whoever it happened to be. They can make things happen 
when they actually want to. (Lawyer Q) 
Individual stories change over the course of a whole narrative. Prosecutors reflect 
less of a divide between management of the Prosecution Service and employees as they 
work through the stories of their collective bargaining experiences. The centre of conflict 
becomes the Public Service Commission, the human resource agency of the government 
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employer. The PSC is the opposition in the struggle for bargaining rights. The 
continuity of employment gives the Association great strength. Many individuals who 
know the history are still employed, and newcomers have been steeped in the history of 
the struggle. 
What I would say is that a number of the people who have been Crown attorneys 
and who have the labour relations experience are now in positions in 
management. [T]hey will carry with them that experience into management and 
that might change the dynamic to the extent that the management group can 
influence labour relations in our context because, I think, essentially the Public 
Service Commission are the governing authority really here, the determinative 
group. (Lawyer M) 
The Public Service Commission, on the other hand, has seen almost complete 
turnover in the years since 1998. Lawyer M explains "we don't have anyone there with 
corporate knowledge of our situation". The NSCAA does not have strong relationships 
with anyone in this central HR agency and profoundly distrusts the policy initiatives, 
bargaining tactics, and bargaining agenda of the employer. Once again this isolation 
contributes to the strength of the occupational community. 
Prosecutors base their struggle for bargaining rights on a need to counter the 
arbitrary actions of their employer. The result of this struggle is fairness achieved in the 
form of a fair salary setting system and a dispute resolution mechanism. Even more 
important, however, is the recognition that the Association is a valid form of employee 
representation and bargaining is necessary and compatible with the professional project 
of prosecutors. 
Epic Stories 
Many of the prosecutors interviewed change their tone and manner when moving 
from stories of their career to those of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining 
story is told with much more effort. Prosecutors take a significant pause at the outset of 
the story; they readjust their position and take large inhalations, for example. Lawyers 
launch right into the stories of their careers without any preamble, but prefaced the 
collective bargaining stories with phrases such as "I need a fireplace and a pipe. I could 
be Wilfred Brimley telling you the story" or "Gather 'round, kids" and "Let me collect 
my thoughts here". In addition, bargaining stories are constructed as epics. In these epic 
stories heroes face irrational opposition, discover the way the opposition operates in a 
loss of innocence, and then find within the occupational community the resources to 
overcome this opposition and ultimately triumph. The new social order that is 
established positions the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association as the agent of 
power in the workplace; "we are the ones that achieve something for prosecutors". 
The storytellers emphasize the change and difference that bargaining represented 
by changing the way they tell these stories. The storytelling process reflects changes in 
prosecutors' relationship with institutions in their stories. The career stories are more 
passive, quickly told tales of assimilation. There is no resistance, and no struggle in the 
career stories to form or to adopt an identity as lawyer. The profession as an institution 
that controls access, education and standards is reflected in the way prosecutors tell these 
types of stories. 
On the other hand, the active change agent role taken on by the Association 
parallels a change in the power relations in the employing organization and also 
emboldens the storytellers as they recount their experiences. The new Association role 
also impacts professional norms in an important way to include a collective voice for 
previously autonomous individuals. The institution of the profession is subtly redefined 
by the prosecutors themselves as they build an occupational community around their 
ethos of fairness. Prosecutors assert themselves upon the profession to craft an identity 
as specialists in a niche of legal practice. They use forceful language and much action in 
their stories about fairness and their labour process. The prosecutors' ability to build an 
occupational community with a sustaining ethos of fairness lies at the heart of their 
movement between strategies of individualized professionalization and of collective 
bargaining. Prosecutors' place on Krause's continuum of closure strategies has shifted 
subtly compared to their non-bargaining peers. Additional instruments of closure are 
taken up by prosecutors, while their relationship to the labour market and forms of 
regulatory control are more limiting. 
Closure Continuum Revisited 
Study participants call collective action different things, "we don't have 
bargaining - we have a salary setting mechanism" was a common refrain among the 
prosecutors interviewed. Arbitration, and especially the legal battle in the arbitration 
hearing, resonates for members of the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association. 
Arbitration consumes most of the bargaining resources of time and money. Arbitration 
also garners more attention from NSCAA members as the hearing format is much more 
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familiar to prosecutors than a negotiating table. Since bargaining has failed to produce a 
negotiated settlement since the first framework agreement in 2000, arbitrated wage 
increases are the norm. This nuance is important to prosecutors' interpretation of their 
experiences because it alters the label on the instrument of closure, and allows 
prosecutors to remain in the realm of the profession while appropriating strategies from 
the realm of the union. 
Certainly,—we're in a different workplace in its entirety. We're somewhat left to 
do our work in the purest form, and don't have to worry about.. .fear of discipline 
for no reason .. .whether or not you are going to fall under that wage freeze 
.. .because we have a bargaining relationship with the government. (Lawyer Q) 
Returning the closure continuum, we see the prosecutors are positioned 
between two instruments of closure: collective bargaining and professionalization. 
Progress along the continuum is not unidirectional, as illustrated when the legal 
profession revises its Legal Ethics Handbook to codify practices long after full 
professionalization is achieved. Likewise, prosecutors skip steps in the continuum 
when they bypass state sanction and certification, proceeding directly to a union shop. 
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The story structures reflect a pattern of logic and rational thought, governed by an 
ethos of fairness that confronts irrational, arbitrary action from an opposing force. The 
catalyst of collective voice, nurtured in the occupational community, overcomes the 
opposition to allow the individual professionals to triumph and overturn unfair treatment. 
The Association is now where people turn for satisfaction of their workplace complaints. 
The individual action of key players has been solidified into procedures, such as a regular 
bargaining cycle and a series of agreements that the Association now owns and oversees. 
Procedures and tools in turn provide the potential to act on complaints for all prosecutors, 
not just those bold enough and political enough to have led the original charge. So we 
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see Giddens's structuration at play again. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the 
cycle of action turns into structure, which enables action in return. This cycle is reflected 
in the history of the Public Prosecution Service, and in the experiences and stories of the 
prosecutors. The stories move prosecutors forward not just through time in a 
chronological sense, but with energy into new frontiers. They have redefined their niche 
of the profession with a specific ethos and used that ethos to embrace new forms of 
closure. 
The Importance of Structure in Organization and Occupational Community 
Structure was the genesis of practice and in turn it has followed practice. The 
prosecutors became contractual appointees and then an organization formed around them 
in the Department of Justice (Archibald, 1989). The prosecutors were concerned with 
their lot and they formed an association representing all lawyers. This was a loose 
grouping that relied on informal discussions and sought a champion to carry forward 
suggested changes and improvements to Cabinet. This broader group of lawyers used the 
privilege of personal relationships with elected officials under the system of Order in 
Council appointments to achieve direct gains in workplace rights. Their action was still 
'within' the fraternity of the legal profession and government appointees. This is clearly 
illustrated by one respondent who introduced each character in his narrative by their 
political affiliation and family ties. The power of the employer to act independently and 
without consultation changed some of the formal structures and employment conditions 
for prosecutors but led to prosecutors to resist. The practice of gathering together to seek 
redress, already well established, led to formation of the NSCAA with a defined purpose: 
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to seek a salary setting mechanism and grievance resolution process, through collective 
bargaining. Prosecutors first had to coalesce as an occupational community, however, in 
order to interpret the actions of the employer as unjust. 
Structure plays an important role in forming the occupational community. The 
fact that prosecutors are gathered together into a single organization helps to forge a 
community in which prosecutors are easily identified by others in the profession and in 
society in general. The workers share similar work conditions, and turn to each other 
through the technical tools of work to get support and advice. These are necessary steps 
in a union organizing drive as well. The formal education conferences for the whole 
Service provide an opportunity for the prosecutors' own association to also meet and 
develop their employee-specific concerns independent of management. In the urban 
centres several prosecutors are gathered in the same physical location, and share tools and 
resources for their legal research. In almost all cases prosecutors have court partners with 
whom they share actual cases and files, as well as the work environment with a specific 
judge or judges and defence counsel. Even in small centres there is a closeness and 
camaraderie that extends to social events. "Christmas parties for prosecutors were all 
held on the same day and I ended up at the Dartmouth office and commiserated with my 
former colleagues that I was no longer a part of what was the greatest little law firm 
ever." (Lawyer P) 
Prosecutors express a set of values as active agents who present the 'facts', are 
neutral, have a quasi-judicial role and make significant decisions. These values led to 
them to interpret the employer's actions, management's actions, and their captive 
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situation of powerlessness as 'unjust'. They turned their professional values, nurtured in 
an occupational community, into the basis for collective action. 
Conclusion 
Stories of early apprenticeship and early career reinforce the characteristics of a 
tightly bound occupational community. The prosecutors describe consistently how their 
early apprenticeship to prosecution is intense. They are on their own almost immediately 
and though there is a strong network of support for asking questions, they work 
independently and come to rely on themselves quickly. In all but two cases of those I 
interviewed across Canada, the job search was also very rapid. Prosecutors describe 
choosing criminal law and then finding a job. Though the practical aspects of the search, 
interview, etc. may in fact have been more complex, the story is presented as a smooth 
transition once the idea and norms of criminal prosecution were embraced by the 
incumbent. Prosecutors still embed themselves in the legal profession when they refer to 
their employment as "my practice". 
Crown prosecutors definitely "work together, have some sort of common life 
together and are to some extent separate from the rest of society" (Salaman, 1974, p. 19). 
Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors invoked closure through the NSCAA as a way to 
separate from management and the Public Service employees generally. They use the 
organization structure of the PPS to establish their expertise as prosecutors and control 
over the practice of prosecution and they use the Association to reclaim control over their 
labour process. They have little faith in management either to advise on policy or to 
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oversee their work. Although they welcome every prosecutor to the association as a 
member, they also see some management as hiding from the real work of practising law 
and they push those managers out of the occupational community. 
The occupational community finds its expression within the environment of 
dependent employment. The community was defined as prosecutors transitioned to 
dependent employment. But the full realization of the power of the occupational 
community lies within the execution of prosecution duties; the independence and the 
requirement for fairness in all dealings. This is the ethos that both sets prosecutors apart 
from other lawyers in general and unites them within the prosecution service. The classic 
labour gripes of poor pay and inadequate working conditions are the surface issues the 
media reported during the June 1998 strike. But the malaise among prosecutors was 
more fundamentally tied to their labour process. It was powerlessness that irked the 
professionals so profoundly, in addition to the arbitrary treatment by individual leaders 
and by government policy on a broad scale. Their efforts to address these injustices 
through internal, informal networks of lobby and consultation with Attorney general were 
unsuccessful. This further isolated them from any collegiality of the Bar that may have 
previously existed, and pitted prosecutors against their own senior management and the 
Public Service Commission. It is interesting that despite some very strong political views 
among key informants for this study, there is little targeted animosity towards the parade 
of Attorneys General, with only one exception described above. Otherwise the 
prosecutors attribute action in their stories to those closest to them, their colleagues and 
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direct managers, or else the Public Service Commission as the employer and implementer 
of Government's policy decisions. 
Is an occupational community necessary for collective action among 
professionals? The data from this study shows that such a community is united on a 
dimension that speaks to their professional tenets and has a goal that reinforces 
professionalism in conjunction with usurping power from the employer. Circumstances 
and history combined to highlight prosecutorial discretion in the Nova Scotia Public 
Prosecution Service. The presence of a strong occupational community enabled 
prosecutors to articulate their concerns and reconcile collective action with 
professionalism. This case indicates that occupational community is the vehicle that 
enables prosecutors in Nova Scotia to articulate an ethos and then to build union 
solidarity. Is the professionals' goal any different from that of other employees? The 
literature provides arguments for and against this proposition. The goals of professionals 
are those of all employees, namely control over their labour process. Perhaps the 
difference between professionals and other workers is no longer one of class as Parkin 
suggests but of one of the order of events. Prosecutors are workers, plying their trade in a 
captive situation, subject to structural constraints and practice norms. Social boundaries 
limit their relationships and they simply want recognition for their efforts - compensation 
when their labour process is fettered. However, they cannot abandon the essential 
element of their professional project, the exercise of discretion, in pursuit of collective 
bargaining goals. The individualism of the profession fights against the collective nature 
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of bargaining. An occupational community seems necessary in order for professionals to 
articulate a theme that traverses both forms of closure. 
Prosecutors sell their labour but they still control the deployment of their 
expertise. Bureaucratic policy fetters their professional discretion somewhat as does the 
criminal code but they also set the boundaries of the profession. Prosecutors resist the 
rules by not applying them, by criticizing them, and by using their professional and 
prosecutorial discretion. They assert their professionalism, in their daily reaction to their 
employed condition. They may use tactics of unionists but they come to these as 
professionals and do not abandon one identity and rhetoric only to replace it with another. 
Prosecutors have built perhaps a new breed of unionism built on occupational community 
and manage to traverse the dimensions of closure without giving up their 
professionalism. In fact it is reinforced through this experience. 
Because of the Association and the profile building that we've done, the actual 
view of a Crown attorney has changed by other lawyers. There used to be a time 
when we weren't considered really lawyers at all. You were just considered 
.. .throw-aways. If you couldn't get a job, then you were a Crown attorney, .. .a 
government lawyer. The Crown Attorney's Association's there... to protect 
Crown attorneys who are valuable. (Lawyer Q) 
As a profession evolves into specialized sub-segments, a new community arises 
from stratification of the work (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984). Prosecutors draw on the 
strength of the professional inclusiveness and the structure of captive employment, yet 
they move further into an occupational community than either the other members of their 
profession in private practice or other lawyers in the civil service. Using that 
occupational community to craft an agenda for labour process control, prosecutors raise 
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the status of their professional niche and secure more control over the workplace and 
working conditions. At the same time, the development of collective bargaining projects 
across the country reinforces the occupational community of prosecutors on a national 
scale, what Salaman would call the cosmopolitan (Salaman, 1971b). The knowledge that 
others are struggling who share values and do similar work enables prosecutors to move 
across the country and build a broader occupational community. 
The structure of the Public Prosecution Service and the evolution of the 
prosecution function contributed to building a distinct occupational community among 
prosecutors. The OC is built on the dimensions of strong involvement, dominant values, 
and marginal status. These features alone are insufficient to explain the strength and 
sustained length of the prosecutors' struggle for collective bargaining. The prosecutors' 
occupational community is further underpinned by an ethos of fairness. The ethos of 
fairness appears in their work, their struggle, and their stories. Prosecutors create a 
narrative of epic proportions that sets them on a quest for fairness. They seek a way of 
distinguishing themselves from other government lawyers, a way to set themselves apart 
from the rest of their profession, and a means to rise above their marginalized status. 
Collective bargaining is the strategy that achieves these goals. A strong occupational 
community united around a compelling ideology or ethos was necessary to mobilize 
prosecutors in their quest. Wage rollbacks may have been a triggering event in the 
prosecutors' narrative. A salary setting mechanism was the first major gain in their 
struggle and is source of satisfaction for the community's members. Salary may have 
been the opening volley in the struggle, but fairness became the anthem. 
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
People are capable of maintaining many separate identities, often tied to different 
life circumstances. We need only think of an individual who is a parent, a spouse, an 
employee, and a community volunteer to illustrate this point. Often those identities are 
circumstance-specific. Such is not the case for prosecutors. They are not moving 
between different locations as they navigate across identities. Both their professional and 
collective bargaining identities are rooted in their work experience and these identities are 
compatible, not mutually exclusive. This dissertation asks how it is possible to strongly 
maintain both forms of closure, exclusionary and usurpationary closure, in the same work 
context. Prosecutors manage to accomplish this task. Their dual closure strategies 
coexist through the unifying effect of an occupational community. The social support, 
sharing of work stress and definition of prosecutor role in this OC achieve 
demarcationary closure within the profession; prosecutors are set apart from their legal 
peers and from other public service employees through the presence of their occupational 
community. The OC also defines the issues around which prosecutors rally their 
workplace concerns. The occupational community gives voice to an ethos that crosses 
both professional and workplace concerns and permits prosecutors to be fully engaged in 
their professional project at the same time that they engage in collective bargaining over 
their terms of employment. 
The law is arguably at or near the pinnacle of the hierarchy of professionals in 
Canada. Law may not enjoy the broad popular support of medicine, perhaps because 
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lawyers work in for-profit private practice in a country where medicine is still largely a 
public service. However, law is a fully realized closure project and its members enjoy 
the status and earnings of full professionalization. Lawyers exercise almost complete 
control over the application of their expert knowledge and over their work processes. 
Lawyers maintain control over access to their profession through self governance and the 
self employed/partnership structure of legal work. The legal profession is evolving, 
however, as the literature and my research interviews demonstrate. The legal profession 
is a rich site for research into how features of the contemporary workplace impact a 
longstanding social institution. Specialization, issues of governance, autonomy, formal 
and real labour process control, and accountability for the public trust are all issues 
brought into sharp relief through a study of lawyers' employment experiences. Crown 
prosecutors vividly illustrate the convergence of these pressures in their struggle for 
collective bargaining. 
In this dissertation I described the history of prosecution in Nova Scotia and the 
evolution of employment structures in order to understand the relationships between 
Crown prosecutors and numerous other actors in the social relations of production. 
Marsden (1999) encourages researchers to reconstruct the present day employment 
experience through study of the deep structures that underlie it. In this case, I examined 
the profession and the workplace in order to understand how prosecutors maintain their 
membership in both. They accomplish this through the choice of different closure tactics. 
The prosecutors' sense of professionalism is more complex than a reaction to a 
superficial encounter with either the profession or workplace; it is rooted in a "historical 
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process and its explanatory reflection in thought" (Engels, 1967, p. 895 quoted in 
Marsden, p. 99). Analyzing the stories of prosecutors reveals the structure of social 
relations within the profession and within the workplace. Analysis of the relationships 
between these two social institutions, profession and workplace, reveals an occupational 
community. The presence of this community within the profession shapes prosecutors' 
choices for collective action in the employment setting. 
Nova Scotia is a particularly appropriate site for this study because the Nova 
Scotia Public Prosecution Service (PPS) has a unique relationship to the Government. 
Due to its history the Service enjoys a measure of independence. Guidelines and 
instructions on cases from the Attorney General must be written and reported. The issue 
of independence in prosecutorial decision-making is particularly sensitive in Nova Scotia, 
and notions of autonomy and subordination are especially acute. Nova Scotia is not 
unique in its experience of public scrutiny however, it is a first instance of an independent 
prosecution service in Canada and thus an important opportunity to study the effect of 
such a structure on the legal profession and employee representation in collective 
bargaining. A case study approach is well suited to examining the Nova Scotia 
experience as other studies of the process of labour mobilization and the 
institutionalization of collective power have shown (Haiven et al., 2005). 
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Contribution of the Research Project 
The Employed Professional 
The theoretical themes upon which the dissertation is based, professionalization, 
collective bargaining, and occupational community, each address ways in which people 
organize their work: the work spaces, work processes, the rules that govern workers, 
access to work, and the broader social relations of work. Each theme is distinct because 
it takes a specific perspective on these various aspects of work. Each theme explores a 
different form of worker control. The manner in which the themes reinforce each other is 
the major contribution of this research. In particular, this project examines the 
relationship between a large social institution, the legal profession, with a dominant role 
in the economy and in crafting and upholding social rules, and the power of its individual 
members when those members step outside the usual employment structure and become 
dependent employees. The workings of instruments of exclusionary and usurpationary 
closure are examined in this study and found to converge in cases where professionals are 
employed. 
In this case study of Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors I found professionalization 
to be an evolving process, whose structural forms are slow to change but whose members 
differentiate and adapt themselves to market realities quite readily. I also found 
collective bargaining coexists compatibly with professionalization in a dependent 
workplace when an occupational community is clearly defined among employees. 
Furthermore the occupational community provides a discourse that crosses the 
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ideological divide between forms of closure. The basis of such an occupational 
community is founded jointly in the professional project and in the nature and culture of 
the employment setting. Thus the two forms of closure; professionalization and 
collective bargaining can and need to be examined together. Furthermore, a basis for 
compatibility can be located in the operation of the professional project itself. 
Interest-based associations alone do not appear to be sufficient to mobilize 
workers. The Nova Scotia Government Lawyers Association, for example, did not 
mobilize workers in collective action. That group faltered for reasons that have not been 
documented; however the location of individual civil lawyers in separate client 
departments of government may have impeded the formation of an occupational 
community. Civil lawyers did not have the rallying point of an ethos of fairness in the 
way prosecutors did. The Civil Trial Lawyers' Association mentioned by Lawyer R in 
Chapter 5 is also in marked contrast to the associations of prosecutors that engage in 
collective bargaining. Prosecutors perceive that there is little to bind lawyers who do not 
share working conditions. In fact, lawyers in private practice agree. However, shared 
working conditions alone are not enough to mobilize workers either. 
The marginalization of a professional specialty coupled with organization crises 
isolates workers from their profession and reduces some of the rewards of 
professionalization. Thus separated from the support of their profession, these workers 
turn towards each other to form a new type of solidarity. This solidarity is based on a 
language of professionalism and individuality, similar to the profession's norms, but 
through a shared workplace it also mobilizes workers to take collective action. A 
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structured association arises to support the occupational community when workers 
articulate a sense of injustice. With the support of a powerful ethos or discourse the OC 
can help to mobilize workers towards collective action. Further research is needed to 
explore whether this phenomenon exists in more loosely affiliated work settings, 
especially since occupational community has been identified across workplaces and not 
just within them. Investigation is also warranted in instances of OC solidarity which do 
not lead to collective bargaining. 
Summary of Findings 
Benefits that accrue to professionals as a result of successful closure were eroded 
when prosecutors became dependent employees. The vehicle of professionalism, which 
serves their self-employed colleagues adequately, was failing prosecutors in this new 
environment. They lost respect, status, and financial security. Prosecutors turned to 
collective bargaining in order to reclaim some of these benefits. In particular, they 
looked for wage increases, job security, and guarantees of professional development to 
maintain their skills. They remade an existing association to represent their interests to 
the employer and foster solidarity across other provincial prosecution services. 
The Research Question 
The research question I posed in Chapter 2 asks how is it possible for 
professionals to move back and forth from usurpationary to exclusionary strategies of 
closure and still maintain full membership and support for each form of collective to 
which they belong: the profession and the collective bargaining association. I examined 
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three forms of worker control that converge in the case of Nova Scotia Crown 
prosecutors to find an answer to this question. Professionalization, collective bargaining, 
and occupational community are all instruments used by prosecutors in an attempt to 
control their labour process. These professionals develop an occupational community 
based on their professional specialty. The occupational community is rooted in an ethos 
that speaks to both professional ideals and the dependent employment condition. The 
occupational community bridges the apparent gap between two worlds of closure. OC 
allows professionals to move back and forth between closure strategies, negotiating 
different identities as professional, prosecutor, employee, and bargaining association 
member. I studied a series of elements related to each of these forms of worker control in 
order to understand how prosecutors were successful in embracing all three instruments 
of control. Below I summarize the key aspects of the research project and my findings. I 
then reflect on the implications of this study and possibilities for future research. 
Professionalization 
My study began with a discussion of the professionalization, and the legal 
profession in particular. The general literature on the professions holds many insights for 
this study. What has occurred in the medical profession, for example, is a continual 
differentiation of specialties as the profession matured and as technological and scientific 
advances were embodied in practice. A similar process has occurred in the practice of 
law, with particular emphasis on private practice and the growing complexity of 
commercial transactions and civil litigation. Legal firms now exist that have very 
specific expertise. Individual practitioners are also identified as experts in very specific 
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applications of the law. Statutes and case law have also evolved into a more complex 
web of rules and precedents which complicate the practice of criminal law. 
Specialization has segmented the profession into niche practices. The professionalization 
project in the law continues to evolve requiring its members to reassess and adapt their 
tactics of exclusionary closure. Education requirements and access to the profession have 
become more structured and the boundaries of the profession are carefully drawn. For 
example, the Nova Scotia Legal Professions Act specifies what tasks belong to the 
profession; it defines the practice of law, and specifies the boundaries between law and 
other occupations. 
Dependent Employment 
Crown prosecutors in Nova Scotia practice within this evolving profession and 
they are socialized to the profession's dominant norms. For example, they refer to their 
work as "my practice". However, the prosecutors are located at the intersection of two 
important developments. They are highly specialized and are found in dependent 
employment. The prosecutors' employment structure is tied to the segmentation of the 
legal profession and the specialization of the public prosecution function. They are 
gathered into a single group and the business side of law as well as competition for work 
is no longer part of their professional experience. All prosecution work is controlled by 
employees of the Prosecution Service; they perform the work or else delegate it. 
Prosecutors are further distinguished from their self-employed peers because they share 
working conditions and terms of employment that are not of their making. The status of 
dependent employment creates an 'other', an opposing force in the form of the employer. 
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The bureaucracy of the civil service and its emphasis on management roles and control 
through policy introduces a control in the labour process that lawyers are not necessarily 
trained to understand or to accept. 
At the outset of this research I hypothesized that the tightening controls of 
bureaucratic and direct personal resistance (Hodson, 1995) led prosecutors to become 
isolated from the profession of law. The power inherent in the professional project is 
diminished when lawyers are employed in a dependent employment relationship. Their 
autonomy is eroded and professional discretion is threatened. Both segmentation in the 
profession and grouping lawyers into a single place of employment without the 
ownership/business aspect of a legal practice changes prosecutors' perception of 
professionalism to the point where their behaviour is markedly different from their legal 
peers. Public challenges to the integrity and professionalism of Crown prosecutors 
negatively impact their status in the profession and in society. This undermining of the 
public function of prosecution exacerbates the prosecutors' feeling of isolation from the 
balance of the profession. Prosecutors drew on the power of the profession to define their 
niche, yet the exclusionary closure of the profession as a whole failed to satisfy their 
interests. Professional collegiality also failed to control their labour process (Hinings, 
2005). As a result, prosecutors look for an alternate instrument to achieve their 
professional and workplace goals. 
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Occupational Community 
My research examines the elements of occupational community to determine 
which are important for prosecutors. I found many of the determinants and 
characteristics of occupational communities are present in the case of prosecutors. These 
professionals have a strong involvement in their work and identify with their specialty 
from a very early point in the professional training. They are distinguishable from their 
legal peers on this dimension, which is reinforced through their demanding and solitary 
work experiences. Prosecutors form a close social bond with their reference group of 
peers, with whom they share a strong set of work values. As individuals many are also 
driven by a strong sense of social justice. As a group they share difficult working 
conditions and have a need to consult with their peers on professional decisions. Though 
in dependent employment, they are autonomous to a large extent and difficult to 
supervise. They are marginalized through low pay and government employment. 
The occupational community gave prosecutors a bridge between 
professionalization and collective bargaining. OC gives its members a language that 
makes sense in both contexts, and enables them to tell their stories as professionals and 
members of a bargaining association without sacrificing the benefits of either closure 
strategy. An occupational community enables prosecutors to move between strategies of 
usurpationary closure and exclusionary closure to maintain their professional identity and 
vigorously pursue bargaining rights. 
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The characteristics of occupational community are enhanced in dependent 
employment with the Public Prosecution Service. In the context of a strong professional 
project that has achieved social closure to the extent the legal profession has, there needs 
to be something more that mobilizes professionals to seek bargaining rights. In the case 
of Nova Scotia prosecutors it is the presence of an occupational community that is 
characterized by an ethos of fairness and independence. This is fertile ground for 
mobilization when prosecutors are faced with bureaucratic work setting. The Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and the Criminal Code of Canada demand impartiality and full 
disclosure of evidence by the prosecution in a criminal trial. The history of the 
organization of public prosecution services and the PPS policy manual are constant 
reminders of the need for operational independence from elected officials. The values of 
the prosecution service play an important role in binding the members together more so 
than the friendship and social aspects of OC. 
The emphasis in the Nova Scotia criminal justice system on independence comes 
from the legacy of the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall Jr. and is an important 
part of the culture of the Public Prosecution Service. Prosecutors take this notion of 
independence and marry it to the requirement for disclosure and fairness in their practice 
of prosecution to create an ethos that permeates all of their stories. They see their 
circumstances and they interpret their experiences through a lens that demands they 
remain impartial but that also requires impartial, reasoned behaviour from others. When 
prosecutors encountered irrational, indefensible, unfair treatment from their employer, 
they mobilize their ranks to push for collective bargaining rights. The struggle endured 
for over a decade before a first agreement was achieved containing the two fundamental 
elements of a collective agreement: a salary setting mechanism and a grievance 
procedure. The struggle continues as bargaining moves forward. 
I asked in the course of this study whether there is a hierarchy of specialties in the 
legal professional and as a result ,if there is a proletarianization within the profession, or 
somehow a subordination of the specialty? I found that yes, prosecutors perceive a 
hierarchy that is based on status, competence and salary. But it is not clear whether that 
subordination is due to the nature of the work (i.e. dirty work), or if it is due to dependent 
employment. Prosecutors are dedicated to the 'pure practice' of their profession and I 
have found they are not proletarianized (Rosen, 1999). By this I mean that although 
prosecutors do not own the fruits of their labour, they still exert autonomy over how they 
practice their profession. The formal control imposed by management encroaches on that 
professional autonomy, and is couched in terms of both efficiency as well as quality 
assurance. In contrast, the lawyers in the private sector describe their management 
control almost solely in terms of quality control and mentorship. However, prosecutors 
are able to resist the formal control of their management bosses partly because they work 
independently and are not closely supervised. Prosecution work is not subject to machine 
discipline nor is it Taylorized into prescribed steps and tasks. Individual discretion enters 
into each case file and provides an opportunity for prosecutors to resist management's 
formal controls. The expression of resistance in the form of collective bargaining leads 
prosecutors to build a separate identity within the broader profession and they reclaim 
some of their status and economic power. Prosecutors engage in collective action to 
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protect and preserve the aspects of their professional work that make them unique and set 
them apart from other branches of their occupation. The two factors of dependent 
employment and occupational community are entwined and consideration of both is 
necessary in any explanation of the prosecutors' experiences. 
Bucher and Strauss say (1961) that social movements come from segmentation of 
professions. It was obvious in my interviews that a common education and socialization 
for lawyers do not build a sense of collectivism. Only at work do prosecutors develop a 
differentiated professionalism when they come face to face with the demands of their job 
tasks and the social context of the workplace. This social context includes the support 
from members of their peers as well as the stringencies of management control in the 
civil service bureaucracy. 
What is it that binds a community, brings it together and gives it the capacity to 
act? Kelly (1998) sees injustice as a key element in mobilization. The wrongs suffered 
by an individual must be seen to affect or threaten the broader group, redress must be 
possible, and the end result must be worth the fight (Kelly, 1998). These are values 
prosecutors express when they describe their sense of professionalism. The profession 
from start to finish embraces and reinforces the values of autonomy and independence. 




How does the existence of a strong occupational community impact the struggle 
for collective bargaining? The shared ethos of fairness is vocalized daily in the course of 
prosecutors' work and regularly in meetings of the bargaining association. Each workday 
experience contrasts the professional demands of independent judgment with the realities 
of dependent, supervised employment in a bureaucracy. Prosecutors have constant 
reminders and opportunities to compare their professional ideals with their employment 
realities. They find unfairness in their employment relationship with management and 
with the employer, the Public Service Commission. 
I proposed that the practice of prosecution is not 'de-professionalized' (Haug, 
1975) as a result of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining by Crown prosecutors 
strengthens the sub section of the profession dealing with criminal matters by defining 
boundaries, specifying membership and controlling access to representation and the 
benefits of bargaining. The practice of prosecution exhibits characteristics of an 
occupational community (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984) which have been exacerbated if 
not created by organization and statutory forces and reinforced by the governance of the 
broader profession. Within this occupational community, the bargaining association in 
turn enacts exclusionary closure against management and usurpationary closure against 
the employer. 
Crown prosecutors practice usurpationary closure when they seek collective 
bargaining, and their narratives reflect a subordination story. They occupy a position in 
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the organization and labour process that requires usurpation to satisfy their interests, and 
specifically the interests that the profession protects as well - monopoly of practice, 
security of income, status. Crown prosecutors define their struggle for collective 
bargaining in terms of social closure for their profession and using language that reflects 
the issues of professional discretion. Crown prosecutors do not control their labour 
process when they cannot exercise discretion unfettered by policy and bureaucratic rules. 
Prosecutors move back and forth between two closure strategies using the 
language of fairness that is unique to their employment situation. Occupational 
community nurtures this language and enables prosecutors to access alternative closure 
mechanisms. The occupational community within a sub-specialty takes professionals 
outside their institutional structure and mobilizes them to recraft the profession. 
Collective representation is an evolving process for prosecutors; it is closely tied to 
shared ethos and to their institutional setting. 
The Influence of Organization Context 
Prosecutors resist the constraints of bureaucratic management control. When 
favouritism or arbitrariness appears to affect management decisions and opportunities at 
work, prosecutors begin to resist the work structures and the policies of their employer. 
Is resistance enough on its own to overcome the normalization of the profession? Several 
other groups of lawyers in public service have not sought collective bargaining. Notably 
in Nova Scotia the Department of Justice lawyers did not join their prosecutor peers in 
their struggle for bargaining. Prosecutors in half of the other provinces in Canada did not 
304 
have collective bargaining at the outset of this research. Public employment alone does 
not appear to be enough to trigger mobilization in the absence of a strong discourse of 
fairness. 
The story of the Nova Scotia prosecutors is not unique. Prosecutors from other 
provinces in Canada tell stories that are similar in nature. In British Columbia the 
government and prosecutors went head to head in a bitter battle over breach of contract 
when the government withdrew its earlier recognition of the bargaining agent and refused 
to move forward in an existing bargaining relationship. A series of questionable 
prosecutions and public scrutiny put pressure on prosecution services from the public 
point of view as well in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario. 
Prosecutors in these other provinces have also sought collective bargaining. Public 
service and protection of the public interest are entwined in the struggles of these 
professionals. Both factors are important in their struggle for collective bargaining. 
There may also be evidence of an occupational community that spans different 
workplaces. 
Independence of the PPS 
Although study participants did tell stories about the various landmark 
prosecutions that led to an independent Public Prosecution Service, achieving that 
independence was a key event in itself and provided key language for the prosecutors to 
leverage in their struggle. Independence became a rallying cry that made sense to the 
professional norms and thinking of prosecutors and also to the organization concerns of 
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workers. The antecedents of the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association lie in the 
discontent of all government lawyers, many of whom had been agitating for some time. 
The creation of the PPS made prosecutors different and set them apart in real and 
intangible ways. The obvious changes to legislation and new work premises, separate 
from the Department of Justice were coupled with a change in culture as well. The 
pieces were in place for change from a structural perspective, how prosecutors stitched 
them together is reflected in their stories. The building blocks of the plot could have 
gone in any direction; resistance could have been individual, as some prosecutors wanted. 
However, people with an inclination for bargaining had the language and collateral 
examples to rally prosecutors and mobilize them in a critical event: the June 1998 strike. 
All the people I spoke to with experience in the PPS knew of the strike and 
brought it into their stories in some way, even if only through an oblique reference. Only 
one newcomer was reluctant to acknowledge collective bargaining and may not have 
been aware of the history of job action as she has not participated in any NSCAA 
meetings yet. However, she was aware of bargaining's outcome: a complex salary grid, 
and was quite impressed by it. It will be important for the association to tell its stories to 
newcomers and to develop their fairness discourse in a way that remains meaningful to 
all their members. Members of an occupational community need to share strong core 
values in order to maintain solidarity. This feeling of belonging to a community is what 
enables the prosecutors to move between both streams of the closure continuum. 
Prosecutorial independence is a critical element in the way prosecutors define 
their niche in the profession; it is an essential aspect of the way they apply their 
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professional knowledge and the decisions that they make. This form of independence is 
quite separate from the operational independence of the PPS, but the two are linked. The 
latter is deemed necessary to secure the former. Independence is also part of the culture 
of the Public Prosecution Service, and is a product of the legacy of numerous inquiries 
into the conduct of prosecutions in Nova Scotia. The organization culture of operational 
independence and the prosecutors' quest to demonstrate their independence from political 
interference influence their workplace relationships to the extent that prosecutors cannot 
feel truly independent of the employer's influence without collective bargaining. 
Prosecutorial independence and operational independence for Crown prosecutors are not 
fully achieved unless collective bargaining is in place. 
Relationship with Management 
Collective bargaining and the settlement of issues by arbitration have achieved 
some gains, but mostly in the area of salary. To date, these mechanisms have not been 
successful in fully addressing issues of labour process control or relations of production. 
Although the managers in the PPS went out on strike alongside their employees in June 
of 1998, since that time the prosecutors' have effectively practiced exclusionary closure 
against their former fellows in the dispute. This is partly due to the language in the 
framework agreement that removes managers from the bargaining unit, and partly due to 
the perception that managers do not stay current, and thus lose credibility in terms of the 
technical component of the job. Managers are separated from the occupational 
community because they do not uphold the ethos of fairness in their management 
practices. To some extent the position of management and senior executives with the 
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PPS is also perceived as a status rank, with perquisites in return for little "real 
prosecution work". Prosecutors united in the rigours of what they deem a pure practice 
of law look down upon administration and personnel tasks. This disregard closes the 
ranks of the bargaining association and reinforces the occupational community 
membership for practicing prosecutors only. Ackroyd and Muzio (2007) discuss internal 
closure in professional services firms and the way partners exclude other legal employees 
within a single employer. The phenomena of occupational community and collective 
bargaining may contribute some insights into the professional service firm employment 
context as well. 
Though the official position of senior management at the PPS was against 
collective bargaining and its attendant threats to managerial power, the collective 
bargaining of Crown prosecutors and the increasing independence of the PPS enhanced 
the status of PPS management in relation to other managers in government, other 
Prosecution services in Canada, and internationally15. Collective bargaining among 
Crown prosecutors may also serve to further underscore the segmentation of the legal 
profession generally, at the ownership/managing partner level. In effect, management 
achieved closure from the rest of the profession by proxy, through the efforts of their 
subordinates. 
At the outset of the prosecutors' labour struggle only Australia had an independent prosecution 
service. 
Limitations 
There are limitations of this dissertation that arise from the design of a case study. 
There is also potential bias in the study as a result of my direct experience with the events 
described here and my prior knowledge of several of the individuals involved in my 
research. Both of these limitations are mitigated in my approach to sampling and the 
treatment of the data I collected. 
Case Study 
A case is only one instance of a phenomenon. This case is based on a small group 
of workers in a single workplace not found anywhere else in Nova Scotia. The study 
could be criticized for too narrow a focus on one setting and circumstance without 
relevance to other workers elsewhere. The point of a case study, however, is not to 
duplicate and generalize from the few to the many (Yin, 1981). A case study is an 
opportunity for theorizing in detail with a small data set. It is also an opportunity to 
examine size as an aspect of collective action, testing out what Olson (1977) says about 
small groups being more effective and motivated to seek collective action. Case study 
research permits an in-depth exploration of phenomena and experience that would be 
overwhelming in a larger sample. Narrative analysis facilitates this detailed examination 
of the data. A case study is an opportunity to extend theory through attention to either 
conflicting theories or subtle differences in comparable theoretical approaches. My 
examination of what appear to be conflicting logics of collective action fits well with the 
case study approach. 
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A case study can also be challenged on the grounds that it cannot be duplicated 
elsewhere. There are two ways in which this problem has been mitigated. First we 
know that the phenomenon of prosecutors seeking collective bargaining rights has been 
replicated in several other jurisdictions across Canada. While I did not research these 
instances in detail, I did take pains to learn about them from the national organization of 
prosecutors and civil lawyers, the Canadian Association of Crown Counsel. I did 
documentary and interview research in Ontario and British Columbia. Second, I 
conducted interview and focus group research with some other professional and semi-
professional groups. Thus, I have deepened the scope of the case study research by 
exploring analogous situations. 
Finally, the results of a case study might be criticized for being of little interest to 
a broader research and practitioner audience. Why might that not be the case here? 
Although I have made a point of demonstrating the specialization of the prosecution 
function I have also taken steps to examine British Columbia and Ontario as comparators. 
The themes and critical events in the Nova Scotia data appear in the other jurisdictions 
studied and participants from all three provinces contributed rich data used in my 
analysis. Though their individual circumstances and details varied from province to 
province and individual to individual, these differences are explained in my analysis. In 
addition, prosecutors are not unique in facing workplace and professional challenges. 
Segmentation has occurred in other professions, notably medicine (Freidson, 1986; 
Gawande, 2007a). Many credentialed employees seek representation for collective 
bargaining. The anticipated merger of the Social Science Employees Association and the 
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Canadian Union of Professional and Technical Employees is one recent example of this 
trend in addition to the long standing unionization of healthcare and teaching 
professionals (Campbell & Haiven, 2008). 
Narrative Analysis 
The in-depth analysis and theorizing potential of a case study can be realized by 
using narrative analysis. Narrative analysis of the social relations that underpin the 
labour process has two distinct advantages. Narratives present both a historical as well as 
an ongoing perspective from participants. The way storytellers recount the events of their 
past tells us a great deal about not only how they positioned themselves and interpreted 
the experience at the moment, but also how they continue to interpret and craft meaning 
from those events. Foucault (1975) says we construct identities as we talk and interact. 
Story tellers also share with us new constructions of their identity and position in social 
relations as they tell their stories in the present. Although I asked prosecutors to tell me 
stories of events in retrospect, I did not set any limits on where they began nor where the 
stories ended. For many the longer narrative of career and collective bargaining moved 
right into a commentary about the future. In this way, the research methodology becomes 
part of the process that is being researched. Narrative is not purely a device to analyze 
the historical, but also to situate a story's relevance in the present. 
Storytelling gives participants the power to situate themselves within their stories 
in a particular way (Boje, 1991) and gives them an additional legitimate venue to recount 
the development of their collective bargaining struggle. The participants set the tone and 
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the topics, and reveal what is most important to them. I was able to probe to ensure I 
covered the range of my research questions. The analysis respected the stories of the 
interviewees as themes emerged through critical events, and if the probes did not generate 
a story, there was nothing to report or analyze. This reflects the notion that intense 
experiences and moments of frustration require the most effort to make sense of and 
understand (Weick, 1995). Stories are a valuable means to discover how individuals 
cope with these changes, especially those that contradict their accustomed norms 
(Riessman, 1993). Narrative privileges the voice of participants and their truth and 
knowledge claims. I intentionally chose this methodology in order to help manufacture 
distance from the events and participants described in this research. However, the 
methodology imposes parameters on the analysis and limits the critical examination of 
participants' claims. At the heart of this study is an examination of how Crown 
prosecutors constructed their rationale for collective bargaining as supportive of their 
professional project. A critical examination of that rationale might be possible in a 
second pass at the analysis, but is beyond the scope of the present work. 
Narrative analysis presents an alternative way of looking at labour process as an 
unfolding story; one that changes with the telling but also changes over time. Can we say 
that the labour process is perhaps mutable? Certainly the way workers view it is mutable, 
and organization changes over time as well. Structures change as do priorities, 
relationships and power dynamics. The pressures from the external audience and 
stakeholders also change. The context or social norms that govern the organization 
change as members of society redefine these norms and reinterpret the organization. One 
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aspect of the context is the profession. The professions are specializing to maintain 
control over specialized knowledge. This control preserves mystique and market niche 
but places demands on the governance structure of the profession. Informal divisions 
emerge within professions as well, and intra-profession relationships must be redefined 
on an ongoing basis. Professionals are also becoming employees and this new status 
requires them to adjust to a new set of relationships in the workplace. 
Personal History and Interest 
My personal history with the prosecutors' struggle for collective bargaining and 
my personal interest in labour relations was both an advantage and a disadvantage in this 
study. I had good access to the research setting and to participants. I understood the 
workings of government, the location and access rules surrounding documents and how 
best to approach individual participants. However I was at risk of receiving biased 
stories because of my former role as a negotiator for management. I worked to minimize 
this possible bias by emphasizing my role as a researcher and the distance of six years 
since I had been employed in the civil service. The fact that my negotiation experience 
resulted in a negotiated agreement offset some of the resentment generated in the 
prosecutors' struggle for recognition of bargaining rights. Prosecutors' subsequent 
dealings with the employer and human resources officers were less cordial, but I was not 
a party to those talks, and thus one step removed. I am not and have never been a 
member of the legal profession. My outsider status also lent some credibility to my 
request for participants' stories. I realize that I collected stories that were crafted 
specifically for me, in my role as "researcher with a history". Only two participants in 
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the study had any amount of direct personal contact with me during my time in the civil 
service and I was able to isolate and compare their stories with those of other participants. 
The themes of the study were repeated in their stories. 
Sample 
The potential shortcomings of the size of a case study were overcome in my 
sampling technique. There was diversity among respondents. Study participants are 
located at various spots on the political spectrum and are drawn from the Association 
executive, bargaining committees, and staff prosecutors. Their experiences of 
prosecuting ranged from region to centre, both Halifax and Dartmouth, and they include 
managers and non managers. This sample gives me a range of perspectives with the 
exception of those who did not participate in the strike and were antagonistic towards the 
association. I requested a meeting with the Director of Public Prosecutions but he 
declined to participate in this study at this time. I also requested an informal discussion 
with the former Public Service Commissioner but she failed to respond to my inquiry. 
There was some risk in a snowball sampling approach, particularly that I would 
encounter individuals with consistent values and perspectives on bargaining. In fact I 
found this not to be the case. I spoke with individuals from a wide range of viewpoints 
and with varying knowledge and affiliation with the collective bargaining mechanism. I 
also encountered markedly different ways of viewing the current status of labour relations 
in the workplace. Some participants consider the prosecutors are unionized, bargain 
collectively and refer to the Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys' Association as a union. 
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Others clearly state that prosecutors did not have collective bargaining but have a salary 
setting tribunal instead. Yet they are all Nova Scotia prosecutors. Some participants 
referred me to others as a way of supporting their own comments and reinforcing their 
viewpoint; "so and so can tell you more about that" or "you should really talk to so and 
so because they were there". Most interestingly, I found several times that participants 
referred in this way turned out not to share the viewpoint of the referrer at all. I have thus 
a considerable amount of confidence in the selection of the sample and in its approximate 
representativeness of the diversity of opinion and experience in the prosecution service. I 
acknowledge that a census of the association membership and of management would be 
necessary to gather all possible variations, and that such an exercise would be valid for 
only the point in time for which it is gathered, and this is something I consider a possible 
future research direction. 
Implications of this Research 
A number of research and practical implications arise through this research. This 
study illustrates an intersection of the theories of professions and organizations with 
collective action that helps to explain the experience of Crown prosecutors. This study 
may provide insight into other professionalized workplaces and other occupational 
communities considering closure strategies, especially those where workers are pursuing 
both the professionalization and the collective bargaining paths. Further research 
opportunities are discussed below and extend across the public and private sectors. This 
dissertation, drawing together the professionalization and occupational community 
broadens our understanding of collective action in the workplace at a time when the 
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discourse of professionalism and professionalization is rampant in workplaces and among 
workers, and when traditional forms of unionism face decline (Kumar & Schenk, 2006). 
Professionalization and collective bargaining are not incompatible constructs. 
Professional workers' choice of representation may make a difference in the success of 
their closure strategies. 
Implications for the Legal Profession 
Media coverage of the Canadian legal profession (Ceballos, 2009a, 2009b; 
Moulton, 2009a, 2009b) indicates that the profession is in danger of fundamental 
restructuring as young lawyers continue to prefer urban practice and the small and solo 
practice in non-urban areas is not replenished. Where individuals cannot access legal 
services, the provision of those services by firms and individuals at a distance and with 
different forms of personal contact will contribute to changing the structure and service 
offered by the profession in ways that international writers have foreseen (Abel, 2004; 
Susskind, 2008). What large scale private firm consolidation might mean for the 
continuing practice of prosecution is unclear, as the public service is delivered in a 
relatively craft-type of undertaking, despite the volume of cases prosecutors face. 
However, if collective bargaining is achievable on a small scale among prosecutors there 
may be worthwhile opportunities to study the conditions of large scale employment of 
other specialties of law, particularly where legal services are delivered at a distance and 
automated to address the lack of legal presence in rural communities. The continued 
specialization in legal practice seems assured, and prosecution appears to be positioned to 
maintain its distance from the balance of the profession. What we have learned about the 
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interaction of isolation, specialty and dependent employment in this study may be 
relevant to other employed lawyers. Muzio and Hodgson (2008) have documented 
changes in the structure and labour process in professional service firms. Less attention 
has been paid to public practice of law where a large number of lawyers are employed in 
non-prosecution functions. Civil lawyers in some Canadian provinces also bargain 
collectively with their public service employers. This group will be worth examining 
using the tripartite analysis developed here to determine the role of an occupational 
community among civil lawyers. The presence of a unifying discourse, nurtured in an 
OC may mean the broader labour movement needs to reconsider its traditional 
approaches to solidarity and organizing among professionals. 
Theoretical Implications 
One of the contributions of this research project is the linkage made between a 
profession as a large, diversified social institution, and the immediate workplace of 
members of that profession. Further research could give consideration to another stream 
of theorizing in industrial relations. Kelly (1998) develops mobilization theory into a 
model that follows an injustice-leadership-action motif. He says injustice is the basis of 
collective mobilization and the sense of injustice is based on individual perceptions that 
something is not right or is questionable. Leaders emerge to frame the injustice and to 
allocate responsibility to a particular party. In Kelly's view mobilization moves from the 
individual to the collective, enabled by leadership and rudimentary organization. This is 
a common view of collective action and prosecutors tell stories of individual injustice: 
discipline targeted at an individual, maternity leave benefits denied to women, 
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discrepancies in placement on the salary range relative to years of experience. The 
broader analysis of prosecutors' stories, however, reveals that their mobilization is not 
based solely on group solidarity arising out of instances of individual injustice. 
Individual injustice is not expressed in every story. Rather injustice is expressed as 
"unfair" actions of the employer and management that contrast with the extreme 
sensitivity to fairness that prosecutors embody in their work. Injustice is thus based on a 
collective notion of its opposite and upon an ethos that identifies the group, as opposed to 
experiences that individuals have and which they collect, reflect upon, and then seek to 
redress. 
Although injustice is a strong theme among the narratives of prosecutors, it is not 
used in the sense that Kelly describes. This collective action by prosecutors is more in 
keeping with the challenge to mobilization that Atzeni (2009) presents which is based on 
solidarity and not injustice. The prosecutors achieved such solidarity and used the 
occupational community and its ethos of fairness to define both closure projects: 
collective bargaining and professionalization. Prosecutors describe their struggle for 
bargaining rights in terms of fairness and injustice, but these arguments arose out of 
professional solidarity and the language of that solidarity, fairness, gave them a point of 
departure from which to compare their experiences of management and employer 
treatment. Employees were able to label these experiences "unfair". The potential exists 
to discover this form of mobilization based on shared discourse or shared occupational 
community in occupations and workplaces that have not traditionally been considered 
sites for collective action. Likewise, groups with an interest in collective action, such as 
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labour unions, may make strategic decisions on their organizing efforts in light of this 
interpretation of mobilization potential. 
Existing industrial relations theory is not adequate to explain the case of Crown 
prosecutors' collective bargaining. Prosecutors' collectivism is drawn not solely from 
their experience of the labour process, but from the professional project. When a strong 
occupational community emerges within a subset of a profession and is determined to 
some extent by dependent employment, then collective action is the result of a particular 
blend of power struggles. The prosecutors sought more control over their working 
conditions to address workplace injustice, it is true. But the unifying force for that 
struggle is rooted in their professional project, and its apparent failure to secure the 
benefits originally promised in the professional socialization process. There is more 
support for Atzeni's (2009) position on mobilization and solidarity, though that too is 
incomplete as it is based solely in the capitalist labour process and many aspects of public 
employment and professional work are left unaddressed by both Atzeni and Kelly. 
The proportion of professionals in the Canadian workforce has been growing 
(Kumar & Schenk, 2006; White, 1993). These workers represent potential growth for the 
labour movement. Yet some authors have questioned the usefulness of the traditional 
industrial model of unionization for these employees (Black & Silver, 2006; Hurd, 2005; 
Parkin, 1979). I disagree. I am inclined to support the view that some form of unionism 
is valuable among employed associates, for example, who do not have an ownership 
stake in their firms (Rubenstein, 2007). There are characteristics of public prosecutors' 
associations and their struggle for collective bargaining that I propose differ in important 
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ways from other research into unionization. The inclusion of occupational community as 
an explanatory tool helps us understand how professionals reconcile collective bargaining 
with the logic of professionalism. Occupational community may hold the key to 
organizing professional employees. This feature of my research subject presents an 
opportunity to re-theorize labour processes, and to enrich the body of research with 
multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the collective through to the individual. The 
concept of the independence of the Crown prosecutor and the prosecutorial function is 
not only fundamental to the employment relationship, but is also a relevant reflection of 
professional autonomy for which parallels may be drawn in the broader world of 
professional work. Thus the findings of this program of study have the potential to apply 
across a general range of employment conditions in the Canadian workplace. 
Finally, the closure continuum (Campbell & Haiven, 2008) may be better cast as a 
series of overlapping spheres of activity. This case study illustrates that professional 
projects are fluid. Closure is not stable, but needs constant attention and work as 
conditions change. Those conditions include the institutional context, the institutional 
field and its stakeholders, as well as the market place, relations with the sate, the nature 
of work and workplaces, and the needs and concerns of members of the profession. 
Hence the closure continuum is perhaps better represented conceptually as a set of four 
arrows that are related and that represent the overall notion of progress towards full 
closure. However, activity may take place in one aspect of the project without undoing 
progress made in other areas. 
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Other Professions 
The experience of Crown prosecutors may indicate what might occur across other 
segmented professions under similar stresses and strains. The choice of usurpationary 
closure by one segment of a profession may have an impact on the role and position of 
that part within the broader profession. The study of professions could be further 
developed in an organization-specific context as more and more professionals are 
employed in large pubic and private sector firms. I have shown how isolation and 
marginalization is possible within an elite profession. Other aspects of occupational 
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community may be relevant in different professions. Occupational community among 
prosecutors developed after the fact, and not as a precursor to, professionalization. 
Further research can explore whether OC is present and utilized in the same manner in 
other professions, especially those experiencing a loss of professional autonomy or 
restrictive management practices. 
Semi-professionals may be similarly affected by the convergence of dependent 
employment and professionalization. The growing credentialization of the workforce 
(Freidson, 2001; Haiven 1999) means more and more workers are faced with potentially 
conflicting logics of collective action. They may find themselves grouped in an 
employment setting with loyalties to the employer as well as loyalties to an existing or 
burgeoning professional project. Occupational community may explain how they 
manage this transition. 
Occupational communities do not exist only within organizations. Architects 
have been shown to exhibit a cross-organizational OC within the broader realm of the 
profession (Salaman, 1971b). The role of OC across different employment settings can 
also be studied to determine its role in mobilizing members of a profession to collective 
action. The current union drive among United Church of Canada ministers is a case in 
point. 
Unions and Employers 
Unions may benefit by looking at professional members or those with credential 
and professionalization projects in terms of the dimensions of occupational community in 
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order to address how they target communication and organizing and representation 
strategies. Union organizing is largely workplace based, however the open source 
unionism movement (Freeman & Rogers, 2002) indicates that more labour movement 
growth is possible by using the virtual workplace of the internet. Occupational 
communities can span different workplaces and may provide insight for this realm of 
union activity. Unions may also want to reconsider the role of leadership in labour 
mobilization. Kelly (1998) says that the presence of an articulate leader in the work 
milieu is also necessary for mobilization of workers. The early leadership of the Nova 
Scotia Lawyers Association went on to prominent roles in government, but whether a 
single individual is responsible for framing the need for collective bargaining is less 
clear. Many prosecutors give examples of various individuals who framed an argument 
for collective bargaining or cited injustices that the membership of the NSCAA found 
compelling enough to support. The leadership and the bargaining teams have both 
changed over time and yet all the prosecutors in this study continue to speak about their 
struggle and collective bargaining agenda with energy and commitment. There is more 
to the case of Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors than simply workplace malaise. 
Bucher and Strauss (1961) say the knowledge built by the study of professions 
applies to the study of professionals who bargain collectively. 
Since professions are in movement, work situations and institutions inevitably throw 
people into new relationships... The fate of individual careers is closely tied up with 
the fate of segments, and careers that were possible for one generation rarely are 
repeatable for the next generation (Bucher & Strauss, 1961, p. 334). 
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In light of these conclusions human resource managers and employers may be interested 
in the implication of this study for broader dimensions of work design and career 
planning. 
Extension of this Research 
This study raises a number of questions it does not answer. My findings can be a 
point of departure to question of why prosecutors in some Canadian provinces have not 
achieved collective bargaining. Likewise, one might pursue the question of why not only 
prosecutors but also civil lawyers succeed in winning bargaining rights in other 
provinces. Further afield, I am struck by the question of why is it, for example, that staff 
lawyers in large and medium legal firms do not strive for collective bargaining? They 
have a more controlled labour process and seemingly less autonomy that their self-
employed peers. Private sector staff lawyers are mentored but they are also closely 
managed and have limited access to firm earnings and the exercise of discretion when 
compared with their prosecuting and self-employed colleagues. What role does the 
promise of ownership as a partner play in keeping associate lawyers ideologically 
opposed to bargaining? The oppression by management and the lack of ownership 
opportunity spurs prosecutors onward in their struggle. What implication do these two 
factors have for in-house counsel facing a similar dependent employment setting? 
The response to these questions may entail the use of other methodologies to 
collect additional data using my theoretical framework. A cross-Canada survey of 
members associations in the Canadian Association of Crown Counsel to explore the 
presence and nature of occupational community may shed light on the first questions. 
Other methodologies might also be applied to my data or to the concepts I have used 
here. For example, critical discourse analysis of archival texts is possible. Participant 
observation in ongoing negotiations or the preparation for those negotiations might also 
generate significant data for analysis. And finally, a critical gender analysis of my data 
seems indicated by the themes important to women prosecutors' stories. The role of 
occupational community in building solidarity may be influenced by the gender of 
members of the OC, and by the gendered nature of the work performed. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Twelve years ago, I witnessed Crown prosecutors struggle for collective 
bargaining rights and I saw a tremendous reaction from the employer, government, and 
other members of the legal profession. At the time I felt I could not ask the questions 
necessary for me to understand either the drive for bargaining rights or the resistance to 
recognizing those rights. I was on the opposite side of the bargaining table from Crown 
prosecutors and thus on the opposite side of the struggle during my time as a government 
employee. I received my mandate from Cabinet and my direction from senior civil 
servants and I was not able to challenge either of those. Only through academic research 
am I now able to explore and reflect on how this group of professionals managed 
successfully to redefine their relationship with their employer and their profession. 
Crown prosecutors did not substitute one form of disciplinary control for another 
in their quest for bargaining rights. They maintain full professional status in the 
Barristers' Society even as they form new social relations to bargain. The power inherent 
in the network of social relations has not only shifted in favour of Crowns, but has 
generated new forms of power. To fully understand this we need to reconstruct the 
history of the social production of prosecution. Lawyers' control of the elements in 
Krause's (1996) model of guild power and the strategies of collective bargaining are both 
used to achieve the closure and control goals of professions, bringing us full circle to the 
motivation of the parties' surface action. The relationship between professions and 
employers as social actors has been redefined with the wide scale move of professionals 
into salaried positions. 
I set out to study what happened within one of the elite institutions in our society 
- the legal profession. What I discovered in my study was how a subset of an elite group 
could become marginalized. I identified the instruments available to them to regain the 
benefits of lost status, money, and respect. I am left with the belief that the changes 
experienced by Crown prosecutors and the legal profession are present in some form in 
many workplaces and among many groups of credentialed workers. Other cases will 
doubtless reveal different circumstances; however what remains is to explore how these 
other groups experience and manage through these challenges. 
I stop short hypothesizing that an overarching ideology or ethos will emerge in 
each case, but I do want to say that some powerful aspect unique to an occupational 
community may be at work, and this is not derived from mobilization theory (general 
injustice and dissatisfaction) or closure theory (us versus them). Occupational 
community articulates uniqueness in a way other instruments of collective action cannot. 
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For prosecutors this was an ethos of fairness. However, occupational community may 
not always result in an expression of uniqueness that is compatible with collective 
bargaining. 
Abbott (1988) says that competitions over control of boundaries between 
professions are decided by the group that makes the most compelling case for solving the 
underlying problem of work and management. In the case of Crown prosecutors, the 
model of collective bargaining won this contest which was not between one profession 
and another but between two ways of representing the interests of prosecutors. The 
closure strategies of collective bargaining and professional societies are quite distinct, 
one protecting the public interest and one the interests of individuals, though this 
dissertation has shown the two interests are not incompatible and often overlap. I have 
challenged the profession's universal claim to protection of the public interest by 
illustrating how a specialized segment of the profession, in lobbying for closer control of 
its members' work in the interest of public protection, in fact represents the interests of 
those members on a very individual basis. 
Storytelling is a way to control our past and manage our current identity. 
Studying stories reveals the moments that comprise significant events for the narrators. 
These moments shape the storyteller and her place in a web of social relations. This 
dissertation project offered Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors the chance to remake their 
experience in the telling of their stories, and in turn, this telling may reinforce the 
occupational community and its guiding ethos. 
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Appendix A - Individual Interview questions 
Individual narrative of career in legal profession and experiences as Crown 
Attorney 
1. Tell me the story of your career. 
2. Tell me the story of how you came to be a Crown Prosecutor. 
(where did you go to law school?) 
(describe your work history) 
(Why do you stay? Why did you leave?) 
3. How do you describe what you are and what you do? 
Critical incident: 
4. When did you first feel that you were a lawyer? A Crown prosecutor? 
(Did this involve autonomy?) 
5. What were some of the key events in becoming a lawyer, a prosecutor, a civil 
servant? 
(who are the key actors, protagonists, antagonists, what issues?) 
6. What is the career path of Crown Attorneys generally? 
7. What does professional discipline look like? What is your role as a lawyer under 
the NSBS in terms of discipline by or of other lawyers? 
8. What contact do you have with other lawyers? (OC) 
(Other lawyers at the criminal bar, other prosecutors here and elsewhere?) 
(Other lawyers generally, your classmates from law school?) 
Without giving me names, tell me who are your 5 best friends? 
Organization issues (OQ 
1. What is a day's work like? Who determines what you work on and how you do 
the work? 
Describe for me your leisure time 
2. Is your work process different than that of other lawyers? 
3. Describe the relationship between lawyers and management roles in legal 
practice. How do you make the shift from associate to partner/ from Crown 
Attorney to Senior Crown or Regional Crown? 
4. What is the relationship of management prosecutors to the NSCAA? 
5. Do you want to 'manage' others? 
6. Tell me the story of developing and implementing the Manual for Crown 
Attorneys. Who were the players and how was it received? How is it used? (A. 
MacDonald) 
7. How do per diem prosecutors work? When do they come to a file and what prep 
do they do compared to the Crown Attorneys? What is the responsibility of PD 
compared to the CA? (R. Woodburn) 
8. How many full time permanent CAs are there? How many per diems are used 
and how many casual employees? (R. Woodburn) 
Narratives of collective action and struggle for collective bargaining 
1. Tell me the story of Crown Attorneys seeking collective bargaining. 
(What issue mobilized collective action? ) 
(Why did the collective action begin with (salary?)) 
(What were some of the key events in achieving collective 
bargaining?) 
2. What role did the NSBS play (If any) in the Crowns' struggle for collective 
bargaining? 
3. Given the rural/urban divide, how did you pull all Crown Attorneys together 
into a collective? 
(On what front were they united? ) 
(How did the Crown Attorneys (NSCAA) deal with free riders? 
Who were they (by group not by name)) 
4. What is the story of the creation of the NSCAA? 
5. What does it mean to you to be a member of the NSCAA? (or not to be a 
member?) 
6. What is your role in the Association? 
7. What is the aim of the NSCAA? 
8. Has anything changed in the workplace as a result of collective bargaining? 
Substantive conditions, relationships, work process, autonomy, 
control 
9. Could the goals set out by the NSCAA have been achieved by some means 
other than collective bargaining? 
The profession and forms of interest representation 
1. What other organizations are you a member of? Why are you a member and 
what does membership give you? 
Canadian Association of Crown Council? 
Criminal Lawyers - NS, National 
Canadian Bar Association 
2. Can you tell me about a critical event in your story? 
(Was there a turning point? ) 
(Was there some event, idea, or relationship that had an important 
impact on your experience as a Crown Attorney in Nova Scotia? on your 
experience with collective bargaining? ) 
3. I would like to ask you one question again, now that we have discussed the 
Crown Attorneys and collective bargaining: How do you describe what you are and 
what you do? - and has that changed in light of collective bargaining? 
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Appendix B - Focus Group Questions for discussion 
1. Describe your profession/ (Law, Nursing,Librarianship) is a profession. Please 
comment. 
2. What does it mean to you to be a lawyer? Nurse? Librarian? 
3. What is the role of the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society? College of Nurses? 
Canadian Association of University Librarians? 
4. How does the profession regard the different areas of specialty 
(law/nursing/library) practice? 
5. How has the profession changed since you were admitted to the 
Bar/certified/registerd? 
6. How has your practice changed? 
7. How has the perception of the practice of criminal law changed post Marshall 
inquiry? Post Kaufman reports? 
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Appendix C Nova Scotia Barristers' Society Legal Ethics Handbook Chapter 17 
The Lawyer as Prosecutor (2007) 
Rule 
When acting as a prosecutor, the lawyer has a duty to 
(a) act, in the exercise of any prosecutorial function including the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, fairly and dispassionately;1 
(b) act in the spirit of the decision of Mr. Justice Rand in Boucher v. R., which is to say 
to seek justice, not merely to strive to obtain a conviction and to present to the court in a firm and 
fair manner evidence that the lawyer considers to be credible and relevant;-
(c) not prevent or impede one charged with an offence or in peril of such a charge from 
being represented by counsel or from communicating at reasonable times with counsel; and 
(d) disclose to defence counsel or to the party charged, if unrepresented, in a full, fair 
and timely fashion, before, during and after a trial, as circumstances may dictate, all such matters 
as are required to be disclosed in accordance with the policies and standards of Crown disclosure 
determined, from time to time, by law or by directive of the Attorney General, whether such 
disclosures may tend to show guilt or innocence or would affect punishment.-
Guiding Principles 
1. For the purposes of this Chapter, "prosecutorial discretion" includes the power to conduct a 
prosecution, the power to proceed with multiple offences, the power to make submissions with respect to 
detention in custody, the power to negotiate a plea, the power to prefer an indictment, the power to proceed 
summarily or by indictment, the power to appeal and the power to withdraw charges.-
2. Lawyers acting as prosecutors customarily possess and exercise discretionary powers quite 
unlike other lawyers. Crown Attorneys draw their powers from the Attorney General for whom they act as 
agent and to whom they are accountable. They are accountable for their professional conduct also to the 
Society which is the institution in Nova Scotia charged with the responsibility for the formulation, 
promulgation and enforcement of standards of conduct for its members. The Society, however, when 
considering the conduct of its member lawyers who act as prosecutors, must at all times be mindful of the 
public policy, legal and constitutional considerations that gravitate in favour of permitting prosecutors to 
function independently.- The Society is to understand the difference between taking to task professional 
misconduct or conduct unbecoming lawyers who practise as Crown Attorneys on the one hand and 
interference with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to the detriment of the administration of justice on 
the other and to operate only within the realm of the former.-
In relation to the Crown Attorneys, Society disciplinary investigation or review is to be restricted 
to those complaints showing conduct amounting to a manifestly deliberate and improper use of the office of 
the Crown Attorney. 
Commentary 
Duty not to make unilateral representations 
17.1 Except as required or permitted by law, the court or accepted practice, the prosecutor has a duty not to 
initiate or indulge in unilateral communications with the court concerning the matter currently before the 
court without the consent of all other counsel involved or the accused, if unrepresented. Delivery of pre-
trial memoranda or other material to the court without contemporaneously making reasonable efforts to 
forward it to other counsel or the accused, if unrepresented, is a violation of this duty. 
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Plea bargaining 
17.2 A prosecutor has a duty not to negotiate and recommend a plea agreement if the defence, by such 
agreement, is obliged to plead guilty to an offence or charge not reasonably supported by the facts. 
Applicability of other Rules in the Handbook 
17.3 The other Rules and provisions in the Handbook apply, mutatis mutandis, to lawyers acting as 
prosecutors. 
Applicability of duties to prosecutors other than Crown Attorneys 
17.4 The duties in this Chapter and in the Handbook generally apply, mutatis mutandis, to lawyers acting as 
prosecutors who are not full-time or part-time Crown Attorneys. This will include a lawyer who has 
conduct of proceedings in the name of and on behalf of any complainant in any proceeding against an 
accused who may be convicted of any offence or charge and as a result face fine, punishment or any other 
penalty including reprimand or suspension or dismissal from any employment, activity or organization. 
Notes 
1. The Report of the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution, Volume I, page 
238 states, on this subject, as follows: 
25.12 Prosecutorial discretion in the conduct of trials 
Once the Crown has determined that a prosecution will proceed, the adversarial aspects of the 
criminal justice system are evident. The accused is normally represented by defence counsel, the Crown's 
case is presented by the prosecutor and the trial is conducted before an independent judge with or without a 
jury. 
While the courtroom setting is adversarial, the Crown prosecutor must make sure the criminal 
justice system itself functions in a manner that is scrupulously fair. The phrase 'criminal convictions 
system' is not a mistake of history - we do not have a 'criminal convictions system'. Justice is an ideal that 
requires strict adherence to the principles of fairness and impartiality. The Crown prosecutor as the 
representative of the State is responsible for seeing that the State's system of law enforcement works fairly. 
See also R. v. R.(AJ.) (1994), 20 O.R. (3d) 405 (C.A.) [Duty not to act belligerently towards 
people such as other counsel, parties, and witnesses]. 
2. "It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a 
conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is 
alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is presented: it 
should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength, but it must also be done fairly. The role of 
prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in 
civil life there can be none charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed 
with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings." Boucher v. 
R., [1955] S.C.R. 16 at 23, 20 C.R. 1 at 8, 110 C.C.C. 263 at 270, per Rand J. 
See also K. Bresler," 'I Never Lost a Trial': When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal 
Convictions" (1995-96), 9 Georgetown J. Legal Ethics 537. 
3. See, for example, R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 re: the duty of prosecutors to disclose 
all evidence that might affect the accused (in terms of guilt, innocence, punishment). 
However, see G. MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1993), at 2-6: "...Canadian rules of professional conduct are silent on the subject of a 
lawyer's duty to disclose relevant documents in civil litigation, and discipline proceedings are rarely 
initiated as a result of lawyers' failure to disclose." 
4. See Nelles v. Ontario (1989), 98 N.R. 321, per Lamer J. (S.C.C.), particularly the paragraphs 
under the entitlement "The Role of the Attorney General and Crown Attorney." 
5. For a discussion of public policy considerations of Crown Attorneys in the context of immunity 
from and exposure to the tort of malicious prosecution, see the paragraphs of Mr. Justice Lamer's decision 
in Nelles, supra, note 3, under the entitlement "Policy Considerations." 
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6. For a case in which a law society was found to have overreached itself and exceeded reasonable 
limits in its instigation of disciplinary proceedings against a Crown Attorney in the course of such 
prosecutor's exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see Hoem v. Law Society of British Columbia (1985), 63 
B.C.L.R. 36, 20 D.L.R. (4th) 433, [1985] 5 W.W.R. 1, 20 C.C.C. (3d) 239, (B.C.C.A.). See also, however, 
Cunliffe v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1984] 4 W.W.R. 451; 40 C.R. (3d) 61 (B.C.C.A.), in which 
the court upheld the citing by the Law Society of British Columbia of a Crown Attorney (Bledsoe) for 
conduct unbecoming a barrister and professional misconduct for not informing the defence of particulars of 
witnesses whose evidence was crucial to the accused's defence. 
353 
Appendix D Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service Crown Attorney Manual 
Table of contents16 
Crown Attorney Manual: 
Prosecution and Administrative Policies for the PPS 
The policy documents in this Manual are intended to assist prosecutors in Nova 
Scotia in the exercise of their discretion. They do not create any rights and they do not 
have the force of law. The policy documents are reproduced here so that the public will 
be more fully aware of the principles which underlie the many decisions made by 
prosecutors in dealing with criminal matters. 
Cover 
Prosecution Policies: 
Note: Certain words and phrases in these policies have the meanings established in the 
"WORDS & PHRASES" section of this part of the Manual. These policies are to be read 
in the context provided by the PREFACE to this part of the Manual. 
• Preface 
• Words & Phrases 
• Core Policies: 
o Introduction to Core Policies 
o The Decision to Prosecute 
o Resolution Discussions and Agreements 
o Staying Proceedings and Recommencing Proceedings 
o Disclosure 
• Particular Prosecution Policies: 
o Alternative Measures - Adult Diversion 
o Appeals to the Court of Appeal 
o Assault Prosecutions 
o Cases involving the death of a child less than five years old 
o Conditional Sentences 
o Consent by the Prosecutor to Re-Electing Mode of Trial 
o DNA Identification Act Sampling Authorizations Firearms Registration 
Offences 
o Home Invasions 
o In-custody Informers 
Retreived November 5 l , 2010 from http://www.gov.ns.ca/pps/ca_manual.htm 
o Interviewing Witnesses (Other than Experts or the Police) - Practice 
Note 
o Impaired Driving-Resolution of Charges 
o Impaired Driving - Section 258(1) 
o Impaired Driving - Sentencing Repeat Offenders o J u r o r s -
Background Checks 
o National Flagging System for High Risk, Violent Offenders 
o Nudity - public [Section 174 of the Criminal Code] 
o Police Misconduct - Disclosure (R. v. McNeil) 
o Private Prosecutions - Intervention by the Attorney General 
o Remands to Federal Institutions 
o Restorative Justice Program - Referrals at Crown Entry Point 
o Revocation of Driver's License 
o Risk Assessments in Spousal-Partner Violence Cases ODARA 
o Sexual Offences - Practice Note 
o Sexual Offender Treatment Program (ECFPH) 
o SOIRA Policy 
o Special Communications Needs - Investigation and Prosecution of 
Persons with Special Communication Needs 
o Probation Orders 
o Spousal / Partner Violence 
o Transfer ("Pick-up") Orders - Practice Note 
o Victims of Crime / Witnesses - Publicity (Practice Note) 
o Violent Crimes 
o YCJA 'Bail' Hearings 
o YCJA Extrajudicial Sanctions 
o YCJA Guilty Pleas-Practice note 
o YCJA Prosecutions-Nunn Recommendations 
Administrative Policies: 
Aboriginal Cases 
"Bail Reviews" - Protocol re Section 525 of the Criminal Code 
Case Bulletins 
Complaints - Bar Society 
Complaints - Public 
Conflicts of Interest 
Environmental Prosecutions - Disclosure to Crown 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy (FOIPOP) Act 
Applications for Records 
French Language Communications Policy 
Investigation - Additional Investigation and Reinvestigation 
Major Case Contingency Protocol 
Media Inquiries and Public Statements 
Occupational Health and Safety Act - Disclosure to the Crown 
Parental Support - Young Victims / Witnesses 
Pre-charge Advice re Investigation / Prosecution of Police 
Provincial Forensic Psychiatric Service Sexual Assault Program -
Information 
Records - Routine Access (without FOIPOP Application) 
Review Board Hearings 
- Procedure re 
Provision of 
Sentencing - Supreme Court 
Sign Language Interpreter Services 
Special Prosecutions Section - Referrals 
Vacancy Publicity - Chief Crown Attorney Positions 
Vacancy Publicity - Crown Attorney Positions 
Witness Fees 
Forms: 
Application for Transfer of Charges (Outside Nova Scotia) 
Application for Transfer of Charges (Within Nova Scotia) 
Crown Inter-office Request to Obtain a Transfer Order 
Recommendation for Appeal 
Request for Referral to Special Prosecutions Section 
SOIRA Form 52 
Spousal/Partner Violence Checklist 
Spousal/Partner Violence Notice of Discontinuance 
Undertaking re Videotaped Statements 
Witness Fee Claim Form - W l 
Witness Fee Reimbursement - W1A 
Witness Fee - Special Reimbursement - W2 
Witness - Air Transportation Approval Form - W3 
Case Bulletin Form 
Appendix: 
PPS Organizational Chart 
Public Prosecutions Act 
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Years of experience as a lawyer based on call to the Bar: 
Called before 1980 
Between 1981 and 1990 
Between 1991 and 2000 
Between 2001 and 2010 





Only ever employed in prosecution 
Experience with Legal Aid 
Experience in private practice before prosecutions: 
Civil 
Criminal 
Worked in public sector first 
Left prosecution for a period of time (study or work) 
Serves or served on the Bench 
Changed jurisdiction of practice (to new province or to/from 
Federal) 
Held elected role in collective bargaining association 
Has management experience 
Family status: 
Single 
Married without children 
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